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






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Of all the Mournfull sights w<sup>ch</sup> I  
And Dolefull Places where my <sup>See</sup>



# NOTES ON THE

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*The Cause of God and Truth :* ✓

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BEING A  
**C O N F U T A T I O N**

OF THE  
**ARGUMENTS** from **REASON**,  
used by the *Arminians*;

AND PARTICULARLY

By *Dr. Whitby*, in his Discourse on the Five Points,  
against the Doctrines of Eternal Election, Particular  
Redemption, the Efficacy of God's Grace,  
and the Impotence of Man's Will in Conversion,  
and the Final Perseverance of the Saints.

Wherein is consider'd,

Whether these Doctrines bear any likeness to the  
Sentiments of *Mr. Hobbs*, and the *Swick* Phi-  
losophers, concerning Liberty, Necessity, and  
Fate.

W I T H

A VINDICATION of such Arguments as proceed upon  
rational Accounts in favour of the above Doctrines.

To which is added,

A DEFENCE of the Objections to the UNIVERSAL  
SCHEME, taken from the Prescience and Providence  
of God, and the Case of the *Heathens*.

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P A R T III. ✓

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
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
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THE  
CAUSE  
OF  
GOD and TRUTH.



CHAP. I.  
Of REPROBATION.



HE Decree of Reprobation is said<sup>a</sup> to be contrary both to the nature and will of God, to his perfections, attributes and glory. It must be allow'd, that the nature and will of God, and not the nature and fitness of things, as some say, are the rule and mea-

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 27. *Remonstr. Act. Synod. Circ. Art. i.*  
p. 241, &c. *Curcellaeus*, p. 366. *Limborch*, p. 334.

## 2 The Cause of God and Truth.

sure of the divine conduct. God cannot do any thing contrary to his nature and the perfections of it : as for instance ; he cannot do any thing contrary to his justice and holiness, for he is *without iniquity* ; nor to his truth and faithfulness, for he *cannot lye* ; nor, indeed, to any other perfection of his nature, for he *cannot deny himself*. If therefore the decree of Reprobation is contrary to the nature and perfections of God, it ought to be rejected as against the will of God ; for the nature and will of God never contradict each other ; and yet it is certain, that reprobation is according to the will of God ; *Whom he WILL be hard-neth<sup>b</sup>*. And, *what if God WILLING to shew his wrath, and make his power known, &c.* Besides, his *making or appointing the wicked for the day of evil<sup>c</sup>*, is *for himself*, for his own glory, as well as his making or appointing all other things : so that Reprobation, or appointing the wicked to destruction, as it is not contrary to the will of God, so neither to the perfections of his nature, and the glory of them. But let us attend to what is offered in proof of this assertion, that the decree of Reprobation is plainly contrary to the nature and will of God. And,

<sup>b</sup> Rom. ix. 18, 22.

<sup>c</sup> Prov. xvi. 4.

I. It is observed <sup>d</sup>, that “ God doth immutably and unchangeably, and from the necessary perfection of his own nature, require that we should love, fear and obey him.— That he cannot but be desirous that all men should imitate his moral and imitable perfections of holiness, justice, truth, goodness and mercy, all which is agreeable to the light of nature and revelation ; and therefore he cannot have decreed, that the greatest part of men should be for ever left under an incapacity of loving, and fearing and obeying him ; and seeing he must earnestly desire that all men should be holy, righteous, kind and merciful, he cannot have ordained they should be otherwise, for want of any thing on his part, requisite to make them so ; much less can he command them, under the penalty of his severe displeasure, so to be, and yet leave them under an incapacity of being so.” To which I reply ;

1. It will be granted, that God requires all men, and it is their indispensable duty, to love him with all their heart, soul and strength, to fear him always, and keep his commandments ; and that he desires that all men should imitate him in his moral perfections ; all which the *Heathen Sages*

<sup>d</sup> *Whitby*, p. 27, 28.

#### 4 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

were, in some measure, acquainted with by the light of nature, and which God has more clearly discover'd as his will to his people, under the various revelations he has made : but then none of these things contradict the decree of Reprobation ; for they only express God's will of command, and shew what is man's duty to do, and which, if done, would be grateful and well-pleasing to God, and approved of by him, but not his will, determining what shall be done. Now could it be proved, that God has willed, that is, determined that all men should love, fear and obey him, all men would do so ; for, *Who hath resisted his will ?* This, indeed, would contradict a decree of Reprobation ; then a decree to reject or punish any part of mankind could never be supposed. But for God to require all men to love, fear and obey him, and to signify that these things are approved of by him, are no contradictions to any decree of his, to leave some men to themselves, to the freedom of their own wills, or to any determination of his, to punish them who do not love, fear and obey him.

2. It is certain, that all men in a state of nature, are in an incapacity to love, fear and obey God ; *the carnal mind* is so far from loving, that it is *enmity against God* ; there's neither any *fear of God* in the heart,

or

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 5

or *before the eyes* of an unregenerate man ; nor is he *subject to the law of God*, or obedient to it ; *neither, indeed, can he be* without the grace of God \*. Now this incapacity arises from sin, and the corruption of nature ; and therefore, as it no ways lessens mens obligations to love, fear and obey God, nor weakens his authority to require these things, so it is not to be ascribed to the decree of Reprobation. Could it be thought that such a decree puts men into an incapacity to love, fear and obey God ; it would be apparently contrary to his moral perfections, and unworthy of him. But Reprobation does not, in any view of it, render men incapable of these things ; for, consider the objects of preterition either as fallen or unfallen creatures ; if as unfallen, it finds and leaves them so, without putting them in an incapacity, or supposing them in an incapacity to love, fear and obey God, and therefore neither finds nor leaves them in such an incapacity ; if as fallen creatures, it finds them in this incapacity ; and seeing this is owing to themselves, it cannot be contrary to his moral perfections to leave them in it, or to determine to leave them in it.

3. Let it be observ'd, that it is the grace of God only that can remove this incapa-

\* Rom. viii. 7. and iii. 17.



## 6 The Cause of God and Truth.

city, or make men capable of loving, fearing and obeying him. *We love God, because he first loved us*; love is a *fruit* of the Spirit, and the produce of his grace. An *heart to fear* the Lord, is a part of the new covenant; in which covenant God has also promised to *put his Spirit within* his people, to *cause them to walk in his statutes*, and *keep his judgments and do them*<sup>f</sup>. Now the grace of God is his own, and he may do what he will with it, bestow it on whom he pleases, and withhold it from whom he thinks fit, without any impeachment of his moral perfections; wherefore to leave men without his grace, and in an incapacity of loving, fearing and obeying him, and to determine to do so, even tho' he requires and approves of these things, cannot be contrary to the perfections of his nature. For,

4. It is not to be doubted of, that God requires the very Devils to love, fear and obey him; they are under obligation to these things, and it is their sin that they do not do them, and should they be done by them, would be approved of by God; and yet they are not only in an incapacity to do them, but are *all* of them, and that *for ever*, left in this incapacity. Now if it will comport with the moral perfections of

<sup>f</sup> 1 John iv. 19. Gal. v. 22. Jer. xxxii. 39, 40. Ezek. xxxvi. 27.

God,

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 7

God, to leave the whole body of apostate angels, for ever; in an incapacity of loving, fearing and obeying him; though he requires these things of them, and they would be grateful to him if done, it cannot be contrary to the perfections of his nature, to leave, and to determine to leave, even *the greatest part of mankind*, and that *for ever*, in such an incapacity.

5. 'Tis a misrepresentation of the decree of Reprobation, that God has ordained that men should not be holy, righteous, kind and merciful, for want of any thing on his part requisite to make them so. Since, though by this decree God has determined to deny them his grace to make them so, yet he has not by it ordain'd that they should be unholy, unrighteous, unkind and unmerciful; only has determined to leave them to themselves, and the freedom of their own wills, which issues in their being so; wherefore their being so, is not to be ascribed to the denial of his grace, much less to his decree to deny it, but to their own wickedness: nor is his command, even under the penalty of his severe displeasure, that they be holy, righteous, kind and merciful, inconsistent with his leaving them, or his determining to leave them in an incapacity of being so; since, as has been shewn, that incapacity is from themselves.

## 8 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

II. The decree of Reprobation is represented<sup>a</sup> as contrary to the mercy of God, and as charging him with cruelty and want of compassion to the greatest part of mankind. The mercy of God is either general or special. The general mercy of God reaches to all his creatures; *his tender mercies are over all his works*<sup>b</sup>. From a share in this, the decree of Reprobation does not exclude any man; reprobates may have a larger share of providential mercies and goodness than others: wherefore the decree of Reprobation is not contrary to the mercy of God in general. The special mercy of God, as it is guided by the sovereign will of God; *for he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth*<sup>c</sup>; so it is, indeed, limited to the elect, who are stiled *vessels of mercy*, in distinction from the non-elect, who are called *vessels of wrath*. This mercy, which lies in pardoning sin, in regenerating mens hearts, in their final perseverance and compleat salvation, the decree of Reprobation denies to the objects of it; with such a mercy, dispensing these blessings of grace to all men, the decree of Reprobation cannot stand, we freely own; but then it does not appear

<sup>a</sup> Remonstr. Aët. Synod. Circ. Art. i. p. 242. Curcellæus, p. 370. Limborch, p. 339.

<sup>b</sup> Psal. cxlv. 9.

<sup>c</sup> Rom. ix. 18.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 9

to us, that there is any such mercy in God, dispensing pardoning, regenerating and persevering grace to all men ; for there are some, that *be that made them will not have mercy on them, and be that formed them will shew them no favour* <sup>k</sup>. Could it be proved that there is such a mercy in God, preparing for, and giving the special blessings of grace to, all men, the decree of Reprobation must at once be exploded. But though this decree is opposite to any such mercy in God towards those who are included in it ; yet it is no ways contrary to the mercy of God shewn to the elect : wherefore we cannot but conclude, that our doctrine represents God as merciful, yea, more merciful than that which is opposite to it ; since, according to our doctrine, God, of his abundant grace, and mercy, has determined to give pardoning, regenerating and persevering grace to a certain number of men, whereby they shall be infallibly saved, when he denies it to others : whereas, according to the contrary scheme, God has not absolutely chosen one single person to salvation ; but his choice proceeds upon their faith, repentance and perseverance ; which also are left to the power and will of man : so that, at most, the salvation of every man is precarious and

<sup>k</sup> Isa. xxvii. 11.

## 10 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

uncertain, nay, I'll venture to say, entirely impossible. I proceed to consider the particular instances of the cruelty and unmercifulness of the decree of Reprobation.

1. The *Supralapsarian* scheme is greatly found fault with; and it is asked<sup>1</sup>, "What can be supposed more cruelly of God, than that he should, of his mere will and pleasure, appoint men, *nondum consideratos ut condendos*, not yet considered as to be created, much less, as sinners, to the everlasting torments of hell." I observe, that this learned writer greatly mistakes the *Supralapsarian* scheme; which considers the objects of Election and Reprobation as men either already created, but not fallen, or to be created, and in the pure mass of creatureship, but not as men not yet consider'd; whether they should be created or no. Besides, he confounds, as these men usually do, the decree of negative with positive Reprobation, or the decree of preterition with that of damnation: whereas the *Supralapsarians*, though they think men were not consider'd as sinners in the act of preterition, or passing by some, when others were chosen; yet they always suppose men to be consider'd as sinners in the decree of damnation; and that God appointed none but sinners, and no man, but for sin, to

<sup>1</sup> Linborch, p. 339.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 11

everlasting torments ; and where's the cruelty of this doctrine ?

2. The *Sublapsarians* are represented<sup>m</sup> as thinking unworthily of God ; “ Who knowing that all the lapsed sons of *Adam* were equally the objects of his pity and compassion, equally capable of his mercy, and equally his offspring, and so no more unworthy of it than the rest, believe that his decrees of governing and disposing of them, are wholly founded on such an absolute will, as no rational or wise man acts by ; so that he determines, of the everlasting fate of the souls he daily doth create, after the fall of *Adam*, without respect to any good or evil done by them, and so without respect to any reason why he puts this difference, or any condition on their parts ; and yet afterwards, in all his revelations, made in order to the regulating of their lives, suspends their everlasting state upon conditions.” I reply ; That all the lapsed sons of *Adam*, are equally the offspring of God, as men, and equally capable of his mercy, as being miserable, and equally unworthy of it, as having sinned against him ; and therefore the reason why he shews mercy to one and not to another, can be no other than his sovereign will and pleasure ; who *hath mercy on whom he will*

<sup>m</sup> *Whitby*, p. 29, 32. Ed. 2. 28, 32.

*have*

## 12 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

*have mercy, and whom he will be hardneth.* But then it is intimated, that this is to “believe, that God’s decrees of governing and disposing of men (by which, I suppose is meant, his decrees of shewing mercy to some, and withholding it from others) are wholly founded on such an absolute will, as no rational or wise man acts by.” But it should be observ’d, that neither the mercy, nor the will of God, are to be compared with the mercy and will of man. The mercy of God is not to be consider’d, *quoad affectum*, as an affection moved by the misery of a creature as it is in man; but *quoad effectum*, as an effect guided by the sovereign will of God, to whatsoever object he thinks fit; nor is the will of God to be judged of by the will of man, since he does *according to his will* in heaven and in earth, and is accountable to none of his creatures; there’s a *620<sup>th</sup>*, a *depth in the riches of his wisdom and knowledge*, that is unfathomable, *his judgments are unsearchable, and his ways past finding out* <sup>a</sup>. Besides, wise and rational men, whose wills are the most absolute, as kings and princes, when their subjects have rebelled against them, and have fallen into their hands, have thought it most adviseable to shew both their clemency and justice, by pardoning some and

<sup>a</sup> Dan. iv. 35. Job xxxiii. 13. Rom. xi. 33.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 13

not others, who were equally their subjects, equally objects of their pity and compassion, equally capable of mercy, and no more unworthy of it than the rest; so that such a method is justified by the conduct of the wisest and most rational men. But the most cruel part seems to be thought to lie in "determining the everlasting fate of the souls he daily doth create after the fall of *Adam*, without respect to any good or evil done by them." By *determining the everlasting fate of souls*, I apprehend, is meant, God's appointing them either to salvation or damnation. Now God's appointment of men to salvation, that is, to eternal glory, is not without respect to any good thing done by them, but with respect to their faith, repentance and perseverance; for God chooses *to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth*; though not with respect to these, as causes of his decree, but as means unto the end, or as graces which he prepares, determines to bestow, and does bestow upon them, in order to bring them to glory: so that their everlasting fate is not determined without respect to any good done by them, nor without any reason on the part of God, though without conditions on their parts. So the determining the everlasting fate of souls, or the appointing of them to damnation, is not without respect to evil done  
by



#### 14 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

by them ; though this is to be consider'd not as the cause of God's decree, which is his own sovereign pleasure, but as the cause or reason of the thing decreed : so that this is not without reason on the part of God, nor without cause on their parts. And hence the entrance of each of these persons upon their everlasting state, so determined, tho' not the determination of it, is suspended until these several things take place. And where's the injustice or unmercifulness of such a procedure ? But, perhaps, the cruelty lies here, that God determines of the everlasting fate of *the souls he daily doth create after the fall of Adam* ; the meaning of which is, either that God has determined the everlasting fate of souls, and appointed them to damnation after the fall of *Adam*, which is what we deny ; since no decree or determination of God is temporal, but eternal ; or that God has appointed men to damnation for the sin of *Adam*, in consideration of his fall, and their concern in it, a doctrine by no means to be rejected ; since *death hath passed upon all men ; for that, or in him, i. e. Adam, all have sinned* ° ; and, *by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation* : it can never be unworthy of God, or contrary either to his justice or mercy, to determine the everlast-

° Rom. v. 12, 18.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 15

ing fate of men, consider'd as fallen in *Adam*, by resolving to punish some and spare others. Though none, as I know of, affirm, that God has appointed such who live to riper years, to damnation purely for the sin of *Adam*, but for their own actual transgressions; and as for such who die in infancy, God's determinations about them are a secret to us; and if they perish, it is for, and in the corruption of nature in which they are born: or the meaning is, that it must be a piece of cruelty in God, daily to create souls, after the fall of *Adam*, whose everlasting fate was before determined, without any respect to good or evil done by them. Now, though God's decree, or determination, concerning the final state of man, was before they had done either good or evil, nor was good or evil the cause of his decree; yet neither salvation, nor damnation, were decreed without respect to good or evil, as has been shewn; and therefore it could not be unworthy of God to bring creatures into being, whose everlasting fate he had before determined, no, not after the fall of *Adam*; since the souls he has since created, and daily does create, are not made sinful by him, nor are they created by him for misery, but for his own glory.

3. This

## 16 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

3. This decree is represented as unworthy of the God of love and mercy <sup>p</sup>, since it “leaves men incapable of salvation; and then God not only bids them *save themselves*, invites, encourages, sends messengers to entreat them to be reconciled, knowing he doth all this in vain, when he does no more; and then eternally torments them for neglecting that salvation; though he knows they never can do otherwise without that grace which he hath absolutely purposed for ever to deny to, or withhold from them.” I answer; Negative reprobation, or the act of preterition, in the *Supralapsarian* way, neither finds nor leaves men incapable of salvation; but ‘as it finds so it leaves them, in the pure, unfallen, and uncorrupted mass. The decree of damnation finds and leaves men sinners; yet not the decree, but final impenitence and infidelity, leave them incapable of salvation; for the gospel declaration is indefinitely made <sup>q</sup>; *Whosoever believeth shall be saved*: but though the gospel is preached or published to all men, yet God nowhere bids all men to *save themselves*; nor does he any where invite, encourage, or, by his messengers, entreat all men to be reconciled to him. *Peter* <sup>r</sup>, indeed, ex-

<sup>p</sup> *Whitby*, p. 29.

<sup>q</sup> *Mark* xvi. 16.

<sup>r</sup> *Acts* ii. 40.

horted

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 17

horted and encouraged the three thousand converts, to *save* themselves from that *un-toward generation*, among whom they lived, by separating from them, and professing the name of Christ ; and the Apostle *Paul* entreated ' the members of the church at *Corinth*, to *be reconciled to God* ; neither of which were ever thought to be placed under any absolute decree of Reprobation. And though no man, without the grace of God, can savingly and cordially embrace the gospel, and that salvation which it publishes, which grace God is not obliged to give, and which he may determine to deny to, and withhold from men, without any impeachment of his perfections ; yet it is not the denial of his grace, nor his purpose to deny and withhold it, that is, the cause of their neglecting and despising the gospel of salvation, but their own iniquity, for which they are justly punished. Besides, though this is an aggravation of *condemnation* ; that the light of the gospel, and the good news of salvation by Christ, are *come into the world*, and *men love the darkness* of sin, error and infidelity, *rather than these* ; yet God does not eternally torment them merely for the contempt of the gospel and their unbelief, but for their many sins and transgressions against his law.

<sup>f</sup> 2 Cor. v. 20.

<sup>t</sup> John iii. 19.

## 18 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

4. 'Tis observ'd, That "surely he thinks more worthily of the God of love and mercy, who looks upon him as an universal lover of the souls of men, who therefore *would have all men to be saved, and gives them all things necessary unto life and godliness*; draws them to him *with the cords of a man, the cords of love*, and by the most alluring promises, and by the strivings of his holy Spirit; swears to them, that *he would not they should perish*; warns them of, and conjures them to avoid the things which tend to their eternal ruin; directs them to the means by which they may certainly escape it; rejoiceth more at the conversion of one sinner, than at the righteousness of ninety nine persons who need no repentance; and when all the methods of his grace are lost upon them, breaks forth into compassionate and melting wishes, that they had *known the things which belong to their eternal peace.*" But it unhappily falls out for this author, that not one part of this pathetic harangue can be applied to all the individuals of mankind, as it should, to prove that the God of mercy and love is an universal lover of the souls of men, respecting their everlasting salvation. It is not the determining will of God, that every individual of human nature should be sa-

## The Cause of God and Truth. 19

ved, for then every one of them would be saved: besides, whom he wills should be saved, he wills that they should *come to the knowledge of the truth* <sup>m</sup>: whereas, to multitudes, he does not so much as afford the means of knowledge. Nor does he give to all men *all things necessary to life and godliness*, only to those whom he *calls to glory and vertue*, to whom are *given exceeding great and precious promises*, and are made *partakers of the divine nature* <sup>n</sup>. Nothing is more untrue, than that God draws all men with *the cords of love*; for as none can come to Christ, and believe in him, but whom the Father draws; so all that he draws in this manner, come to him, and are saved by him: The persons he swears he *would not they should perish*, or die, but live, were not all mankind, but the house of *Israel*; and respects not their eternal, but temporal ruin; as the compassionate, melting wishes of Christ, regard not the eternal, but temporal peace of *Jerusalem*. To conclude, Where's the mercifulness of this universal scheme, and how unworthy is it of the God of love, that after all the kind things spoken of to men, all the methods of his grace should be lost upon them, be it even through their own wickedness; when it lay in the power of his hand, had

<sup>m</sup> 1 Tim. ii. 4.

<sup>n</sup> 2 Pet. i. 3, 4.

## 20 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

it been in his heart, notwithstanding all their wickedness, to have made them effectual?

III. The decree of Reprobation is objected to as irreconcilable with the wisdom of God: this, if it can be fairly made out, must remove any such decree from God; for nothing unbecoming that glorious perfection of Deity, ought to be ascribed to him. Though it should be observ'd, that we finite, short sighted creatures, who are of yesterday, and know nothing, comparatively speaking, are very improper judges of what does or does not become the wisdom of God to do. But,

1. We are desired<sup>1</sup> to "consider, whether he conceives more truly and honourably of God, who thinks he chuses his favourites without reason, and rewards them without any qualifications but those he irresistibly works in them; or he who looks upon him as one who dealeth with all men, not according to his, but their own works, as they are willing and obedient, as they render themselves fit objects of his love, and rewards them as they use duly, or receive his grace in vain, as they improve the talents he has given them, or hide them in a napkin?" Now, not to take any notice

<sup>1</sup> *Whitby*, p. 30, Edit. 2. 22.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 21

of the impertinency of what is submitted to consideration ; the former part of it respecting the decree of Election, and not Reprobation ; and the latter, God's rewarding of men according to their own works. Let it be observ'd, that though God chuses his favourites without respect to any thing in them, or done by them, as the reason of such a choice ; yet not without a reason in himself, which is his own sovereign will and pleasure. And shall we deny that to the King of kings, which is allow'd to every earthly prince, to chuse his own favourites as he pleases ? Should it be said, that no wise prince would chuse and reward men unworthy of his favours, or unqualified for his service. It ought to be considered, that in the case before us, none of all the human race are worthy to be the favourites of God, or qualified for his service ; none of them are willing and obedient, or willing to be obedient, until they are made so, *in the day of the power* of his grace upon them ; none can render themselves fit objects of his love, or duly use and improve even the common gifts and mercies of life, without his grace : since then, if he chuses any of them to be his favourites, and he must give them the necessary qualifications for usefulness, service, and ends of his own glory, his wisdom is most highly display'd in fixing upon



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the most unworthy and unpromising in themselves: in this *the foolishness of God is wiser than men: for ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh; not many mighty, not many noble are called; but God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty; and base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen; yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are, that no flesh should glory in his presence*<sup>a</sup>.

2. It is asked<sup>a</sup>, "Doth it become the wisdom of God to use, or to appoint those means for the effecting what he would have done, which he knows to be no means, because no ways sufficient to produce the assigned end, and to withhold, yea, to decree to withhold that which alone could make them so?" I reply; That what God would have done, that is, whatever is his determining will shall be done, is done, either with or without means; if with means, he not only appoints and uses them, but makes them every way sufficient to produce the designed end; nor does he withhold, nor decree to withhold, that which alone can make them so; should

<sup>a</sup> 1 Cor. i. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29.

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 31.

he,

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 23

he, it would highly reflect on his wisdom indeed. Now, could it be proved, that God, in this sense, would have all men converted, regenerated, be brought to repentance unto life, and everlastingly saved; and that he has appointed, and uses means for the effecting of all this, and yet withholds, and has decreed to withhold that which alone can make these means sufficient; as there would be an apparent contradiction in his will, his purposes and decrees, and even in his actions, so it would be a most gross impeachment of his wisdom. But then we utterly deny that God has willed converting and regenerating grace, evangelical repentance, and everlasting salvation, to every individual of mankind; or that he has appointed, or uses means, for the effecting of these in all men; and therefore, as it is no contradiction to his eternal purposes, nor to his methods of acting in time, to withhold, and to decree to withhold from, or to deny his grace to, some men, so it can be no reflection upon his wisdom to do so. It is true, indeed, it is his will of command, that all men should repent, and turn from the evil of their ways; but this is, more properly, expressive of what is man's duty, than of what is the will of God; or, in other words, this shews what God has made man's duty to do, and not what he himself has willed shall be

## 24 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

done. Now God has appointed means, and he uses them, and makes them sufficient to acquaint men, that he has made such and such things their duty; whereby they are left inexcusable, though he does not give them grace to repent and turn, which he is not obliged to.

3. It is said <sup>b</sup>, That "this decree cannot be reconciled to the divine wisdom; because it introduces God expecting what he never would have done, and which cannot be done, the conversion of the reprobates; and enjoining under a promise of eternal life, what he himself will do, and which, unless he does it, cannot be done, namely, faith and obedience in the elect." 'Tis strange! that the decree of Reprobation should have any thing to do with the elect, or introduce God enjoining them faith and obedience: though for God to enjoin his elect these things, under a promise of eternal life, when they cannot be done without his grace, is no ways alien from his wisdom; since hereby he secures his own authority to command, shews his people their weakness, and magnifies the riches of his grace. But it is stranger still! that the decree of Reprobation should introduce God expecting the conversion of the reprobates, when one part of the decree is to deny them

<sup>b</sup> Limborch, p. 339.

that

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that grace by which their infidelity and impenitence can only be removed, and they be savingly converted. Nor do the scriptures any where represent God looking for, or expecting any such thing in them.

IV. The decree of Reprobation is thought greatly to affect the truth and sincerity of God in his declarations, calls, commiserations, promises and offers of grace to men. And,

1. It is asked ; “ Whether he represents God honourably, who believes that God, by his revealed will, hath declared, *he would have all men to be saved* ; and yet, by an antecedent, secret will, would have the greatest part of them to perish.” I answer ; That we do not believe, nor do the scriptures teach us to believe, that God, by his revealed will, hath declared, That he would have all the individuals of mankind saved ; for then all of them would be saved ; whereas they are not, neither will they be all saved. The scriptures, which are God’s revealed will, declare *Judas to be the son of perdition*, and antichrist, *the man of sin*, goes by the same name, *whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall destroy by the brightness of his coming* ; yea, that there are some that *should believe a lye, that they all might be*

“ *Whisby*, p. 30.

*damned* ;

## 26 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

*damned* ; and, that God is *willing to shew his wrath upon the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction* <sup>d</sup>, Wherefore it is no contradiction to the revealed will of God, and so no ways opposes his truth ; nor is it any dishonourable representation of him, to believe, that by his secret will he has determined that some should perish ; and it should be observed, that we do not believe that God has determined that any one should perish, but for sin ; or that he has secretly willed that any should perish, whether they believe and repent or not : therefore his secret will does not, in the least, contradict his revealed one, that *whosoever believeth shall not perish, but have everlasting life* <sup>e</sup>. I observe, that the emphasis is laid upon *the greatest part* of mankind being willed to perish by the secret will of God : how many, and who they are, God has willed should perish, we know not ; but supposing there was but one man, whom God, by an antecedent, secret will, had determined should perish ; Would not this be thought to be a contradiction to his revealed will, and a dishonourable representation of God ? Could the truth and sincerity of God be supported notwithstanding this instance ? if they could, Why may it not be thought, that he has, by his secret will,

<sup>d</sup> John xvii. 12. 2 Thess. ii. 4, 11, 12. Rom. ix. 22.

<sup>e</sup> John iii. 16.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 27

determined that two, or two hundred, or two thousand, or many millions, yea, even the greatest part of men, should perish in, and for their sins, without any impeachment of his truth and sincerity?

2. It is further asked<sup>f</sup>, “Whether he represents God honourably, who believes that he hath imposed a law on men, which he requires them to obey, on penalty of his eternal displeasure; though he knows they cannot do it without his irresistible grace, and yet is absolutely resolved to withhold this grace from them, and then to punish them eternally for what they could not do without it; and after all enquires, *Why will ye die*, &c. or he that believes it more agreeable to the truth and sincerity of the divine nature, to deal plainly with his creatures, and mean what he says.” I reply; That it can be no dishonourable representation of God, to believe that he has imposed a law upon men, who are his creatures, and over whom he has a sovereign dominion, or that he requires them to obey it on penalty of his eternal displeasure, since it is *holy, just and good*, and every way agreeable to his nature and perfections; and especially when it is consider’d, that when this law was imposed on man, as it was agreeable to his nature, make and con-

<sup>f</sup> *Whitby*, p. 30.

dition,

## 28 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

dition, so he was sufficiently furnished with abilities to obey and keep it ; and though man has, by the fall, lost his power to obey, God has not lost his authority to require obedience, and which he does require ; though he knows, man cannot perform it without grace from him, which he is not obliged to give ; and in all this he deals plainly with his creatures, and means what he says. But, perhaps, the insincerity is thought to lie here ; that after God had absolutely resolv'd to withhold, and had withheld that grace, without which they could not yield obedience to his law, he enquires what was wanting on his part, to enable them to do it. But no such enquiries are made by God ; the passages referred to, regard not the spiritual and eternal state of all mankind, only the civil and political state of the *Jews* ; towards the welfare and prosperity of which civil state nothing had been wanting on the part of God.

3. It is also asked \*, “ Does it become his (God's) sincerity, to seem so earnest in his calls to them (men) to repent, and turn themselves from their transgressions, and live ; when he himself hath passed that act of preterition on them, which renders it impossible for them to repent, or turn from the evil of their ways, and therefore im-

\* *Whitby*, p. 33, 75, 233. *Ed.* 2. 32, 74, 227, 228.

possible

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 29

possible that they should live." I answer ; That whenever God calls men to repent, he not only *seems* to be, but he really is serious, and in good earnest : But then the calls referred to in *Ezekiel* <sup>h</sup>, respect not internal conversion, and evangelical repentance, but a national repentance, and an external reformation of manners, as has been shewn in the *first part* <sup>i</sup> of this performance, of which reprobates are capable, and by which they may be preserved from temporal calamities, as the *Ninevites* were. And it will be difficult to prove, that God any where calls and invites all mankind, and particularly such who are not eventually saved to spiritual and evangelical repentance ; for, whom he thus calls, to them he gives repentance and remission of sin. Besides, it is not the act of preterition, but the corruption of nature, which makes this repentance impossible ; and therefore, supposing the corruption of nature, and no act of preterition and reprobation, repentance and conversion would be impossible without the grace of God : hence the same charge of insincerity, and want of seriousness in the calls of God, to repentance and conversion, would remain, supposing no act of preterition, where the grace of God is not given.

<sup>h</sup> Chap. xviii. 30, 31, 32.

<sup>i</sup> N<sup>o</sup>. xx. p. 113, 114.



## 30 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

4. The decree of Reprobation is thought to be <sup>k</sup> inconsistent with the sincerity of God, in his ardent wishes, vehement desires, and passionate concern for the welfare of men ; such as are expressed in *Deut.* v. 29. and xxxii. 29. *Psal.* lxxxii. 13, 14. *Ezek.* xviii. 30, 31, 32. But, as has been made to appear in another part of this work<sup>l</sup>, these things are only to be ascribed to God, after the manner of men, in a figurative, and improper sense, and, at most, only shew what would be agreeable to him if done, but not what is his determining will should be done. Besides, they relate only to the people of *Israel*, and respect not their spiritual and eternal, but civil and temporal welfare. Whereas, if any thing is done to purpose, on this head, in order to disprove the decree of Reprobation, it ought to be proved, that God has ardently wished for, vehemently desired, and has shewed a passionate concern for the spiritual and eternal welfare of every individual of human nature, even of those who are not eventually saved.

5. It is argued<sup>m</sup>, That “ if God promises pardon and salvation to the non-elect, on a condition which his own act of preter-

<sup>k</sup> See *Whitby*, p. 33, 34, 222, 236. Ed. 2. 32, 33, 217, 230. Curcellacus, p. 370.

<sup>l</sup> N<sup>o</sup>. iii, vi, vii, xxi.

<sup>m</sup> *Whitby*, p. 243. Ed. 2. 237.

## The Cause of God and Truth. 31

ition hath render'd impossible for them to perform, How can a God of truth and sincerity be said to promise seriously, and in good earnest ? " I reply ; That the promise of pardon is not made to any, no, not to the elect, upon a condition to be performed by them ; it is an absolute, unconditional one, and runs thus <sup>a</sup> ; *I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins, and their iniquities will I remember no more* : and though this promise is made to faith, yet not as a condition of it, but as descriptive of the persons who enjoy it, and as the hand by which they receive it. And, it is so far from being made upon a condition to the non-elect, that it is not made to them at all, the promise of pardon being a new covenant one, reaches to no more than to those who are in that covenant, and they are only the elect of God, and much less upon a condition render'd impossible, by the act of preterition ; since not that, but the corruption of nature, renders faith, repentance, conversion, or whatever else, of a spiritual kind, that may be thought to be the condition, impossible, without the powerful grace of God.

6. It is intimated °, That, supposing an absolute decree of Reprobation, the tenders

<sup>a</sup> Heb. viii. 12.

<sup>°</sup> *Whitby*, p. 341, 343. Ed. 2, 332, 334. *Limborch*, p. 337. *Curcellæus*, p. 370.

### 32 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

of the gospel to reprobates, must be false and hypocritical; and the offers of grace are not made in good earnest, and with sincerity. But it should first be proved, that there are any offers of grace at all, made to any, whether elect, or non-elect. The gospel is not tender'd to the elect, but is the power of God unto salvation to them. The grace of God is bestow'd upon them, applied to them, and wrought in them, but not offer'd. And as for the non-elect, grace is neither offer'd to them, nor bestow'd on them; and therefore there can be no falsehood or hypocrisy, dissimulation or guile, nothing ludicrous or delusory in the divine conduct towards them, or any thing which disproves God's act of præterition or reprobation.

V. The decree of Reprobation is thought to be "repugnant to the holiness of God; since it is said,

1. It makes God the author of sin, according to the doctrine both of the *Supralapsarians* and the *Sublapsarians*; seeing the former affirm, that God, before he decreed to make man, decreed his destruction; and that he might justly inflict it, decreed, that man should fall into sin, as a means of bringing the reprobate to ap-

<sup>p</sup> Limborch, p. 334. Curcellæus, p. 366, 367.

• *The Cause of God and Truth.* 33

pointed ruin : and the latter, though they do not assert, that God decreed sin as a means of attaining his own end, yet say that *Adam* fell into sin necessarily, by the decree of God, from whence all after sins, and the corruption of all mankind necessarily follow; and both agree, that God imputes that sin of *Adam's*, to all his posterity, and, from that imputation, follows a necessity of sinning ; and therefore God, by this imputation of his, is the cause of all the sins which follow it." I reply ; This author seems to mistake the doctrine both of the *Supralapsarians* and *Sublapsarians*. The *Supralapsarians* distinguish the decrees of God into the decree of the end, and the decree of the means ; the former respects not man's salvation or damnation, but the glory of God as the end ; the latter, with respect to the elect, includes the decree of creation, the permission of sin, redemption by Christ, the giving of grace, perseverance in it, and eternal salvation, as one compleat mean to bring about the glory of God in a way of mercy temper'd with justice ; with respect to the reprobate, it includes the decree of creation, the permission of sin, dereliction in it, damnation for it, as one entire compleat mean for the bringing about of God's glory in a way of vindictive justice. Now let it be observ'd, That though God decreed man's destruction before his crea-

### 34 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

tion, yet he decreed to damn no man, but for sin : and though he has willed, or decreed, that sin should come to pass, or that man should fall into sin ; yet he wills this not by effecting, but by permitting it ; and therefore is not the author of it. Besides, it is not sin, but the permission of sin, that is the mean, in order to the end ; which end is not man's destruction, but God's glory : the permission of sin is, with other things, the means of God's glory, but not of man's destruction ; for permission of sin stands in the same place in the decree of the means, with respect to the reprobate, as it does in the decree of the means, with respect to the elect. As therefore the permission of sin is not the means of the salvation of the elect, so it is not the means of the damnation of the reprobate ; but, as with respect to the elect, it is, together with their salvation, the means of, and is requisite to, the manifestation of God's glory, in a way of mercy mix'd with justice : so it is, together with the damnation of the reprobates, the means of, and requisite to, the display of his glory, in a way of wrath and justice ; and therefore permission of sin no more supposes, or proves God to be the author of sin in the reprobates than in the elect. And though the *Sublapsarians* hold, that *Adam's* fall was according to the decree of God ; yet they do not say, that *Adam* fell into sin  
*necef-*

God's decree made his fall intallibly necessary, as to the event, yet not by way of efficiency, or by force and compulsion on the will; it put nothing in him, or at all intinged the liberty of his will. And though both *Supra* and *Sublapsarians* agree in saying, and that very rightly, that God imputes the first sin of *Adam* to all his posterity, yet not from that act of imputation, but from the corruption of nature derived from *Adam*, follows the necessity of sinning in his posterity; which necessity of sinning is perfectly agreeable to the natural liberty of the will; wherefore the corrupt heart and will of man, and not God, is the cause of this imputation of his, is the cause of all sins that are committed.

2. It is observ'd, That "no man can think that man hath a true love for holiness, who will do nothing, that is in his power, to make others so, as far as he is able, and it is for him to do it." And it

### 36 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

have passed a decree from all eternity, which renders the want of holiness, in most men, an infrustrable event?" I reply; The holiness of God and man are not to be compared; the love of God to holiness, infinitely transcends the love of the most holy man to it; nor is there any proportion between the power of the one and of the other to make men holy. A sinful creature can neither make himself nor others holy; and could he, God does not lie under the same laws and obligations to act to the uttermost of his power and ability in such things as man does. Certain it is, he could, if he would, make all men perfectly holy, as the angels in heaven, but it is evident he does not; and yet this is no impeachment of his holiness. 'Tis enough that he made man upright and holy, who, by sinning against him, has lost the uprightness and holiness of his nature, which God is not obliged to restore unto him. Now, if it is not contrary to the holiness of God to leave men, as he does many, destitute of holiness, in a want of it, it cannot be contrary to his holiness, to decree to leave them in such a case. Besides, it is not any decree, passed from eternity, that renders the want of holiness an infrustrable event; but the corruption of nature, through sin, has render'd it so, without the grace of God. And, whereas it is suggested, as if there

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 37

there was a contradiction between the decree of Reprobation, which leaves men in a want of holiness, and God's command to men, that they should *be holy as he is holy*. It may be replied, That the words 'referred to, are not a command to all men to be holy, but an exhortation to the *Israel* of God, to such who were called, by the grace of God, to be holy and unblameable, to which they were chosen in Christ, before the foundation of the world; but admitting they are a command to all men to be holy, God's command only expresses what is his will should be man's duty, not what he has determin'd shall be done. It may be every man's duty to be holy, and yet God may resolve not to give his grace to some persons, to make them holy, without which they cannot be so. Hence it follows, that between God's command of holiness to all men, and his decree to leave some in the want of holiness, is no contradiction; nor is such a decree repugnant to the holiness of his nature, nor to his love of it.

VI. The decree of Reprobation is represented 'as incompatible with the justice of God, for these reasons,

<sup>r</sup> 1 Pet. i. 16.

<sup>r</sup> Curcellæus, p. 367. Limborch, p. 334.



## *The Cause of God and Truth.*

Because, by this decree, God reprobates  
n, consider'd as innocent, and appoints  
nocent persons to eternal destruction, ac-  
cording to the *Supralapsarian* scheme, or  
such whom, of his mere will and pleasure,  
he was about to make nocent, having de-  
served no such thing, according to the  
*Sublapsarian* scheme. Another writer \* ob-  
serves, " This obvious exception lies against  
the equity of his proceedings with the sons  
of men ; that most of the sons of *Adam* lie  
under death eternal by his peremptory de-  
cree, for the sin of their forefather, com-  
mitted long before they had a being, and  
so before they were in a capacity of any  
personal offence." I answer ; The *Supra-*  
*lapsarians* distinguish Reprobation into ne-  
gative and positive ; negative Reprobation  
is non-election, or preterition, a passing by  
of some, when others were chosen ; the ob-  
jects of this decree, are men consider'd as  
not yet created, and so neither wicked nor  
righteous. Positive Reprobation is the de-  
cree of damnation, or that which appoints  
men to everlasting ruin, to which it ap-  
points no man but for sin. It is therefore  
a most injurious representation of the *Supra-*  
*lapsarians*, that they assert that God has  
reprobated, that is, appointed innocent  
persons to eternal destruction ; when they,

\* *Whistby*, p. 32.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 39

over and over, say, as may easily be observed in the writings of that famous *Supralapsarian*, Dr. *Twiss*, That God has not decreed to damn any man, but for sin ; and that the decree of Reprobation is in no moment, or reason of nature, before, and without the consideration of sin. Now if it is not incompatible with the justice of God, to damn men for sin, it can be no ways incompatible with his justice, to decree to damn men for sin. The *Sublapsarians* are equally abused, when they are represented as holding, that God reprobates such, whom, of his mere will and pleasure, *redditurus erat nocentes*, he was about to make nocent, having deserved no such thing : whereas they neither say, that God of innocent creatures, makes nocent, or sinful ones, and then reprobates them ; though, with the scriptures, That *God made man upright ; but they have sought out many inventions* ", sinful ones ; whereby they have lost their uprightness and innocence, and so justly deserve the displeasure of God ; nor that the objects of Reprobation are such, who are to be made nocent, or sinful, either through themselves or any others ; when 'tis well known, that these divines always consider the objects of Reprobation as men already created and cor-

" Eccles. vii. 29.

## 40 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

rupted. But let the objects of the decree of Reprobation be consider'd either in the pure, or in the corrupt mass; that decree puts nothing in them, it leaves them as it finds them; and therefore does them no injustice. Nor is it any obvious exception against the equity of God's proceedings with the sons of men, that most of the sons of *Adam* lie, yea, if even all of them had lain under death eternal, by his peremptory decree, for the sin of their forefather; if the wages of sin is death eternal, and all the sons of *Adam* were concerned in that sin, as the scriptures declare; for *in him all have sinned*; and by his *offence judgment came upon all men to condemnation*<sup>\*</sup>. Though none, as I know of, say, that any of the sons of *Adam*, who live to riper years, are laid under eternal death only for the sin of *Adam*, but for their numerous, actual sins and transgressions, and for their final impenitence and unbelief. And as for infants dying in infancy, their case is a secret to us; yet inasmuch as they come into the world *children of wrath*, should they go out as such, Is there any unrighteousness in God?

2. This decree is said<sup>†</sup> to be contrary to the justice of God; because by it God is made to require faith and obedience of per-

<sup>\*</sup> Rom. v. 12, 18.

<sup>†</sup> Curcellacus, p. 368. Limborch, p. 336,

*The Cause of God and Truth.* 41

sons from whom he has either taken away strength to perform, or to whom he has absolutely decreed not to give it; which makes it impossible for them to believe and obey; and no man is bound to do that which is impossible. I reply; That the rule, which is so frequent in the mouths and writings of our opponents, *Nemo obligatur ad impossibile*, no man is bound to that which is impossible, in many cases will not hold good; a debtor may be in such a case as that it is impossible to pay his creditor, and yet he is obliged to it. It is impossible for man, in his present sinful state, to keep the whole law of God, and yet he is obliged to it. It will be own'd, by those who are on the other side of the question, That a man, by a long train of sinning, or by a continued course of vicious practices, may be so habituated to sin, as that it is as impossible for him to do good, as it is for the *Ethiopian* to change his skin, or the leopard his spots; yet it will not follow, that he is not obliged any longer to do that which is good. It is man's duty to believe the word of the Lord, and obey his will, though he has not a power, yea, even though God has decreed to withhold that grace, without which he cannot believe and obey. So it was *Pharaoh's* duty to believe and obey the Lord, and let *Israel* go; tho'  
God

## 42 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

God had determin'd to harden his heart, that he should not let them go. However, there are many things which may be believed and done by reprobates, and therefore they may be justly requir'd to believe and obey : 'tis true, they are not able to believe in Christ to the saving of their souls, or to perform spiritual and evangelical obedience ; but then it will be difficult to prove, that God requires these things of them ; and should that appear, yet the impossibility of doing them, arises from the corruption of their hearts, being destitute of the grace of God, and not from the decree of Reprobation, which, though it denies them that grace and strength, without which they cannot believe and obey, in this sense ; yet it takes none from them, and therefore does them no injustice.

From the whole it appears, That the decree of Reprobation is not contrary to the nature and perfections of God, or unworthy of him ; and therefore, since it has the testimony of divine revelation, ought to be believed by us. But we are told <sup>2</sup>, That “ infinite are the demonstrations which might be produced against this tremendous decree, which our author, at present, waves, intending, in the next section,

<sup>2</sup> *Whistby*, p. 35. Ed. 2. 34.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 43

containing arguments against an absolute election, to confute both these decrees together ;” whither I shall next follow him.



### C H A P. II.

#### *Of ELECTION and REPROBATION.*

**D**OCTOR *Whitby*, in the *fourth Chapter* of his *Discourse*, concerning *Election*, proposes arguments against the doctrine of an absolute Election to salvation, and consequently to the means which shall inevitably, and unfrustrably, produce it, and to confute the doctrine of absolute Reprobation ; and are as follow ;

“ *Arg. I.* He <sup>a</sup> who would have all men, to whom the gospel is vouchsafed, sincerely to believe in Christ, to come to repentance, and yield sincere obedience to his will revealed to them ; hath not prepared this saving grace only for some few Christians, leaving the rest under a necessity of perishing for the want of it ; for to all such

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 70. Ed. 2. 69.

persons

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persons he hath promised, That they shall not perish. Now that God seriously wills, that all to whom the gospel is vouchsafed, should repent, believe, and yield sincere obedience to his laws, is evident from the *scriptures*; frequently and expressly declaring the doing of these things to be the doing of the will of God, and the neglecting of them, to be the neglecting and even rejecting the will of God; from God's calling them to faith, repentance, and obedience, from his sending his Apostles and Messengers to invite them to them, and from his compassionate declarations and enquiries concerning them." To which I answer;

1. That this argument, supposing it never so strong in favour of the persons included in it, namely, all to whom the gospel is vouchsafed, is too much limited and restrained, to militate against the doctrines of absolute Election and Reprobation; seeing there have been, and are, multitudes of men and women, to whom the gospel has not been, and is not vouchsafed. God formerly *shewed his word to Jacob, his statutes and his judgments unto Israel; he hath not dealt so with any nation: and as for his judgments, they have not known them*<sup>b</sup>; for many hundreds of years *God suffered all other nations to walk in their own ways*<sup>c</sup>.

<sup>b</sup> Psal. cxlvii. 19, 20.

<sup>c</sup> Acts xiv. 16.

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The gospel has been taken away from the *Jews*, and carried among the *Gentiles*; yet in no age has it been vouchsafed to all nations at once, much less to all the individuals of mankind, in all nations; no, nor to all the individuals in a nation where it has been, or is preach'd; the greatest part have generally been without it. Now admitting that it is the will of God, that all men, to whom the gospel is vouchsafed, should believe, repent and obey; nay, supposing that they should, all of them, actually believe, repent and obey, which is more than is in the argument; this would not be sufficient to set aside the doctrines of absolute Election and Reprobation; since these persons, enjoying the gospel, the means of grace, and obtaining grace it self, should rather appear to be owing to an eternal, secret will and purpose in God, or to an absolute decree of Election, preparing this grace, and providing these means for them, in order to bring them to salvation; whilst others have neither means nor grace, being denied them by an act of Preterition or Reprobation. If any thing is done to purpose, it should be proved, that God has vouchsafed the gospel to all men; that he has given to all men sufficient means of grace, and has put them all into a capacity of obtaining the blessings of grace and glory.

2. This



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2. This argument proceeds upon God's will of command, which does not thwart his will of purpose. These two wills tho' they differ, are not contradictory; the purpose of God is from eternity; his command is in time; the one is within himself, the other put forth from himself; the one is always fulfilled, the other seldom; the one cannot be resisted, the other may; the will of command only signifies, what is the pleasure of God should be the duty of man, or what he *should* do, but not what he *shall* do. Now admitting that it is God's will of command, that not only all to whom the gospel is vouchsafed, but even all mankind, should repent, believe and obey; it does not follow, that it is the determining will of God to give grace to all men, to repent, believe and obey: nor does it contradict such a will in God; determining to give grace to some, to enable them to repent, believe and obey, and to deny it to others: Could it be proved, that either God has willed to give this grace to all men, or that there is no such will in God, to give it to some, and deny it to others, the controversy would be shut up, and we should have no more to say.

3. What is said for the illustration and confirmation of this argument, is founded upon passages of scripture which are not to the purpose; some of them belong only to

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 47

the *Jews*, and not all mankind, nor even to all to whom the gospel is vouchsafed, and are either exhortations to a national repentance, and outward reformation of manners ; as *Ezek.* xviii. 30. *Acts* iii. 19. or are compassionate inquiries, and vehement desires concerning their civil and temporal welfare ; as *Deut.* v. 29. *Psal* lxxxi. 13. *Isa.* v. 4. *Ezek.* xviii. 31. and xxiv. 13. *Luke* xiii. 34. some of them contain exhortations to persons already converted and called by grace ; as *2 Cor.* v. 20. *Phil.* ii. 12. *2 Pet.* i. 10. as has been made evident in the *first* part of this work ; where also the text so much insisted on, *1 Tim.* ii. 4. is proved to intend only some, and not all the individuals of human nature. Others of them are expressions, declarations and invitations of grace, deliver'd out in indefinite terms, for the encouragement and relief of sensible sinners, to believe in Christ for life and salvation ; as *John* iii. 16. *Prov.* ix. 6. *Rev.* xxii. 17. and those which are most for the purpose ; as *1 John* iii. 23. *Acts* xvii. 30. only declare God's will or command, or what he has made man's duty ; but not his intentions, purposes, counsels and decrees, concerning what man shall do, or he will bestow upon him, and so in no wise contradict the doctrines of absolute Election and Reprobation.

“ *Arg.*

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“ *Arg. II.* This<sup>d</sup> decree is absolutely false in the foundation of it, that being laid in the sin of *Adam*, imputed by God’s arbitrary will to his posterity.” To which I reply; not to take notice that this argument has not the form, and scarce the appearance of one; It is not very easy to determine what decree the author means, whether the decree of Election, or of Reprobation. If the decree of Election is intended, the imputation of *Adam*’s sin to his posterity is not the foundation of that, either according to the *Supra* or *Sublapsarian* scheme. The *Sublapsarians*, indeed, suppose the objects of Election to be men consider’d as fallen; but the *Supralapsarians* suppose them consider’d as unfallen, not yet made, in the pure mass of creatureship; yet both, with the scriptures, make the foundation of this decree to be the sovereign will and pleasure of God. If the decree of Reprobation is designed, this, according to the *Sublapsarians*, finds and leaves men sinners, and, as such, appoints them to damnation; and, according to the *Supralapsarians*, it finds and leaves men unfallen, but appoints no man to damnation but for sin; yet both agree, that sin, neither actual or imputed, is the foundation

<sup>d</sup> *Whistby*, p. 77. Ed. 2. 76.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 49

or cause of the decree, which can only be the will of God, but of damnation, the thing decreed. It might, with much more propriety, be said, that the imputation of *Adam's* sin is founded on that decree, than that the decree is founded on that imputation. Hence it follows, that whereas neither the decree of Election, nor the decree of Reprobation, are founded upon the imputation of *Adam's* sin, to his posterity; they neither stand nor fall by it. Moreover, though the sin of *Adam* is imputed to his posterity; yet not merely by the arbitrary will of God. 'Tis true, it is the will of God that it should be imputed to them; but then it is imputed to them, not in a way of mere pleasure, but in a way of justice; for if all sinned in him, it is but just that judgment should come upon all men to condemnation; if it was the sin of our nature, and all human nature was corrupted and defiled with it, it is but a righteous thing that the guilt of it should be charged upon all. The several things which are proposed for the strengthening of this argument, and objected to the doctrine of the imputation of *Adam's* sin to his posterity, have been replied to in the *second part* of this performance, to which I refer the reader.

<sup>c</sup> Page 128, &c.

Part III.

E

“ *Arg.*

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“ *Arg. III.* This <sup>f</sup> decree is false both in the parts and the end of it. The parts of it are these; That God hath, from all eternity, elected a certain number of persons to salvation; and, in order to the accomplishing of it, has decreed to afford them that grace which shall infallibly, and infustrably, bring them to it; and that he hath left the rest under an absolute decree of Reprobation or Preterition, infallibly to fail of eternal life, of which there can be no other cause but God's own free will; for predestination being an immanent act, cannot be dependant on any foreseen acts of man's will. The end is the manifestation of his grace and mercy in the salvation of the one, and of his justice and sovereignty in the damnation of the other. Now,

1. It is said <sup>z</sup>, “ The falshood of these decrees, touching the absolute Election of some persons to salvation, is sufficiently argued in the *fifth discourse*, from God's command to all Christians, to make their calling and election sure, from his exhortations and cautions directed to them, and from the threats denounced against them.” But how these things militate against an absolute Election of some persons to salvation, is not easy to discern; since the com-

<sup>f</sup> *Whitby*, p. 86. Ed. 2. 85;

<sup>z</sup> *Ib.* p. 87. Ed. 2. 86.  
mand,

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mand, as it is called, to make Election sure, supposes an Election of some, or it could not be made sure ; and the making of it sure, respects not the thing it self, but the evidence of it to others, by an agreeable conversation. Besides, it is given not to all men, but to Christians ; and admitting it respects all Christians, for though all that bear that name are not really and truly so ; yet inasmuch as they are, and whilst they are under a profession, in a judgment of charity, they are to be esteemed the elect of God, and may be exhorted in this manner. But then all Christians are not all men, and all men are not Christians, in the largest and most extensive sense ; wherefore this hinders not, but that there may be an absolute Election of some certain persons to eternal salvation. And as for the exhortation to continuance in the faith, cautions about falling away, and threats against such that draw back, unless it can be proved from hence, that any good Christians, who have been really and truly so, any true believers, have totally and finally fallen away, the doctrine of absolute, particular Election cannot be disproved by them. In the first part of this performance, I have given the sense of the passages referred to, answer'd the objections taken from them, and have shewn that they are so far from militating against the saints

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final perseverance, that they are designed, and used by the Spirit of God, as the means of it; and therefore cannot contradict the choice of some persons to eternal life.

2. It is further observ'd<sup>h</sup>, That "as these decrees respect those that are supposed to lie under an absolute decree of Reprobation, the falshood of them hath been fully proved in the *second discourse*; from God's serious and earnest invitations of them to repentance; from his vehement desires of their reformation and obedience; from his declarations, that he had done for them what was sufficient to produce it; from his promises to excite them to it; from his threats to deter them from their evil ways, and from the manifold declarations afforded in scripture, that he doth not look upon wicked men as under an utter disability of being reformed by his judgments or mercies, or of hearkening to his calls and invitations, to return and live." I reply; That these calls, desires, declarations, promises and threats, do not respect all men, only the people of *Israel*, and not their spiritual and eternal, only their civil welfare, as a body politic; and could they be thought to belong to all mankind, even to such who are not eventually saved, it would not disprove the decree of

<sup>h</sup> *Whitby*, p. 88. Ed. 2. 87.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 53

Reprobation ; since they only regard external repentance, outward reformation and obedience, which we readily own, wicked men may be capable of, by the judgments or mercies of God ; and which are not only agreeable to God, but are for their good, even for the good of reprobates, *quo mitius puniantur*, that their punishment may be the milder.

3. It is urged <sup>i</sup>, That “ such a decree as this, being a secret of God’s counsel, no man can know that God has made it, but from the express and clear revelation of the holy scripture ; and so no person can have any reason to assert it on any other account. Now the scripture hath said nothing of the decree of Election, and that it is absolute, and without respect to man’s faith, repentance, or perseverance ; nor has it one syllable to prove, that the object of this Election is a certain number of singular persons, or that God hath absolutely ordained one single person to faith, repentance and perseverance, to the end.” I answer ; That the decree of Election is a secret of God’s counsel, and that no man can know that God has made it, but from the revelation of the holy scripture, and so can have no reason to assert it on any other account, is readily granted ; and we desire to

<sup>i</sup> *Whitby*, p. 88, 89. Ed. 2. 87, 88.



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bring it to no other test or standard, being well assured, that the scripture has said a great deal concerning it; and we are willing that it should be tried by it, whether Election is conditional or absolute, respective or irrespective to man's faith, repentance and perseverance; and whether it has for its object, churches and nations, or a certain number of singular persons. I have shewn, in the *second part* of this work, that the scriptures often speak of this decree, and that as absolute and unconditional: and, as of a certain number of persons, whom the Lord knows to be his, who are the little flock and sheep of Christ, the Father has given to him, not as *Judas* was, to be his Apostle, but to be saved by him, with an everlasting salvation. When we say that this decree is irrespective of faith, or holiness, or perseverance in grace, we do not mean that God, in this decree, had no respect to these things; for we know, that whom he hath chosen, they are chosen by him *through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth*<sup>k</sup>; and that God saves none, and has determined to save none of riper years, but such who believe and persevere to the end: so that this decree perfectly agrees with the express declarations of the scripture, in *Mark* xvi. 16.

<sup>k</sup> 2 *Thess.* ii. 13.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 55.

*Matt. xxiv. 13. and others of the like kind.* But we say, and mean, that God, in this decree, did not consider these things as to be performed by the will of man, and as motives inducing him to make such a decree, but as what he determined to bestow upon them, as means of salvation. And as for God's ordaining single persons to faith, repentance, and perseverance to the end, we say, with the scriptures, that men are *ordained to eternal life*<sup>1</sup>; which cannot be understood of churches or nations, but of single persons; and that he has determined to give them grace to repent, believe, and persevere to the end, that they may enjoy that eternal life, which he has ordained them to.

4. But 'tis objected<sup>m</sup>, That, "to say that Election, or Predestination, being an immanent, eternal act of God's understanding, or rather of his will, can have no dependance on, or respect to, any act of man's will, by way of motive, or condition, is to say things contrary to scripture, and to common sense: for, did not God decree from all eternity, to pardon the penitent, justify him that believes in Jesus, save the obedient, glorify them that suffer for Christ, judge all men according to their works, offer to man a new covenant of

<sup>1</sup> Acts xiii. 48.

<sup>m</sup> *Whist*, p. 90, 91. *Edix.* 2. 89, 90.

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grace, promising pardon and salvation to him, upon condition of his faith, repentance, and sincere obedience, and that he that believeth in his Son should have everlasting life: and must not these immanent, eternal acts, have respect to the temporal acts of men?" I answer; That since Election, or Predestination, is an immanent act of God, it must be within himself, and therefore, nothing without him can be the cause or condition of it, or motive to it: and seeing it is an eternal one, not any thing done in time, can have any influence upon it; and inasmuch as it is an act of his will, rather than of his understanding, it cannot depend upon, or be moved by any act of man's will, without making the will of God dependant on the will of the creature, and the first mover of it. It is true, indeed; that God did, from all eternity, decree to pardon the penitent, justify the believer, save the obedient, glorify such who suffer for Christ, judge men according to their works, and did, from all eternity, really make a covenant of grace with Christ, on the behalf of the elect; but did not decree to offer to man a new covenant of grace, nor make one promising pardon and salvation to them, upon condition of their faith, repentance, and sincere obedience, but upon condition of the perfect obedience, and sufferings of Christ; and has also declared  
in

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in the gospel, That he that believes in his Son, shall have eternal life: but then, as repentance is not the cause of pardon, nor faith of justification, nor obedience of salvation, nor sufferings for, and with Christ, of glorification; so when God, from all eternity, did decree to pardon, justify, save, and glorify these persons, he had no respect to these things by way of motive or condition: he did not decree to pardon, justify, save, and glorify, upon a foresight of these things, as arising from the will of man; but having resolv'd to pardon, justify, save, and glorify these men, he determines to give them, of his own will and pleasure, the grace by which they should become penitent, believers, obedient and chearful sufferers for, and with Christ. So that faith, repentance, obedience, and the like, cannot be consider'd as conditions of, or motives to the decrees of God; since they spring from the grace which God, in these decrees of his, has determined to bestow upon the persons he bears such a good will unto. If sin, as is suggested, is the inducement to God, from all eternity, to decree to cast *some* men out of his favour, it must have been an inducement to cast *all* men out of his favour, since all have sinned, and are equally unworthy of it; and if those actions, wrought by the assistance of his grace in some, are inducements to him, to decree

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decree to reward them with eternal life, how comes it to pass, that such actions are not wrought, by the assistance of his grace, in all men? It remains, that nothing can be the cause of these immanent and eternal decrees of God, but his own will and pleasure.

5. Whereas we say, That God's ultimate end in these decrees, is his own glory, the manifestation of the glory of his grace and mercy, together with his justice by the one, and the manifestation of the glory of his vindictive wrath and justice by the other, our author " takes some pains to shew, that " the end for which he decrees any thing concerning us, is not, and cannot be any advantage, or good he expects to reap from it, he being, from all eternity past, as compleatly happy as he can be to eternity to come; and therefore, what other end, he asks, can he be supposed to aim at in these things, but our good? " I reply; That it will be freely own'd, that God is compleatly happy, nor can any thing in time, or to eternity, be added to his happiness and glory; yet his great design, in all his ways and works, is the manifestation of his glory to his creatures; *for of him, and through him, and to him, are all things; to whom be glory for ever. Amen* °. Which

\* *Whitby*, p. 92. Ed. 2. 91.

° Rom. xi. 36.

may

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may be concluded, without entertaining such vain imaginations and conceits, as if his view was, to "gain esteem, or a good word, from such vile creatures as we are; or as if he was concerned, whether we approve or disapprove of his proceedings; or as if he can be tickled with applause, and aim at reputation from us in his glorious design." Moreover, though the good of the elect, even their eternal salvation, is a subordinate end in the decree of election; yet what good can be designed for the reprobates in the decree of Reprobation, even according to our author's own scheme of it, is not easy to discern; for he says<sup>p</sup>, "He, *i. e.* God, from his justice, hath decreed, from all eternity, to cast some men out of his favour; the inducement to it is, that sin, which hath render'd them unworthy of it, and render'd it inconsistent with his holiness and justice, to admit them to it." But it is certain from the scriptures, which only can give us an account of these decrees, that God's design in the one, is the declaration of his wrath and justice; and in the other, of his grace and mercy; for not to take notice of *Prov. xvi. 4.* the sense of which passage, and the argument upon it, have been vindicated in the *second part*<sup>q</sup> of this work, *The scripture saith*

<sup>p</sup> *Whitby*, p. 82. Ed. 2. 90.

<sup>q</sup> N<sup>o</sup>. i. p. 6.

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*unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. And a little after ; What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction ; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, afore prepared unto glory<sup>r</sup>. Add to this that well known place<sup>r</sup> of scripture ; Having predestinated us to the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ, to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace. This writer suggests<sup>r</sup>, that if it is for the glory of his grace, to decree to save some, it must be more for the glory of it, to decree to save more ; and, most of all, to decree to save all, and to prepare saving grace for all, and not restrain it to a few. To which I reply ; That had God decreed to save all men, and had prepared saving grace for all men, then all men would be saved ; What should hinder ? But I do not find that the opposite scheme provides for this any more than ours, and therefore no more magnifies the glory of God's grace and mercy than ours does, if so much ; since it provides not for a certain, but an uncertain*

<sup>r</sup> Rom. ix. 17, 22, 23.

<sup>r</sup> Eph. i. 5, 6.

<sup>r</sup> *Whitby*, p. 95. Ed. 2. 94.

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precarious salvation. Besides, if God had decreed to save all men, and had prepared saving grace for all men, here would, indeed, have been a display of the glory of his grace and mercy; but where would have been the declaration of his wrath and justice? Especially, the glory of God's sovereignty more appears by these distinct decrees, than if no such distinction had been made: for hence it is evident, that *he will have mercy on whom he will have mercy; and whom he will he hardeneth*<sup>u</sup>.

6. The other black part of this decree is said \* "to be still more horrible in its immediate consequences; for it makes God to create innumerable souls, after the fall of *Adam*, to be inevitably damned, without the least compassion for them, or will to afford them means sufficient to exempt them from that dreadful doom; and, in prosecution of this end, having created them pure and innocent, it makes him to put them into bodies, that so they may be made or deem'd the offspring of *Adam*, and, by being so, may be made the fit objects of eternal wrath." I answer; That innumerable souls are made since the fall of *Adam*, and are put into, or united to, human bodies, are things generally agreed upon; but how these souls are united to human bo-

<sup>u</sup> Rom. ix. 18.

\* *Whitby*, p. 95. Ed. 2. 94.



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dies, and how they become polluted with sin, and so fit objects of God's wrath, and, indeed, whether they are, by immediate creation, or *ex traduce*, or both, cannot be so easily determined: however, that God created souls to be inevitably damn'd, and put them into bodies, that they might be fit objects of his eternal wrath, are things we abhor and detest, and are no consequences of, nor can they be fairly deduced from the decree of Reprobation; which, whether it considers creatures fallen, or un-fallen, leaves them as it finds them, and puts nothing in them; nor is creation the means of damnation, nor damnation the end of creation: God made no man to damn him; but he made him for himself, for his own glory.

To conclude; This author himself owns a decree of God from all eternity, to cast *some* men out of his favour, induced to it by sin; and another decree, to reward *some* of them with eternal life, or the enjoyment of himself, induced to it by those actions wrought in them by the assistance of his grace; and, according to this scheme, salvation and damnation are as inevitable as they are according to ours; since God's foreknowledge of sin and damnation, of grace and salvation, is as infallible as his decree to damn or save; and the absurdities which are supposed to follow upon our scheme,  
must

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 63

must follow upon this : for God foreknew that these men would sin and continue in it ; whereby he would be induced, nay, on the account of which, he decreed, to cast them out of his favour ; and yet he creates them, permits them to sin, when he could have hinder'd it, and, to many of them, he does not give the outward means of grace, and to none of them the assistance of his grace, by which these actions are performed, which induce him to reward others with eternal life, when it is equally in his power to assist them as others ; and in a word, denies them that grace which would cure them of their impenitence and unbelief, as it does in others to whom it is given ; but suffers them to continue in sin, when he could have restrained them from it, and deliver'd out of it ; the consequence of which is, their everlasting ruin and destruction.



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### C H A P. III.

#### Of R E D E M P T I O N.



Propose, in this Chapter, to consider the arguments from reason, for and against the universality of Christ's redemption; and such as are said <sup>v</sup> plainly to offer themselves to confirm this doctrine, are these:

I. " If God intended not the death of Christ for the saving of any but the elect, then he never intended the salvation of any to whom the gospel is revealed, but the elect; and then he never designed any salvation for the greatest part of men, to whom the gospel was, or is revealed, on any condition whatsoever; for since *there is no other name under heaven given by which we can be saved*, salvation could not be intended for them, on any condition whatsoever, to whom the benefit of Christ's death was not intended." To which I answer; That God never intended the death of Christ for the saving of any but the elect,

<sup>v</sup> *Whitby*, p. 158. Ed. 2. 154.

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 65

is evident from this consideration, That none are saved but the elect; no one will say, that any are saved who are not the elect of God. This author himself will allow, that such who repent and believe, and are persevering Christians, are the elect; and such are all those that are saved. Now if God intended to save any besides the elect, his intentions are frustrated, and he disappointed, things which cannot be said of, and ascribed to the divine Being. Besides, what is God's intending to save any by the death of Christ, but the very act of Election it self? 'tis no other than an appointing to salvation by our Lord Jesus Christ. Wherefore to talk of God's intending the death of Christ for the saving of any, or intending to save any by the death of Christ, besides the elect, is a contradiction in terms. Nor is the gospel revealed internally to any but the elect, even to those *to whom God would make known what is the riches of the glory of this mystery, among the Gentiles; which is Christ in you, the hope of glory. To these only is it given to know the mysteries of the kingdom; to others, they are hid in parables; for, if our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost*<sup>\*</sup>. Hence it follows not, that God never designed any salvation for the greatest part of

<sup>\*</sup> Col. i. 27. Matt. xiii. 11. 2 Cor. iv. 3.

## 66 *The Cause of God and Truth.*

men, to whom the gospel was, or is revealed; since he has designed salvation for all, and every one of those to whom the gospel was, or is thus internally revealed, and they shall all of them enjoy it. 'Tis true, that the gospel is externally revealed, or the outward ministry of it is vouchsafed to more than to the elect; but then the outward ministration of it, in an indefinite manner, is only designed, and blessed for the effectual vocation of the elect: but what means this restraining clause, *to whom the gospel was, or is revealed?* for if God intended the death of Christ for the saving of any besides the elect, he intended it either for the saving of all, and every one besides them, or only for the saving of some: if he intended it for the saving of all besides them, why is not the gospel revealed unto all men? Strange! that God should intend the death of Christ for the saving of all men, and yet not afford the knowledge, no, nor the means of the knowledge of salvation by his death, or of the saving benefits of it to all men! if he intended it only for the saving of some besides the elect, even of those to whom the gospel was, or is revealed, the weakness, and inconclusiveness of this argument, for the universality of Redemption, are easily discerned: who does not see that it must be exceeding weak, to argue from God's  
inten-

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 67

intention to save *some* by the death of Christ, for an *universal* Redemption by it? nothing is more certain than that salvation could not be intended for any, to whom the benefit of Christ's death was not intended; since salvation is the benefit of Christ's death, and which is not intended for any persons conditionally, it being absolutely designed for the elect, absolutely wrought out for them, and absolutely applied unto them: nor is such a special intention of Christ's death, for the saving of the elect only, contrary to the love of God to the world, or to his mercy and goodness to the sons of men; the passages referred to, being either impertinent, or misunderstood and misapplied; as has been shewn in the *first part* of this performance, to which I refer the reader.

II. It is further urged<sup>a</sup>, That, "hence it must follow, that Christ never died with an intention to save them, whom he doth not actually save and deliver from the wrath to come." I answer; 'Tis very true; for if he had died with an intention to save them, whom he doth not actually save, not only his designs must be defeated, and his intentions frustrated, but his death be so far in vain. Moreover, their being

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 161. Ed. 2. 157.

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not actually saved, must arise either from an incapacity in him to save them, and a superior power in other men, or devils, or both, to obstruct his methods and designs; which can never be thought of him, who is *the Almighty*; or from a change of his intentions and purposes; which can by no means agree with him, who is *Jesus, the same to day, yesterday, and for ever*. The passages opposed to this, either regard the elect of God only, whether among *Jews* or *Gentiles*, or else have no concern with Redemption, either general or particular, the thing in controversy between us; as has been made to appear in that part of this work, just now referred to.

III. 'Tis said <sup>b</sup>, "Hence it must follow, That none of those, to whom God never intended salvation by Christ, or who shall not be actually saved by him, are bound to believe in him." I reply; The consequence is very just; none are bound to believe in Christ, but such to whom a revelation of him is made; and according to the revelation, is the faith they are obliged to. Such who have no revelation of him, as the *Heathens*, are not bound to believe in him, in any sense; and, indeed, *How shall they believe in him of whom they have*

<sup>b</sup> *Whitby*, p. 152. Ed. 2. 138. Remonstr. A&C. Synod. Circ. Art. ii. p. 337. *Curcellacus*, p. 360. *Limborch*, p. 322.

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*not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher<sup>c</sup>?* Such who have only an external revelation of him by the ministry of the word, are obliged to believe no more than is included in that revelation, as that Jesus is the Son of God, the Messiah, who died and rose again, and is the Saviour of sinners, &c. but not that he died for them, or that he is their Saviour. 'Tis true, the ministers of the gospel, though they ought not to offer and tender salvation to any, for which they have no commission; yet they may preach the gospel of salvation to all men, and declare, That whosoever believes, shall be saved; for this they are commissioned to do: *Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature; he that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved<sup>d</sup>.* But then this preaching of the gospel to all indefinitely, no ways contradicts the particular Redemption, and special salvation of the elect only; it being designed, and is blessed, for the effectual gathering of them to Christ, and does become *the power of God to their salvation, and to theirs only.*

IV. 'Tis also said<sup>e</sup>, "Hence it clearly follows, That no man can be condemned

<sup>c</sup> Rom. x. 14.

<sup>d</sup> Mark xvi. 15, 16.

<sup>e</sup> *Whisby*, p. 163. Ed. 2. 159. Remonstr. Act. Synod. Circ. Art. ii. p. 369. Curcellæus, p. 361. Limborch, p. 324.



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hereafter for final impenitency and unbelief, seeing he transgresseth no law of God by his unbelief: for, surely God commandeth no man to believe in Christ for salvation, for whom he never intended salvation by Christ; or to repent for salvation, whom he intended not to save by Christ." I answer; Why repentance unto salvation, or final impenitency, should be brought into this argument, I see not; since God might have required repentance of men, and have justly condemned them for final impenitence, supposing Christ had never died at all, or for any at all; and as for final unbelief, none, who have not enjoy'd a revelation of Christ, as the *Pagans*, will be condemn'd for not believing in him, but for their sins against the law and light of nature; and as for such who have enjoy'd the external revelation of the gospel, and yet have remained finally unbelievers, as the *Jews*, and others, they'll be condemned, not for not believing that Christ died for them, or that he was their Saviour; but they'll be condemn'd, and die in their sins, for their not believing that he was God, the Son of God, the Messiah and Saviour of the world, and for the contempt of his gospel, and for their transgressions of the law of God.

V. This

V. This author goes on to observe<sup>f</sup>, That  
“hence it will follow, that neither the  
elect, nor non-elect, can rationally be ex-  
horted to believe; not they who are not  
elect, because Christ died not for them;  
nor the elect, for he that knows himself to  
be one of that number, hath believed and  
repented already; if he do not know this,  
he cannot know that Christ died for him,  
and so he cannot know it is his duty to be-  
lieve in him for salvation.” I reply; That  
ministers, in exhorting men to believe in  
Christ, do not, and cannot consider them  
as elect, or non-elect, but as sinners, stand-  
ing in need of Christ, and salvation by  
him; and that either as sensible, or as in-  
sensible of their state and condition; not as  
insensible of it, for I do not find, that any  
such are exhorted to believe in Christ for  
salvation; but as sensible of it, as the jaylor  
was, who *trembling said, Sirs, What must  
I do to be saved?* when the Apostle ex-  
horted him, saying, *Believe in the Lord Je-  
sus Christ, and thou shalt be saved*<sup>g</sup>. Be-  
sides, such who have believed already, and  
do know that Christ has died for them, and  
that they are of the number of God’s elect,  
may be rationally exhorted to walk on in  
Christ, as they have received him, and to

<sup>f</sup> *Whitby*, p. 164. Ed. 2. 160.

<sup>g</sup> *Acts* xvi. 30, 31.

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go on believing to the saving of their souls.

VI. 'Tis further observ'd <sup>h</sup>, That "hence it must follow, that God hath not vouchsafed sufficient means of salvation to all to whom the gospel is revealed, which is said to be contrary to the whole tenor of the gospel; and 'tis argued, that if men have not sufficient means to be saved by the covenant of grace, then have they only means given them to encrease their condemnation, which is contrary to the mercy of God; and that if all men, under the gospel, have not means sufficient to repent and believe, so as they may be saved, vouchsafed by God, then he must still withhold something from them, without which they cannot repent and believe to salvation; upon which these absurdities will follow, That God condemns them to destruction, for that which is no sin; And then must every impenitent and unbelieving person, have a just excuse, and a sufficient plea, why he should not be punished and condemned for his infidelity and unbelief." To all which I reply; That there is no pardon, justification, peace with God, deliverance from wrath to come, in short, no salvation but by Christ; That no means of salvation are

<sup>h</sup> *Whitby*, p. 164. Ed. 2. 165.

suffici-

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sufficient without the grace of God ; That all men are so far from having an interest in the death of Christ, and salvation by him, that there have been, and are, multitudes that know nothing of either, and are so far from having sufficient means of salvation, that they have none at all ; and could it be allow'd, that sufficient means of salvation are vouchsafed to all to whom the gospel is revealed, who are but a few, comparatively speaking ; this would not prove universal Redemption, or that Christ died for all men ; since, in all ages, God has given his word and ordinances but to a few, and has suffer'd whole nations to walk in their own ways. And, indeed, all to whom the gospel is only externally revealed, have not sufficient means of salvation ; for, besides an interest in Christ and his death, the sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth, or regenerating grace, and faith in Christ, are requisite means of salvation ; which all, who enjoy the outward ministry of the gospel, are not possessed of : nor is this contrary, but perfectly agreeable to the whole tenour of the gospel ; for though *the gospel is the power of God to salvation*<sup>i</sup>, 'tis only to them that believe ; which all men do not, who are under the external ministry of the word. *The word of grace, which is able to*

<sup>i</sup> Rom. i. 16.

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*build us up and give us an inheritance among them that are sanctified*<sup>k</sup>, is not the written, but the essential word, Christ Jesus, who is full of grace and truth. *The grace of God which bringeth salvation*, i. e. the doctrine of the grace of God, the gospel, which brings the good tidings of salvation, hath, indeed, *appeared to all men*<sup>l</sup>; but then it does not *teach* all men to whom it appears, only *us* that believe; *that denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we live soberly, righteously and godly*. The scriptures are also able to *make men wise unto salvation*<sup>m</sup>; but then it is *through faith, which is in Christ Jesus*, and when they are accompanied with the Spirit of God, which first inspired them. Many of the *signs* and *miracles* which Christ did, are *written*<sup>n</sup>, that men might believe that *Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing, they might have life through his name*; but then these signs, when either seen, or heard, or read of, were not, nor are they sufficient to bring persons to believe in him, and so to have life through him, without the powerful grace of God; for *no man can come to Christ, or believe in him, unless the Father draw him*, notwithstanding all his doctrines and miracles. But it is further urged<sup>o</sup>,

<sup>k</sup> Acts xx. 32.

<sup>l</sup> Tit. ii. 11.

<sup>m</sup> 2 Tim. iii. 15.

<sup>n</sup> John xx. 30, 31.

<sup>o</sup> *Whitby*, p. 165. Ed. 2. 161.

That

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That “if men have not sufficient means to be saved by the covenant of grace, then have they only means given them to increase their condemnation.” I reply; That by the covenant of grace, not only provision is made of sufficient means of salvation, but of salvation it self, even of all grace and glory; but then this provision is made only for those who are interested in it, and they are only the elect of God. Though, I suppose, this author, by the covenant of grace, means no other than the gospel, or gospel dispensation. Now this, though it is not a sufficient means of salvation, without the grace of God, and though the rejection and contempt of it is an aggravation of mens condemnation, yet is far from being given on purpose to increase their condemnation; which is wholly owing to their own wickedness; and therefore the giving of it can be no ways contrary to the mercy and goodness of God, or any unnatural action in him. ’Tis added<sup>p</sup>, That “if all men, under the gospel, have not means sufficient to repent and believe, so as they may be saved, vouchsafed by God, then must he withhold something from them, without which they cannot repent and believe, to salvation, *viz.* special grace, an irresistible impulse, a divine energy, or

<sup>p</sup> *Whistly*, p. 166, Ed. 2. 162.

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an almighty power." But what has this kind of reasoning to do with the doctrine of general or particular Redemption, the controversy before us; when it rather belongs to the doctrine of sufficient and efficacious grace? and besides, is wholly confined to persons living under the gospel; whereas it should be proved, That God has vouchsafed to all men, whether under, or not under the gospel, sufficient means to repent and believe, so as they may be saved, to make things comport, in any tolerable manner, with the notion of universal Redemption. And supposing that sufficient means are not given to all men, in either situation, as it is certain they are not given to all men, even under the gospel, What follows upon it? Why, that God withholds from them special grace, an irresistible impulse, and a divine energy. And is he obliged to give special grace to all under the gospel ministry? or throw in an irresistible impulse upon them? or put forth a divine energy, or an almighty power, to enable them to repent and believe? These things depend upon his sovereign will and pleasure. But then we are told<sup>1</sup>, That if the want of all, or any of these things, be the reason why so many, who live under the gospel dispensation, do not believe and re-

<sup>1</sup> *Whitby*, p. 166. Ed. 2. 162.

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pent to salvation, and, upon this account, continue in their impenitence and unbelief, great absurdities will follow." But who says that the want of these things is the reason or cause of men's unbelief and impenitence, and of their continuance in them? The want of special, powerful, and efficacious grace, is no more the cause or reason of mens unbelief and impenitence, and continuance in them, than the sun, and the withdrawing of its light, is the cause and reason of darkness. 'Tis true, that 'tis only the grace of God that can cure men of their impenitence and unbelief; but then it is not the want of it that is the cause or reason of either, but the viciousity and corruption of their hearts; wherefore no great absurdities can follow. But what are these supposed ones? One is, "That God condemns them to destruction for that which is no sin;" as if unbelief and impenitence were not sins, because they can only be cured by the grace of God, without which no man can truly repent and believe; and because God is pleased to withhold this grace from, and not bestow it upon some men, therefore he cannot condemn for these things as sins; whereas, it should be observ'd, That God does not condemn men for the want of that grace which he does not think fit to bestow upon them, without which they cannot repent and believe, so as to be saved;  
but



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but for the impenitence and unbelief he finds in them, and which he is not obliged to cure them of. According to this author's reasoning, because man cannot be subject to the law, without the power and grace of God, it can be no sin in him to remain unsubjected to it; for then it must be the sin of man, not to be God: and if he punish him for not being subject to the law, he must punish him for not being equal in power with God himself. Such reasonings need no confutation, they carry their own in them. The other absurdity is<sup>r</sup>, That "then must every impenitent and unbelieving person, have a just excuse, and a sufficient plea, why he should not be punished, or condemned for his infidelity and unbelief." And such another plea is put into the mouths of these persons as was used by "the officers of the *Jews*, to *Pharaoh*; *There is no straw given to us, and thou sayest to us, make bricks*; no special grace, no divine energy afforded us; and thou sayest to us, do that which can no more be done without it, than men can make bricks without straw; and, *thy servants are beaten, but the fault is in him*, who denies us straw, and yet requires bricks; yea, who requires that faith, and that repentance, which he never would afford us sufficient

<sup>r</sup> *Whitby*, p. 167. Ed. 2. 163.

means

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means to perform." This is a bold charge, an insolent way of treating the Almighty, to compare him with *Pharaoh's* officers, and say the fault is in him, who requires faith and repentance, and affords no special grace, no divine energy to perform. Moreover, the case is not parallel ; the impotence of the *Israelites* to make bricks, arose from straw being denied them, and withheld from them, they formerly had : but the impotence of men to believe and repent, does not arise from special grace, and a divine energy being denied or withheld from them, which they never had ; but from the corruption and viciousity of their nature, their enmity to God, alienation from him, through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness or hardness of their hearts. Besides, God never calls persons to evangelical repentance, or requires them to believe in Christ to the saving of their souls, but he gives them that special grace, and puts forth that divine energy which enables them to believe and repent. God does not require all men to believe in Christ, and where he does, 'tis according to the revelation he makes of him. He does not require the *Heathens*, who are without an external revelation of Christ, to believe in him at all ; and those who only have the outward ministry of the word, unattended with the special illuminations of the Spirit  
of

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of God, are obliged to believe no further than that external revelation they enjoy, reaches; as, that Jesus is the Son of God, the Messiah, &c. not to believe these things is the sin of all that are under the gospel dispensation, as it was of the *Jews*; who, though they saw his miracles, and heard his doctrines, yet, through the corruption and prejudices of their minds, did not believe him to be the Messiah, and therefore died in their sins: nor had they a just excuse, or sufficient plea, why they should not be punished, or condemned, for their infidelity and unbelief, respecting the Messiah, even though they could not come to him, or believe in him, to the saving of their souls, without the special grace of God; they were not condemn'd for the want of that they had not, and which was not bestowed upon them; but for that which was really in them, the sin of unbelief; nor were they, nor are any, condemned for not believing that Christ died for them, but for the transgressions of the law of God, and the disbelief, or contempt of his gospel. And as for those who, besides the external, have also an internal revelation of Christ, as they are called to the exercise of evangelical repentance, and to faith in Christ, as their Saviour and Redeemer, who loved them, and gave himself for them; they have that grace bestow'd upon them, and that power  
put

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put forth in them, which enables them to believe and repent. I make no use of a reply commonly made on our side the question, "That we all had sufficient strength to believe in our first parent *Adam*, which we have lost by our fall in him; and though we have thus lost our power to believe, yet God has not lost his authority to require it, and may deal with us as if we had it still;" since, according to the scheme I proceed upon, that as is the revelation God makes to the sons of men, such is the faith he requires of them, there's no need of it. However, I cannot consider it as such a lamentable, weak pretence, and so sure a sign of a desperate cause, as our author<sup>f</sup>, from Dr. *Claget*, represents it to be; for, that *Adam*, in a state of innocence, had a power of believing in Christ, and did believe in him as the second Person in the Trinity, as the Son of God, cannot well be denied; since, with the other two Persons, he was his Creator and Preserver; the knowledge of which cannot well be thought to be withheld from him. And his not believing in him as the Mediator, Saviour and Redeemer, did not arise from any defect of power in him, but from the state, condition and situation in which he was, and from the nature of the revelation made

<sup>f</sup> *Whistly*, p. 168. Edit. 2. 164.

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unto him ; for, no doubt, *Adam* had a power to believe every word of God, any revelation that was, or might be made unto him. Now all mankind were in him, in such sense, as *Levi* was in the loins of *Abraham*, and paid tithes in him long before he was born ; yea, they were in *Adam* as their federal and representative head, and so had, representatively, the power he had, which, when they *sinned in him*, and fell with him, in his first transgression, they lost : hence followed a depravation of nature, an enmity to God, an opposition to his will, and an impotence to all that is spiritually good, which is the root and source of infidelity ; but tho' men have lost the power of believing, and are shut up in unbelief, God may justly require them to give credit to, and believe, whatever revelation he is pleased to make. As for those texts of scripture<sup>†</sup>, I know of none, that exhort and command all men, all the individuals of human nature, to repent, and believe in Christ for salvation ; they can only, at most, concern such persons who are under the gospel dispensation, and, in general, only regard an external repentance and reformation, and an historical faith in, or assent to, Jesus, as the Messiah. Our blessed Saviour<sup>‡</sup>, marvelling at the unbelief of his

<sup>†</sup> *Whitby*, p. 169. Ed. 2. 165;      <sup>‡</sup> *Ib.* p. 172. Ed. 2. 168.

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countrymen, and at the faith of the Centurion, is to be understood of him as man, and no way contradicts mens disability to believe: he marvelled at the unbelief of his countrymen, that they should be offended at him, and reject him as the Messiah, on the account of the meanness of his parentage and education, when they had such large means, by his ministry and miracles, to convince them that he was the Messiah, whom they might have believed in, and received as such, though they lay under a disability of coming to him, or believing in him to the saving of their souls, without the special grace of God: he marvelled at the faith of the Centurion, that he, who had such small means, and such little knowledge of him, yet should so strongly believe in him; which greatly argued the mighty power of God in him, and is what our Lord designed, those about him should take notice of to the glory of God. The instances \* from scripture of Christ's upbraiding persons for their impenitence and unbelief, respect himself as the Messiah, and not assenting to him as such, and not repenting of their rejection of him, when they had such plain proofs, demonstrations and examples; and are far from disproving man's disability to repent and believe in a

\* *Whitby*, p. 173. Ed. 2. 169.

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spiritual manner. The parables of the marriage supper, and the talents, are foreign to the purpose; the design of the one being to shew that men may be externally called, by the ministry of the word, and not be chosen; and have neither the grace of God, nor the righteousness of Christ; and so will, at the last day, be speechless, and have nothing to say why they should not be condemned for their many actual sins and transgressions, from which, the grace of God, and the righteousness of Christ, could only save them; though they could not obtain, procure, and merit either of these by their own deservings, since, as they were destitute of them, so they were unconcern'd about them, made no application for them, but, perhaps, slighted and contemned them. The design of the other, is to shew the nature and use of external gifts for the ministry, which men may have, and use, and improve, as they ought, and as they have power to do, even though destitute of the grace of God. But these instances, as they do not properly belong to this branch of the argument, so most, if not all of them, have been consider'd in the *first part* of this performance, which the reader may consult.

VII. It is said <sup>v</sup>, That “ that which doth render this doctrine (of particular Redemption) most worthy to be rejected by all who truly love their God and Saviour, is this consideration, that it unworthily reflects upon our good and gracious God, our blessed Lord and merciful High-priest, who is, in scripture, often said, but, by this doctrine, is denied to be *the Saviour of the world*; for it, in effect, declares he who is, in scripture, stiled *Love*, hath, from eternity, hated the greatest portion of mankind; represents him as having no bowels of compassion, no drop of mercy, no inclination to do good to the generality of his most noble creatures, and renders the God of truth and sincerity, full of guile, deceit and insincerity, dissimulation and hypocrisy.” To all which I reply;

I. As to what is said, That “ this doctrine unworthily reflects on our blessed Lord and merciful High-priest, who is, in scripture, often said, but, by this doctrine, is denied to be *the Saviour of the world* ;” I observe, That Christ is not often, only twice, in scripture, said to be *the Saviour of the world*, John iv. 42. 1 John iv. 14. nor is he denied to be so, by the doctrine of particular redemption; though, accord-

<sup>v</sup> *Whitby*, p: 176, 177, 179. Ed. 2. 171, 172, 175.



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ing to that doctrine, this phrase is to be understood in a limited and restrained sense, as it appears, it should be from those scriptures in which he is oftner said to be *our Saviour*, the *Saviour of Israel*, and *the Saviour of the body*, the church. He is, indeed, a *merciful* High-priest ; but it should be observ'd, that he is also a *faithful* one, in *things pertaining to God*, to *make reconciliation for the sins of the people* : but if he has not taken care of *things pertaining to God*, so as to make full atonement for the sins of his people, that justice may have no more to require, and they be entirely free from any further demands of his, and not liable to future punishment ; I cannot see how he can be either a merciful, or a faithful High-priest. And it deserves consideration, whether that doctrine does not most unworthily reflect upon our blessed Lord and merciful High-priest ; which represents him not as procuring by his death, an actual pardon and reconciliation for any, only a conditional one for all ; not as obtaining certain salvation for any of the sons of men, only as putting them into a salvable state, or into a capacity of being pardoned, reconciled, and saved, through conditions of their own performing, and as dying in vain for multitudes, whom he came into the world to save.

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2. As to the love and mercy of God, these are to be consider'd not *quoad affectus*, as affections, or passions, in him; which are to be moved, raised, and influenced, by any thing out of himself, as the misery or goodness of an object: so to think of God, is to conceive most unworthily of him, to take him to be altogether such an one as our selves, and favours rankly of Atheism, and scarcely deserves any other name; but they are to be consider'd *quoad effectus*, as to their effects; which are guided by the sovereign will of God, to whatsoever objects he pleases; for he *will have mercy on whom he will have mercy*. Add to this consideration, That the love, grace and mercy of God, and the glory of them, lie not in the numbers to which they extend, but in the freeness of them, or in the liberal manner in which they are communicated to objects altogether undeserving of them; for that of *Austin* will always hold good, *Gratia non est gratia, nisi omnino gratuita, Grace is not grace, unless it is altogether free*. Besides, if the glory of God's love, grace and mercy, is more advanced by the Redemption of all men, according to this way of reasoning, it would be still more advanced by the salvation of all men; and most of all, by the salvation of all the devils, as well as all men; and therefore, if God does not save all men, and all the devils, when it is

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in his power to do it, it must be a reflection upon his love, grace and mercy, and upon him, as the *Lover of souls*, and *Father of spirits*. And, indeed, what is said by our author<sup>2</sup>, in favour of general, and against particular Redemption, upon this head, may be argued in favour of the Redemption and Salvation of devils, in opposition to a restraint of it to the sons of men; as, *1st.* " That God, by sending his Son to be the Saviour of the world, or in giving him up to the death, had no other primary end, than the glorifying himself in the salvation of men; had he therefore designed his death for the salvation of *all the devils*, upon conditions possible to be performed by them, he must have glorified himself more than by restraining the design of it only to the salvation of *men*. *2dly.* That the death of Christ was a sufficient sacrifice for the sins of *all the devils*, and so might have procured a conditional pardon for *all them*, as well as for *all men*, had God been pleased to give him up to the death for *them* all. *3dly.* That it could be no ways more dishonourable to God, or more inconsistent with his justice, wisdom, hatred of sin, or any other of his attributes, to have designed Christ's death for the salvation of *all the devils*, than to intend it only for the salva-

<sup>2</sup> *Whistly*, p. 177, 178. Ed. 2. 173, 174.

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tion of *men*. 4thly. That the *devils* who are supposed to be excluded from any benefit by Christ's death, were as much the offspring of *the Father of spirits*, and every whit as miserable, and as much wanting an interest in our Lord's salutary passion, as *men*, who are supposed to be the objects of the pardon and salvation, purchased by our Saviour's blood : Can it be then consistent with the grace, goodness and mercy of the divine nature, and of the lover of souls, and the relation which this *Father of spirits* beareth to them, to consign the death of Christ only to *men*, and to suffer a large number of his creatures, which were equally his offspring, and as miserable, and so in the same need of pardon and salvation with *men*, to remain inevitably miserable, only for want of God's designing the same sacrifice for the procuring mercy to them as well as others." If this reasoning is closely attended to, the patrons of universal Redemption, as well as we, must fly to the sovereignty and prerogative of God over his creatures, in shewing and denying mercy to whom he pleases ; which is never to be mentioned and compared with that absolute power, prerogative and sovereignty, exercised by *Grecian* or *Roman* governors, or any other princes over their subjects. But to proceed ; Where's the love, grace, mercy and goodness of God, in sending  
Christ

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Christ to die only to procure the possibility of salvation for all men, and leave it precarious and uncertain, whether any are saved at all? What kind of love and mercy is that which sends Christ to die for men, and then leaves them to deny that Lord who is supposed to have bought them, and to aggravate their guilt by sinning against him? It must have been much better for them if he had never been sent, or had never died for them, or had never bought them. What sort of love is that which gives Christ to die for men, and yet withholds the gospel of salvation from them, and does not send down the Spirit of God into their hearts, to reveal and apply salvation to them, purchased by Christ? How easily might the several things, objected by our author <sup>a</sup>, be retorted upon this scheme, to shew that God, according to it, must hate the greatest portion of his creatures, and have no mercy, bowels of compassion, or any inclination to do good unto the generality of them; might it not be said, with equal force, that "if God himself saith, *Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated*; only because he *laid the mountains and heritage of Esau waste* <sup>b</sup>; is there not greater reason to say, he hated all those souls, whom he has *suffered to walk in their own ways* <sup>c</sup>; whose

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 176, 177. Ed. 2. 172, 173.

<sup>b</sup> Mal. i. 2, 3. <sup>c</sup> Acts xiv. 18. and xvii. 30.

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*times of ignorance he has winked at, or overlooked; and, notwithstanding all his seeming love, in sending Christ to die for them, he does not so much as give them an external revelation of him, the outward means of grace, the ministry of the word? If he is said<sup>a</sup> to hate his brother in his heart, who suffers him to go on in his sin without reproof; Must not he hate those souls much more, who, though he has given his Son for them, does not so much as send his Spirit to them to reprove them of sin, of righteousness and of judgment? Our Lord makes it the particular case of Judas<sup>f</sup>, that it had been better for him he had not been born; whereas this doctrine makes it the case, even of multitudes redeemed by Christ, who notwithstanding their redemption by Christ, are left to perish in the horrible pit, in the mire and clay of an unregenerate state. Now can we imagine, that that God, who will require the blood of souls, from every watchman, who doth not warn the sinner to turn from his iniquities, that he die not, should himself leave them to perish in it, and not warn, even multitudes of his redeemed ones, of their sin and danger? So that what he doth threaten to him only<sup>g</sup>, who being often reprov'd, hardneth his heart, should be the state and case of many for whom Christ has*

<sup>a</sup> Lev. xix. 17.

<sup>c</sup> John xvi, 8.

<sup>f</sup> Matt. xxvi. 24.

<sup>g</sup> Prov, xxix. 1.

*died,*

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*died, viz. to be destroy'd without remedy.* And is not this to represent our God and Saviour more uncompassionate to the souls of men, *redeemed by Christ; who, seeing them in their blood, does not say unto them, live; or, dead in trespasses and sins, does not quicken them*<sup>h</sup>, *when it is in his power to do it; than were that Priest and Levite to their brother's body, who seeing him ready to perish by his wounds*<sup>i</sup>, *passed unconcerned by another way? And when the Apostle enquires,*<sup>k</sup> *If any man see his brother in need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him?* Would not this doctrine teach him to reply, even as it dwells in God himself, towards a considerable number of those his son has died for; *who seeing them in extreme need, in a state of sin and misery, yet shuts up his bowels of compassion from them, withhold the outward means, the ministry of the word, from them, does not give them the least knowledge of his Son the Saviour of the world, nor the least measure of the grace of the blessed Spirit?*" In a word, the love, grace, mercy and goodness of God, are more magnified and display'd in the doctrine of particular Redemption, which provides for the sure and certain salvation of some men, for their actual participa-

<sup>h</sup> Ezek. xvi. 6. Eph. ii. 5.

<sup>i</sup> Luke x. 31, 32.

<sup>k</sup> 1 John iii. 17.

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tion of grace here, and glory hereafter, than by the doctrine of universal Redemption; which provides for the possibility of the salvation of all men, leaving it to the mutable will of man, and to conditions to be performed by the creature; which makes it precarious and uncertain, whether any will be saved or no.

3. As to the charge of guile, deceit and insincerity, which the doctrine of particular Redemption is thought to fix upon the divine Being; this proceeds upon a mistaken sense of several passages of scripture, which contain declarations, calls, and exhortations of God to men, and expostulations with them, and ardent wishes concerning them; all which either only regard civil and temporal, and not spiritual and eternal things; or do not belong to all mankind, or are not directed to any who are not eventually saved; as has been made to appear in the *first part* of this performance, where the scriptures referred to, are particularly consider'd under distinct numbers.

VIII. It is urged<sup>1</sup>, That, "this doctrine (of particular Redemption) is visibly destructive of almost all the acts of piety and vertue; as prayer, thanksgiving, loving the Lord with all our hearts and souls; when,

<sup>1</sup> *Whitby*, p. 182, &c. Ed. 2. 177, &c.



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on the other hand, the doctrine of general Redemption layeth the greatest obligations on us to fear the Lord, and to serve him; gives him the glory of his free love, rich goodness, great mercy and compassion to the sons of men, far above the contrary doctrine; instructs us how to imitate the goodness, mercy and compassion of God, administers just ground of comfort to the greatest sinner, and gives life and energy to all exhortations to him, to return and live." And,

1. 'Tis observed<sup>m</sup>, That "all prayer is the duty of all Christians, to be performed in every place, and at all times, for all Christians, and all men; and that in faith, and in the name of Jesus, for pardon." And, 'tis ask'd, "How can we have access to God in our prayers for pardon, or for any other spiritual blessings, for all men, through the blood of Jesus, if he did not shed his blood for all?" I answer; That all prayer is the duty of all Christians, is certain; and that this is to be made for all Christians, for *all saints*, is as certain; yea, even for our enemies, as well as for our friends; but that we are to pray for all the individuals of human nature, that have been, are, or shall be in the world, is not so certain: since then we must pray for the dead as well as the living, for the saints in

<sup>m</sup> *Whitby*, p. 182. Ed. 2. 177.

heaven

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heaven and the damned in hell, and for them that are not yet born, as for those that are ; and yet so we should pray to answer to the extent of Redemption pleaded for. The Apostle, indeed, exhorts <sup>a</sup>, That *supplications, prayers and intercessions, be made for all men ;* that is, for men of all sorts, ranks and degrees, particularly *for kings, and for all that are in authority,* and chiefly respect the civil affairs of government, that kings may act for the glory of God, and the welfare of their subjects ; and that the latter, especially such as are Christians, may *lead a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and honesty.* The scripture gives us no warrant, any where, to pray for the pardon and salvation of all men, collectively ; to do so, would be to act contrary to divine revelation ; which represents to us, that the sins of all men will not be pardon'd, and that all men will not be saved. And if a man prays for the pardon and salvation of any particular person or persons, for whom he is more especially concern'd, it should be always with submission to the will of God, who *will have mercy on whom he will have mercy ;* for no man can pray in faith, and with confidence, but for such things as are agreeable to the revealed will of God. There is, indeed, great encouragement for

<sup>a</sup> 1 Tim. ii. 1.

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a man to go to God through Christ, and pray for the discovery of pardon, and application of salvation, to himself and others, upon the scheme of particular Redemption; since *the blood of Christ was shed for many, for the remission of sins*; and therefore, Why not for their sins? and he came to *save the chief of sinners*, and therefore, Why not them? But, upon the scheme of general Redemption, a man has no encouragement to pray for pardon and salvation, either for himself or others; since, according to that scheme°, Christ, by his death, has not procured actual pardon, reconciliation or salvation, only obtained a new covenant, in which these things are promised, on conditions to be performed by men; so that all a man has to do, is to perform these conditions, and then he may claim his interest in pardon and salvation, and consequently has no need to pray for them. When these things are consider'd, 'twill be easy to judge, which scheme is most likely to damp devotion, or to be destructive of fervent prayer.

2. 'Tis further observ'd, That "it is the duty of all Christians, to *give thanks always for all things to God, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, &c.* and this we are to do for all men; and the opinion which ob-

° See *Whitby*, p. 109, 110. Ed. 2. 106, 107.

° *Ib.* p. 184. Ed. 2. 179, 180.

structs

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structs this gratitude, must be repugnant to scripture and reason." I reply ; That it is beyond dispute, the duty of all Christians, to give thanks to God in the name of Christ, for all things which they have received, enjoy, and are made partakers of ; and particularly for God's sending his Son to die for them, and for their Redemption by him : and though he is not an universal Saviour, yet the greatest part of Christians, that is, believers, by the scheme of particular Redemption, are so far from being disobliged, and incapacitated, as is suggested, reasonably to thank, or to praise him for any thing that he hath suffer'd and done, that they are all, and every one of them, laid under the greatest obligations, and put into the best capacity of gratitude and thankfulness, on the account thereof ; for these grounds of thanksgiving respect all Christians, all believers in Christ, who have any degree of faith and hope in him, though they may not be fully assured of their salvation by him. But then, that it is their duty to give thanks, for all men, and for redeeming grace, and other spiritual blessings, which they have not received, do not enjoy, are not made partakers of, does not at all appear. *Giving of thanks* is, indeed, to be *made for all men*, on the account of civil and temporal blessings they enjoy, and because of that use and service

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they are of to others; though this cannot be extended to every individual, as to a persecuting tyrant, or an infamous heretick. Add to this, that the form of thanksgiving and praise, used by the saints on the score of Redemption, which is referred to in the margin by the *learned Doctor*, but not transcribed, runs thus<sup>a</sup>: *Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood, out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation; not every kindred, every tongue, every people, and every nation.*

3. It is said<sup>r</sup>, That “ the great duty required from the *Jew and Gentile*, is to *love the Lord with all our hearts*: but if he intended no such kindness to the greatest part of mankind (as the sending of his Son to be their Saviour) What motive can they have to love him, who never had any love to their souls? Surely they cannot be obliged to love him for that Redemption which never was intended for them, or for that grace which will not be vouchsafed to them.” To which may be reply’d; That it is the duty of all men to love the Lord, as they are the creatures of his make, the care of his providence, and supplied by him with the blessings of life, and, so long

<sup>a</sup>..Rev. v. 9.

<sup>r</sup>..*Wright*, p. 185. Ed. 2. 181.

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as they are, the obligation to love him continues, and would have continued, had there been no Redemption at all by Christ. 'Tis true, Redemption by Christ lays a fresh obligation on those who are interested in it, to love the Lord ; and, indeed, those who have no interest in that special blessing of grace, have reason to love the Lord upon the account of it ; since 'tis owing to Christ's engagement to redeem his own people, that the rest are continued in their blessings, and supplied with the blessings of providence, which were forfeited by sin. Besides, though such cannot be obliged to love the Lord for that Redemption which never was intended for them, nor for that grace which will not be vouchsafed to them ; yet, all to whom the gospel-revelation comes, are obliged to love the Lord on the account of Redemption by Christ, since all who see their need of it, and are desirous of interest in it, have no reason to conclude otherwise, than that Christ died for them, and has redeemed them by his blood.

4. 'Tis urged<sup>f</sup>, That the doctrine of general Redemption layeth the greatest obligations on us, to fear and serve the Lord. But why may not the doctrine of particular Redemption be thought to lay as great obli-

<sup>f</sup> *Whitby*, p. 186. Ed. 2. 181.

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gations upon us to do the same? for if God thus first loved us, when we did not love him, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins, and not the sins of others; surely we stand bound to shew our love to him by that obedience, which is the only test of our sincere affection; and if Christ has bought us, and not others, with the price of his own precious blood, we ought to *glorify him with our souls and bodies, which are his*: and especially, this doctrine may be thought to lay as great obligations on us, to fear and serve the Lord, since it teaches us<sup>c</sup>, That Christ *gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works*; yea, this doctrine may be thought to lay greater obligations upon us than the other, to fear and serve the Lord; since, according to the scheme of general Redemption, no actual pardon, reconciliation and salvation were procured by the death of Christ; only by it men were put into a capacity, and there was a possibility of their enjoying these things on certain conditions to be performed by them; whereas the doctrine of particular Redemption assures the salvation of all, who have interest in it; which every one has reason to conclude, who is sensible

<sup>c</sup> Tit. ii. 14. j

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of sin, of his need of Christ, and salvation by him.

5. 'Tis said<sup>u</sup>, That "the doctrine of universal Redemption, tends highly to the promotion of God's glory; it gives him the glory of his free love, rich goodness, great mercy and compassion to the sons of men, far above the contrary doctrine." But how does it promote the glory of God, when, notwithstanding this Redemption by Christ, 'tis possible not one soul may be saved; and they that are saved, must save themselves by performing the conditions of the new covenant, which is all that Christ has obtained by his death? And where does the glory of his free love, rich goodness, great mercy and compassion to the sons of men appear, when, notwithstanding his sending his Son to be their Saviour, he does not so much as give, to multitudes of them, any knowledge of him, or means of knowing him; and where the external revelation of the gospel does come, to multitudes, he does not give his Spirit to make known and apply salvation by Christ, to them? And if, as it is said, "to redeem any, doth magnify his goodness; to redeem many, doth increase it; to redeem all, doth advance it to the highest pitch." It would follow, That not only to redeem all mankind, but

<sup>u</sup> *Whitby*, p. 185. Ed. 2. 182.



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to redeem all the devils, would tend most highly to magnify the goodness of God: but the glory of God's grace, mercy and goodness, lies not so much in the numbers to which they are extended, as in the freeness of them; as I have observed under the preceding head of argument; where I have also shewn, That the love, grace, mercy and goodness of God, are more magnified by the doctrine of particular Redemption, than by that of general Redemption. The instance of a king's redeeming one hundred of his subjects, when he found five thousand of them in thralldom, upon a declaration he would be gracious to them all; and which is therefore represented as delusory and insincere, inhuman and unmerciful, is foreign to the purpose; since God has nowhere declared, that he would shew himself gracious to all the individuals of mankind; but, on the contrary, that he *will be gracious to whom he will be gracious*; nor has he any where declared, That he is not willing any of them should perish.

6. 'Tis observed \*, That "this doctrine of general Redemption, doth best instruct us how to imitate the goodness, mercy and compassion of our God, even by being kind and merciful unto all, and ready to procure, as much as in us lies, the welfare of

\* *Whitby*, p. 187. Ed. 2. 183.

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all men; *Matt.* v. 44, 45. *Luke* vi. 35, 36. 1 *Thess.* iii. 12. and iv. 9. *Eph.* iv. 32. *Matt.* xviii. 35." But, without this doctrine, we are sufficiently instructed, even by the providential goodness of God, to all his creatures, to which the passages in *Matt.* v. 44, 45. *Luke* vi. 6—35, 36. refer, to imitate the goodness, mercy and compassion of God, by being kind and merciful to all men. Nor do we need this doctrine to teach us to love all men as men and fellow creatures, nor to love one another as Christians, or believers in Christ; since all that are born again, are taught of God in regeneration, to love as brethren, all that are regenerated by the grace of God; which is the meaning of 1 *Thess.* iv. 9. Such who have received, or expect to receive forgiveness from God, ought to forgive one another, every man his brother's trespasses; but then the rule of this proceeding is not, nor is it necessary that it should be, *even as God for Christ's sake has forgiven* all men; which the argument in favour of general Redemption, requires; but *even as God for Christ's sake hath forgiven you*, *Eph.* iv. 32. 'Tis said, That it is not a sufficient answer to the argument, to say that God is kind in temporals; for this is, indeed, no kindness,

† *Whitby*, p. 188, 189. Ed. 2. 184.

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if all these temporal enjoyments, without grace and interest in Christ, which is denied them, can only be abused, to the aggravation of their guilt and punishment; and that it is thinking unworthily of God, that he should take such care of human bodies, and make no provision for their souls. I reply; That it must be kindness in God, to bestow temporal blessings upon the sons of men, seeing they are altogether undeserving of them, which should engage them to seek and serve him; and it is owing to the wickedness of men, that they are abused by them; for without the grace of God, and interest in Christ, temporal enjoyments may be so used, as not to be abused; nor does it become us to say what is worthy or unworthy of God, respecting the communications of his providential goodness, or special grace, since they depend entirely on his will and pleasure. Tho' it is an awful consideration, that God should bestow upon some of the sons of men such a large share of temporal blessings, and withhold from them his special grace; and, on the other hand, make such large provisions of grace for his dear children, and yet suffer many of them to be in strait circumstances, and without the conveniences of life; What shall we say to these things, but what the Apostle does? *O the depth of the riches*  
*both*

*both of the wisdom and knowledge of God !  
How unsearchable are his judgments, and  
his ways past finding out <sup>a</sup> !*

7. 'Tis thought <sup>a</sup> that the doctrine of general Redemption administers most comfort to sinners, under the terror of God's threats and convictions of conscience. I answer; It must be matter of comfort to distressed minds, that Christ came to seek that which was lost, to save the chief of sinners; that whosoever comes to him, he will in no wise cast out; and whosoever believes in him, shall not perish, but have everlasting life. All which perfectly agree with the doctrine of particular Redemption, and which administers better ground of comfort to distressed minds than the other doctrine does; since it secures both grace and glory to those who are interested in it. Whereas the other leaves the salvation of every man very precarious and uncertain, and, at most, barely possible, if it can be said to be so, when it depends upon conditions to be performed by themselves: What comfort can that doctrine yield to a distressed mind, which tells the man, that Christ died for all men, and has redeemed all men by his blood, and so himself among the rest, and yet he may be damn'd for all this, and be in no better or safer state than *Cain* or *Judas*? Whereas

<sup>a</sup> Rom. xi. 33.

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 190. Ed. 2. 185.

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the doctrine of particular Redemption ascertains the salvation of some; and all that believe in Christ, have reason to conclude their interest in it, and take comfort from it, believing that they shall have, in consequence of it, every blessing of grace here, and eternal life hereafter; so that penitent believers may take as much, yea, more comfort from this doctrine than the other. Could our opponents, upon their general scheme, ascertain salvation to all men, they would have some room and reason to talk upon this head.

8. 'Tis said <sup>b</sup>, "That this doctrine (of general Redemption) gives life and energy to all our exhortations to the sinner, to return and live; whereas, the contrary persuasion robs them of their strength and virtue." I reply; For my own part, I know of no exhortations to dead sinners, to return and live, in a spiritual manner. Those referred to in *Ezekiel* xviii. I have often observ'd, respect civil and temporal, and not spiritual and eternal things: we may, and should, indeed, encourage and exhort sensible sinners to believe in Christ, and testify their repentance, by bringing forth fruits meet for the same; and to such exhortations the doctrine of particular Redemption gives life and energy, and cannot rob them

<sup>b</sup> *Whisty*, p. 190. Ed. 2. 186.

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of any strength and vertue; since it ascertains compleat salvation, continuance in grace here, and glory hereafter, to all that repent and believe; whereas the other doctrine does not; for, according to that, persons may repent and believe, and yet finally and totally fall away, and at last be damn'd. Let any unprejudiced person judge which doctrine gives most life and energy to these exhortations, or robs them of their strength and vertue; and, with respect to men in general, I see not why, upon our scheme, we may not as briskly put the question, *How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation?* And, as boldly enquire, *Why despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance, and long suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance?* The learned writer attended to, proceeds<sup>c</sup> to remove an objection or two lying in his way; as,

(1.) "That after all our quarrelling about this affair, we seem both, at last, to say the same thing; the one, that Christ will save none but the elect; the other, that he will only save those who perform the conditions of the new covenant: now these are the same men both for number and quality. And the actual salvation of men being not enlarged by their

<sup>c</sup> Whitby, p. 191. Ed. 2. 187.

doctrine,

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doctrine, it seems not to be much more worthy of God, or to represent him more a lover of souls, or more concerned for their welfare than the other. To this he answers ; That though the persons saved be eventually the same, yet the doctrine is by no means the same, nor is the honour of God as much consulted, or his love to souls as much demonstrated by the one as by the other." To which I reply ; That the doctrine is by no means the same, is certain : and as for the absurdities which this author thinks the doctrine of particular Redemption is clog'd with ; as, that no salvation ever was by God designed for some persons ; and so if they are damn'd for unbelief, must be damn'd for what they neither could do, nor were, by any law of God, obliged to do ; and because they want sufficient means, on God's part, to render their salvation possible ; and that this doctrine represents the God of truth and sincerity, full of guile, deceit, dissimulation and hypocrisy, and is visibly destructive of all the acts of piety and vertue. All this has been replied to before ; I shall only observe, That by the doctrine of particular Redemption, the honour of God is more consulted, and his love to souls is more demonstrated than by that of general Redemption ; for, according to the former, all the gracious purposes and designs of God, respecting the  
salva-

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salvation of men, are fully accomplished; his justice is fully satisfied by the obedience and sufferings of his son; his grace and mercy are wonderfully display'd, and all his people are certainly saved with an everlasting salvation: whereas, according to the latter, the gracious purposes and designs of God, respecting the salvation of men, are, with regard to a large, if not the largest number of them, entirely frustrated; his justice does not appear to be satisfied with the sacrifice of his Son for their sins; nor are his grace and mercy display'd in the application of salvation to them; this doctrine not providing for the sure and certain salvation of any, but leaving it upon a precarious bottom, to be procured upon Conditions of mens own performing; so that if it is obtained, it is rather to be ascribed to the free will of man, than to the free grace of God; and if so, How is the honour of God consulted by this doctrine? And that the love of God is more demonstrated by the doctrine of particular, than by that of general Redemption, has been shewn in the consideration of the preceding argument.

(2.) The other <sup>d</sup> objection is, "That God is no debtor to any man; he was at perfect freedom, whether he would shew mercy to any, or make provision for the

<sup>d</sup> *Whitby*, p. 193, 194. Ed. 2. 189.



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salvation of the smallest number, and so he could not be termed unmerciful, had he made no provision for the salvation of any; much less in not making provision for the salvation of all." To this he answers; That "God is no debtor to any man; but yet, he is most certainly obliged, by the perfection of his own nature, to act suitably to his attributes." It is very true; but let it be shewn, and proved, if it can be, that God, in shewing mercy to some men, and not to all, in making provision for the salvation of some, and not for all, in sending his Son to die for some, and not all, and so in saving of some, and not all, when he could, in justice, have damned all mankind for sin, acts unsuitably to any of his attributes. The main of this author's reasoning in his answer to this objection, belongs to the doctrine of efficacious grace, and therefore must be thought to be impertinent, and does not require an answer here, but must be referr'd to its proper place. From the whole,

(3.) The two corollaries, or inferences, *viz.* That there is no absolute decree of Reprobation excluding from saving mercy; and that there is no absolute decree of Election of a certain number of particular persons to salvation, do not necessarily follow, as it is said<sup>c</sup>; but, on the contrary,

<sup>c</sup> *Whitby*, p. 196. Ed. 2. 191.

that

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that whereas there is a Redemption of particular persons, by the blood of Christ, whose everlasting salvation is procured and secured thereby ; so there is an Election of particular persons in Christ, who shall certainly enjoy all the grace and glory to which they are chosen. The harangue this author makes upon this, proceeds upon some passages of scripture, which either have no manner of relation to this controversy, or are misunderstood and misapplied, as I think has been sufficiently shewn in the *first part* of this work. I now proceed to consider the answers of this learned writer, to our arguments, and what he calls objections, made from rational accounts, against the doctrine of general Redemption, contained in the *seventh* chapter of his discourse upon this subject. And,

I. The first argument, or objection, he takes notice of, is, That “ it is not reasonable to believe, that Christ should die in vain, with respect to any : whereas, if he had died for all, he must have died in vain, with respect to the greatest part of mankind.” Which is said with a great deal of reason ; for if Christ died for all men, and some, or many of them perish, then he must die in vain, with respect to these persons. But that a matter of so much moment and importance, as the death of Christ,

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Christ, whereby the purposes of God, the promises of the covenant, and the salvation of men, were to be accomplished; in which the wisdom, love and grace of God are so much display'd; his holiness and justice, truth and faithfulness, so much concern'd, should, in any respect, be thought to be in vain, is an unreasonable conclusion. In answer to this it is said,<sup>1</sup> "That all those acts of divine grace, whose effect depends upon the will of man, or which are offered to him upon conditions which he may perform or not, are, through man's wickedness, too oft done and offer'd in vain, as that imports their being done and offer'd without any benefit man receiveth by them." And then instances are produced, of the law and ordinances of God, his fatherly corrections, the gospel, and the ministry of it by Christ and his Apostles, being often in vain. But what are all these things to the purpose? Does it follow, that because corrections are sometimes in vain, and the external ministry of the word and ordinances have been in vain, that therefore the death of Christ may be, in any respect, in vain? Does the effect of it depend upon the will of man, or is it ever offer'd upon conditions to men? to suggest any thing of this kind, must be in-

<sup>1</sup> *Whitby*; p. 199. Edit. 2. 174

jurious

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jurious to and highly reflect upon the sufferings and death of Christ. This learned writer affirms,<sup>a</sup> that "to say indeed Christ died to no purpose, or to no good end, is a great absurdity; but to say he died in vain eventually for them who will not repent or believe in him, is none at all." But surely to die in vain for any, is to die to no purpose, or to no good end with respect to them; and therefore if to die to no purpose, or to no good end, is a great absurdity, to die in vain must be so too; for to what purpose or good end can Christ die for those, for whom he died in vain? Besides, the Apostle represents Christ's dying in vain as a great absurdity, when he says,<sup>b</sup> *If righteousness came by the law, then Christ is dead in vain.* And with equal strength of argument it may be said, if men can be saved without the death of Christ, or any are not saved for whom Christ died, then is he dead in vain with respect to them.

II. Another argument or objection against general redemption is; "That a general will that all men should be saved, carries some marks of imperfection in it, as representing God wishing somewhat which he would not accomplish; whereas Infinite Perfection can wish nothing but what it can execute, and

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 200. Ed. 2. 1795.

<sup>b</sup> Gal. ii. 21.

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if it be fit for him to wish it, it must be fit for him to execute it." The answer to it is, <sup>c</sup> That "this objection advances a metaphysical nicety against the clearest revelations of the holy scripture, *Pf.* lxxxi. 12, 13. *If.* xlviii. 18. *Deut.* xxxii. 29. *If.* v. 4, 5. *Matt.* xxiii. 37. *Luk.* xix. 42.." I reply, It will be allow'd, that God sometimes wishes that to be done by others, which he himself does not think fit to execute; but then wishing is to be ascribed to him only in a figurative and improper sense, and is only expressive of what, if done, would be grateful and well-pleasing to him, but not of what is his proper will and determination should be done, in which sense the *passages* referr'd to are to be understood; and besides, they regard not the spiritual and eternal salvation of all mankind, only the civil and temporal welfare of the *Jewish* nation, as has been shewn in the *first part* of this performance, and so are not apposite and pertinent to the case before us. It should be proved, that there is in God a general will that all men should be saved, or that he any where wishes for and desires the salvation of all the individuals of mankind. For God to will or wish the salvation of all men, and intend the death of Christ for that purpose, and yet not save all men, is inconsistent with

<sup>c</sup> *Wibb.*, p. 201. Ed. 2. 196,

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the perfection of his nature, and the immutability of his counsel. Nor is this argument, that God wills not what he sees not fit to execute, attended with those dreadful consequences as are suggested, <sup>d</sup> as "That God is not willing any should obey his will who doth not obey it; that he is not unwilling any one should sin whom he restrains not from it, and that he is not willing any one should repent who doth not repent." Since God's commanding and approving will is one thing, and his determining will another; in the former sense God wills what he does not see fit to execute; it is what he commands and approves of, that men should obey his will, abstain from sin, and repent of it, when he does not see fit to give 'em grace to enable 'em to do these things; but God never wills, that is, determines any thing, but he sees fit to execute, and does execute it. Besides, it's one thing for God to will and wish, that is, command and approve, what is entirely man's duty to do, tho' he does not see fit to give him grace to execute it, which he is not oblig'd to do, and another thing to will and wish the salvation of all men, which entirely depends upon himself, and which, if he did wish, he would surely see fit to execute.

<sup>d</sup> *Whisby*, p. 201. Ed. 2. p. 196

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III. Another argument taken notice of is, "That if Christ died for all men, and all are not saved, the wisdom of God must be defective and imperfect; for, to fall short of what a man intends, argues a deficiency in point of wisdom." The meaning of which is, That if God intended the death of Christ for the salvation of all men, and all are not saved, his intentions being frustrated, there must be a deficiency of wisdom in the case, which is by no means to be ascribed to the all-wise Being; it should therefore seem rather, that God never intended the death of Christ for the salvation of all men. To this it is answer'd, That, "if this be so, then every prince, parent, master, neighbour, or schoolmaster, who cannot make their subjects, children, servants, friends, or scholars, as good as they intended they should be, must be deficient in wisdom." To which may be reply'd, That the instances are very impertinent, since it is not in the power of a prince, a parent, a master, a neighbour, a schoolmaster, to make those with whom they are concern'd as good as they would have them to be; and so it is no impeachment of their wisdom, that their good intentions do not succeed when they have taken wise and proper methods, but their

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ill success must be ascribed to the evil dispositions of the persons related to 'em, Whereas God is able to save as many as he pleases; salvation does not depend upon the dispositions and inclinations of men, but lies entirely in the breast, and depends upon the will and pleasure of God. Now, if God intended the death of Christ for the salvation of all men, and all men are not saved, either the means he has pitched upon are not sufficient to answer the end, or he has changed his mind and altered his intentions, either of which would imply deficiency of wisdom in him. Should it be said that God intended the death of Christ for the salvation of all men, upon certain conditions to be perform'd by them, and that it is the non-performance of these conditions, which is the reason why some are not saved? Now, not to observe that this greatly reflects upon the death of Christ, as tho' it was insufficient and ineffectual to the salvation of men, without some performances of theirs, I argue thus; God foreknew either that these conditions would be perform'd, or that they would not be perform'd; if he foreknew they would be perform'd, and yet are not perform'd, he must be defective in his knowledge; if he foreknew they would not be perform'd, where's his wisdom in appointing the death of his Son, and intending that for the salvation of



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all men, when he knew that multitudes would not perform the conditions on which their salvation depended? Moreover, it is further observ'd,<sup>f</sup> That "if a God, perfect in wisdom, can intend nothing but what he actually doth compass and perform, it plainly follows, that he intended not by his prohibition of sin, that any person should avoid or abstain from it, who doth not actually do so; or by his exhortations to repentance, holiness, obedience, that any person should repent, be holy or obedient, who is not actually so." I reply, That whatever God intends, resolves and determines upon, he always actually compasses and performs; so when he intends, that is, resolves, that men shall avoid and abstain from sin, repent, be holy and obedient, his intentions are never frustrated; men do actually avoid and abstain from sin, repent of it, become holy and obedient. But his bare prohibitions of sin, and exhortations to repentance, holiness and obedience, are not expressive of his intentions, resolutions and determinations, of what shall be avoided or done, but declare his will of command what should be avoided or done; and which, if avoided or done, would be agreeable and well-pleasing to him, and this indeed is not always, yea, very rarely accomplish'd; and therefore he

<sup>f</sup> *Hitchy*, p. 202. Ed. 2. 197.

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may justly blame and punish for those things which are contrary to his reveal'd will, tho' he, in his secret intentions and purposes, has determin'd not to give them that grace to enable them to avoid sin, repent of it, be holy and obedient, which he is no ways obliged to give.

IV. A fourth objection or argument against universal Redemption is, "If Christ died for all men, and all men are not saved, then is not God omnipotent, since he could not apply to them that benefit, which he was willing should be procur'd for them." For that the benefit of Redemption is not applied to some persons, must arise either from want of power or from want of will in God; not from want of will, for it would be exceeding strange, that he should be willing it should be procured for them, and not be willing it should be apply'd to them; and if from want of power, then he is not omnipotent. But it is suggested,\* That it is owing to "a want of will and a perverseness or evil disposition in others obstructing his kind influences on, or intentions towards them, and that it cannot be apply'd because of their unbelief." The consequence of which is, that he is not omnipotent; for, can he be omnipotent, whose influences can

\* *Whitby*, p. 203. Ed. 2. 1728.

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be obstructed by the perverseness of a creature's will? Can't an omnipotent Being remove that unbelief which stands in the way of the application of the benefit of Christ's death? And if he can do it, and will not, it follows, that tho' it is his will the benefit of Redemption should be procured for all men, yet it is not his will that it should be applied to them; and then where is the love and kindness of God, so much boasted of in the universal Scheme? That God wills, that is, commands and approves many things which he does not effect, is certain, and no way impeaches his omnipotence; wherefore the instances alledged in the *second* answer to this argument being of this kind, are impertinent; but that he should intend to bestow any benefit or blessing upon any persons, and not bestow it upon them, or not make them partakers of it, must arise either from a change of mind, which is inconsistent with the perfection of his nature, or from want of power to give it, which is contrary to his omnipotence.

V. Another argument or objection, and which is said to be but the first in other words, is, "That if Christ died for all men, and all men come not to be saved, then the great love of God in giving his Son to men is useless and unprofitable; for to what purpose, or of what use is the love of God and  
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the gift of his Son to men, if he doth not withal give them faith in his Son?" And indeed, what kind of love can that be thought to be in God, which gives his Son to die for men, and by his death to procure Redemption for them, but does not give his Spirit to apply, nor faith to receive this benefit, without which it must be useless and of no service to them? It should seem rather, that if God has *not spared his own Son, but has deliver'd him up* to death for all the individuals of human nature, that he should *with him also freely give them all things*, his spirit and faith, and every other grace, and at last glory; and if he does not, it will be more rational to conclude, that he has not deliver'd up his Son to death for all mankind. The answer to this is,<sup>h</sup> "As if all God's acts of grace and favour to men which are not effectual, through men's perverseness of their wills, to obtain his gracious purposes, must be vain and fruitless on his part, if he also giveth not the grace which will make them effectual to his ends." Why, really I think, that both the gracious purposes of God are made void, and his acts of grace and favour vain and fruitless, if they become ineffectual, through the perverseness and stubbornness of mens wills, to those ends for which they were made; and par-

<sup>h</sup> *Whisby*, p. 205. Ed. 2. 200.

ticularly,

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ticularly, that the act of God's grace and favour, in giving his Son to die for the salvation of men is vain and fruitless, if they are not saved by his death. The providential goodness of God, the external ministry of the word, God's prohibitions of, and revelation of wrath from heaven against sin, his commands and gracious calls to the sons of men, instanced in, tho' they are oftentimes ineffectual with respect to man, yet always answer the ends God has design'd by them; and besides, are not to be put upon a level with the gift of his son. What tho' providential goodness, the external ministry of the word, &c. are fruitless and ineffectual, does it follow, that the death of Christ, which is of so much consequence and importance, and which depends not upon the will of men, but of God, should be so in any respect? And should it be so, it must be asked again, of what use is the love of God, in the gift and mission of his son?

VI. The favourers of particular, and who oppose general Redemption, are introduced arguing in this manner: "No man wittingly pays a price of Redemption for a captive, which he certainly knows this miserable man will never be the better for; Christ therefore paid no price of Redemption for any man who will never be the better for it." And indeed no wise man would do so,  
and

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and therefore it must be unreasonable to conclude, that the only wise God and our Saviour should act in this manner. To shew the absurdity of this objection, the dispensations of God, from the beginning of the world, are taken notice of; <sup>1</sup> as, the striving of the Spirit of God with the old world, and allowing them space to repent; the sending of the prophets with promises and threats to the *Jewish* nation, and the ministry of Christ and his ambassadors, when God knew that men would be never the better for either of them. I reply, That some, tho' not all, were the better for these dispensations of Providence, and the rest left without excuse; and it is easy to observe the wisdom of God, his long-suffering and forbearance to them; whereas for Christ to pay a price for the Redemption of men, and the justice of God to accept of that price, and yet men be never the better for it, one must be at an eternal loss to account for the divine Wisdom in such a procedure. Besides, the offer of the things instanced in, according to this author, depended on the will of man; whereas the price of man's Redemption, the acceptance of it, and the consequences attending it, or the effects of it, wholly depend on the will of God, and the covenant transactions between the Fa-

<sup>1</sup> *Whitby*, p. 206. Ed. 2. 201.

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ther and the Son. To say<sup>k</sup>, "this objection or argument is built upon a false supposition, *viz.* that Christ paid no such price for them that perish as for them that will be saved," is a mere *petitio principii*, a begging of the question; 'tis the very thing in dispute. And tho' under the old law, the same sacrifice was offer'd to make atonement for a single person, and for the whole nation of the *Jews*, it does not follow, that the sacrifice of Christ was offer'd to make atonement for the whole world; for tho' those sacrifices were typical of Christ's sacrifice, yet the people for whom they were offer'd were not typical of the whole world, but only of God's elect, the true and spiritual *Israel*. Remission of sins is indeed received, but not obtained by faith; not that, but the grace of God gives an interest in Christ's atonement. The reason why one man has the remission of sins, and faith to receive it, is, because the blood of Christ was shed to obtain it for him; and the reason why another man has not the remission of sins, nor faith given him to receive it, is, because the blood of Christ is not shed for him, nor any atonement made by that blood on his account. Thus having vindicated the arguments in favour of particular, and against general Redemption, taken from rational

<sup>k</sup> *Whitby*, p. 207. Ed. 2. 202.

accounts,

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accounts, from the exceptions of Dr. *Whitby*, I shall proceed to observe some others which he has omitted, and have been taken notice of by the famous *Limborch*; and are as follow.

VII. Another argument against general, and for particular Redemption, is formed thus: "If grace and remission of sins is procured for all men by the death of Christ, 'tis necessary that the word of grace and redemption should be preach'd to all and each, at all and every time, that so by faith they may be made partakers of this reconciliation; or otherwise, Christ died in vain for many, to whom this revelation never comes; which is very absurd. But the word of reconciliation is not preach'd to all and each, at all and every time; for before the coming of Christ, God excluded the Gentiles from the knowledge of his law, *Pf.* cxlvii. 19, 20. *Acts* xiv. 16. Nor did he suffer the Apostles at a certain time to preach the gospel in *Asia*, *Acts* xvi. 6. And now the *Indians* and other nations are yet destitute of the knowledge of the Gospel." The more general answer to this is<sup>1</sup>, That when Christ is said to die for all men, so as that they may obtain salvation through the benefit of his death, respect is chiefly had to them to whom

<sup>1</sup> *Limborch*, p. 327.



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the gospel is preach'd ; That, according to the intention and command of God, it ought to be preach'd to all men ; that there has never been an age, from the fall of *Adam* to the present time, which has been entirely destitute of it ; and that the reason why it is at any time removed from a people is, their own fault, they having either neglected or despised it, or held it in unrighteousness. I reply, To say, that respect is chiefly had in this argument to those to whom the gospel is preach'd, is not only to alter the state of the question, but, in a good measure, to give up the cause ; for the question before us is, not whether Christ died for all to whom the gospel is preach'd, but whether he died for all the individuals of mankind ; and if he died only or chiefly for those to whom the gospel is preach'd, then he died not for all mankind, since the gospel is not, and never was preached to every man. 'Tis indeed the will and command of God now, that it should be preach'd to every creature ; but this was not always his will and pleasure, 'tis of a late date, and belongs only to the times of the gospel. 'Tis true, there never was an age entirely destitute of it ; but then, the revelation was made to some particular persons, and those but few, or to a particular nation, to the exclusion of others, excepting a few particular persons only among them. There never was an age since the  
creation

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creation of the world to the present time, in which the gospel was preach'd to all nations, and to all the individuals of them, nor is it now; there are multitudes that know nothing at all of it. It has been indeed preach'd where it is not now, and its removal has been owing to mens neglect, contempt, or abuse of it; but why should their posterity be deprived of it? Surely, if God had a people among them, and Christ had died for them, he would have sent his gospel age after age to make known their Saviour to them, and the benefits of his death, that they, thro' faith in him, might enjoy them. To this a more special answer is<sup>m</sup> return'd, " That the people who are now destitute of the knowledge of Christ, either have been before called to believe in him by the gospel; but, thro' their own wickedness and infidelity, are deprived of it, or the gospel was never sent to them; if the former, the answer is easy, That God once vouchsaf'd the favour to them, and willed that they should propagate it to posterity; but if negligent, the fault is not in God, who is to be consider'd as having called their posterity virtually by them, but in men neglecting their duty. As for those to whom the gospel was never preached, as the *Indians*, it is certain, that God has now

<sup>m</sup> Limborch, p. 318.

abolish'd

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abolish'd all distinction among people, and wills that the gospel should be preach'd to all nations, and to all and each man among all nations, without any difference, for their conversion; and that those who are converted might instruct others, which is all one as if he virtually called them. But if men are negligent, or the people to whom they come stubborn, and by force drive away the preachers, and reject the truth, the fault is not in God, but men. 'Tis granted, that it may be that God may never expressly send ministers of the word to some men, and yet he never denies the communication of his grace, unless it be for mens demerits." To which may be replied, That some persons, to whom the gospel has been vouchsafed, have been deprived of it thro' their own wickedness and infidelity, will not be denied; but that the salvation of any for whom Christ died, should depend upon the will and conduct of other men, or that the means of the knowledge of Christ, of the benefits of his death, and salvation by him, should be withheld from such for whom Christ died, thro' the negligence, ingratitude, or unbelief of others, is neither consistent with the perfections or providence of God. Besides, if it was his will where the gospel has been sent, that it should be propagated to posterity, this will of his is either an imperfect velleity, a faint wish, which  
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is not to be ascrib'd to God, or his proper will, and this would have been fulfill'd ; *for who bath resisted his will?* Nor can God be thought to have virtually called the posterity of those men to whom his gospel has been sent, who have neither received it themselves, nor transmitted it to them. Can the present inhabitants of *Ephesus*, *Smyrna*, and other places in *Asia*, where the gospel was once preach'd, be said to be virtually called by God, by the means of their ancestors, who, in process of time, either neglected or despised the gospel, or held it in unrighteousness? As to what is said respecting the *Indians*, or such to whom the gospel was never sent, the former part of the reasoning upon it is very impertinent; seeing it supposes, not only that it is the will of God that the gospel should be preach'd to them, which, if it was, it doubtless would be preached to them, but that it has been sent unto them, and rejected by them. It is own'd, that God may never send the ministers of his gospel to some men; but why does he not? Is it because they are more unworthy of it than those to whom they are sent? This is not said, what should be the reason of this inequality and difference, that God sends his gospel to some, and not others, gives his grace to the more unworthy, and passes by the less unworthy? The learned writer, attended to, is obliged to

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own, that no reason can be assign'd by us, that it depends on the mere will and pleasure of God, and is to be referr'd to the secret treasures of divine Wisdom, unsearchable by us.

VIII. The next argument is, That "if Christ died for all men, it follows, that he died for *Cain*, the *Sodamites*, *Pharaoh*, *Judas*, &c. as well as for *Abel*, *Lot*, *Abraham*, *David*, *Peter*, &c. yea, for the impenitent, and even for those who were already dead in their impenitence before he himself died." To this it is answer'd "as before, That "special regard is had to those who live after Christ died, and to whom the gospel is preach'd, that tho' those who died in their impenitence before the death of Christ, could receive no benefit by it, yet Christ is truly said to die for them, since, had they seriously converted themselves to God, as they might by the grace of God, they would have found remission of sins in the blood of Christ hereafter to be shed, even as those did who repented and died in piety before the death of Christ. That the case of *Judas* is single, and is no exception to the universality of Christ's death; tho' there's no need to except him, for Christ may be rightly said to die for him, and he might have been

<sup>n</sup> *Whitby*, p. 329.

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a partaker of the benefit of Christ's death ; and that on a two-fold account. *First*, inasmuch as by grace communicated to him, because of the death of Christ, a little after to be endured, he might have abstain'd from the great sin of betraying him. And, *Secondly*, had he repented, he would have obtain'd pardon of God for it." I reply, as before, That the controversy between us, is not whether Christ died for those who lived before or after his death, but whether he died for all the sons and daughters of *Adam*, whether they live before or after his death? And if he died only or chiefly for those who lived after his death, and to whom the gospel is preach'd, then not for all men, since the far greater part of mankind lived before his death, and to whom the gospel was never preached. With what view, upon what consideration or account soever, could Christ be said to die for those that were already dead in their impenitence? Had he died for them, grace would have been communicated to them on the account of his death, hereafter to have been endur'd, as this author says in the case of *Judas* ; and so they would have repented and been converted, as well as have received remission of sins in his blood, hereafter to be shed. But inasmuch as they neither had grace to repent, nor forgiveness of sins, by virtue of the future death of Christ, as

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others had, 'tis most reasonable to conclude, he never died for them; for to what purpose should he or could he die for them that were already damned? As to the case of *Judas*, tho' single, it must be an exception to Christ's dying for every individual man; tho' I think the cases of *Cain*, the *Sodomites*, *Pharaoh*, such who have sinned the sin against the Holy Ghost, Antichrist, the man of sin, &c. are much alike exceptions to it. What grace *Judas* had communicated to him on the account of Christ's death, a little after to be endured, by which he might have abstain'd from the sin of betraying him, I don't understand, when his betraying of him was to be the means of his death: and as for his repentance, this writer himself owns, that God justly depriv'd him of the power of repenting, and so the death of Christ was of no advantage to him.

IX. Another argument against universal Redemption, stands thus: "If they can perish, and some of them do perish for whom Christ died, then their sins are twice punished; once in Christ, who died for them, and again, in themselves undergoing the punishment of everlasting fire:" which is contrary to the justice of God, which will never inflict punishment and require satisfaction twice for the same offence, and must greatly reflect upon the satisfaction and atone-

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atonement of Christ, as insufficient. The answer to this<sup>o</sup> is, "That Christ was not properly punish'd for men, nor did he properly translate the punishment of sin from sinners to himself, that their sins might be punish'd in him." But, surely, if Christ did not translate to himself and bear the punishment of our sins, how could he be said to be made *sin* and a *curse for us*, to have the *chastisement* of our peace upon him, to be *wounded, bruised, and die for our sins*, to be *stricken and cut off* in a judicial way *for the transgressions of his people*? And if he was, and underwent all this for all mankind, their sins must have been punish'd in him; and therefore it would not be consistent with the justice of God, to send any of them into everlasting fire, when Christ bore what was equivalent to it in their room and stead.

X. "If Christ died for all men, then also for infants dying in their infancy; but this the *Remonstrants* do not believe, since they affirm, that infants are born without original sin, and are not guilty of eternal condemnation; and therefore, according to them, need no Redeemer:" and, indeed,

<sup>o</sup> Limborch, p. 329.

<sup>p</sup> 2 Cor. v. 21. Gal. iii. 13. Isa. liii. 5, 6, 1 Cor. xv. 3: Isa. 53. 8.



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if they have neither original nor actual sin, and so not liable to condemnation and death, what should they be redeemed from? The answer<sup>a</sup> is, "not from sin, but from an hereditary death they derived from *Adam*." But how comes death to be hereditary to them, or how come they to derive it from *Adam*, if they are not involved in his sin and guilt? Besides, they are not redeemed by Christ from this hereditary corporal death; *Death reigned from Adam to Moses*, and so it has ever since, *even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression*<sup>c</sup>. Should it be said, they'll be redeemed from it in the resurrection morn, so will all the wicked who will have no share in eternal life, and so no proof of their redemption by Christ; should it be urg'd, that they will not only be redeem'd from this death, but also translated into the possession of eternal life, thro' the death of Christ, this must be in consequence of their Redemption from sin the cause of this death, and by virtue of Christ's righteousness wrought out for them, which justifies from sin, and gives a title to eternal life. The case is this, either infants dying in infancy are sinners, or they are not; if they are, they must be so by virtue and in consequence of original sin, which the *Arminians* deny; if they are not

<sup>a</sup> Limborch, p. 330.

<sup>c</sup> Rom. v. 14.

sinners,

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sinners, they stand in no need of a Saviour, they are not the objects of Redemption, Christ died not for them; and if not for them, then not for all mankind.

XI. The last argument is, "If Christ died for all men, even for them that can and do perish, then no consolation nor certainty of salvation can be had from the death of Christ, even by those that believe he died for them, seeing, notwithstanding he has died for them, they may perish: but this is absurd, and contrary to *Rom. viii. 34.* where believers conclude from the death of Christ, that they cannot come into condemnation." The consequence of this argument is denied<sup>f</sup>. But how is it possible, that there should be any solid comfort or real certainty of salvation from the death of Christ, when, notwithstanding compleat Redemption is obtain'd by it, the benefit of it enjoy'd, sin really forgiven in Christ, and the remission of it truly applied, yet persons may fall from the enjoyment of these benefits thro' sin and unbelief, and eternally perish? So that the benefit of Christ's death and continuance in the enjoyment of it, depend on the will of man, and certain conditions to be performed by him; whence if any comfort or assurance of salvation arise,

<sup>f</sup> Limborch, p. 330.

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which must be very low and precarious, they must arise, not from the death of Christ, but from the performances of men : whereas, on the other hand, the doctrine of particular Redemption secures grace here, and glory hereafter, to all the subjects of it ; so that those who believe in Christ, may take solid comfort from his death, that they shall never enter into condemnation, but shall be for ever with him ; and may be strongly assur'd of this, that, maugre all the opposition of sin, satan, and the world, they shall be saved with an everlasting salvation by him.



## C H A P. IV.

### Of EFFICACIOUS GRACE.

**D**R. *Whitby*, in the *second chapter* of his *discourse of sufficient and effectual, common and efficacious grace*<sup>t</sup>, proposes arguments to overthrow the doctrine of irresistible or unfrustrable grace, as necessary in the conversion of a sinner ; and begins with some general considerations, which he thinks suffi-

<sup>t</sup> *Whitby*, p. 231, 232, 233. Ed. 2. 226, 227.

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cient to cause any man to distrust, if not entirely reject it ; as, that the defenders of it grant, what is inconsistent with it, “ That preventing grace is given irresistibly and universally to men, and is never taken away by God from any man, unless he first, of his own accord, rejects it ; that there are certain inward workings and effects wrought by the word and spirit of God, preceding conversion and regeneration, in the hearts of persons not yet justify’d ; which God ceaseth not to promote and carry on towards conversion, till he be forsaken of them, by their voluntary negligence, and his grace be repell’d by them ; that God doth very seriously and in earnest call all those to faith and repentance, and conversion, in whom, by his word and spirit, he works a knowledge of the divine will, a sense of sin, a dread of punishment, some hopes of pardon, and yet that all these men, excepting the elect, are not converted, thro’ a defectiveness in the grace of God to do it, or for want of means sufficient for their conversion, and because God never intended by these means salvation to any but the elect.” Who these defenders are, that make these concessions, I am not concerned to know, the inconsistency of them with the doctrine of efficacious grace, will be readily own’d ;

<sup>a</sup> No 3. 10, 11, 13, 14. 17.

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how can grace be said to be given universally to men, when multitudes of them have not so much as the means of it ? or be said to be given irresistibly, when man, of his own accord, may reject it ? And tho' some certain effects may follow upon hearing the word, as, awakening of the natural conscience, fear of a future judgment, and trembling of the spirits in some persons, as in *Felix*, who never were or will be converted; yet these things are not promoted and carried on by God, nor were ever design'd to be promoted and carried on by him towards conversion, or in order to it : had they been wrought or design'd for that purpose, man's forsaking the Lord, by voluntary negligence, or repelling his grace, could never frustrate his designs, or cause him to cease promoting the carrying on his own work until he has brought it to perfection. Nor is it true, that God calls all those to faith and repentance, and conversion, who have a knowledge of the divine will, a sense of sin, a dread of punishment, and some hopes of pardon : for the devils have all these but the last, whom he never calls to faith and repentance, and the latter, as well as the former, some men may have, and yet be never called by the grace of God ; indeed, all those to whom God, by his spirit and word, gives a spiritual knowledge of his will, a real thorough sense of the evil nature

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ture of sin, as well as of the punishment that comes by it, and a good hope, through grace, of pardon thro' the blood of Christ, he not only calls seriously and in earnest to faith and repentance, but he bestows these gifts of his grace upon them. But I proceed to the consideration of the arguments which, 'tis said, evidently seem to confute the doctrine of irresistible and unfrustrable grace in conversion. The *first four* arguments, with the *eighth* and *ninth*, are founded upon passages of scriptures, which have been consider'd in the *first part* of this work, to which the reader is referr'd; the rest shall be attended to, and are as follow.

I. " " If such a divine unfrustrable operation is necessary to the conversion of a sinner, then the word *read* or *preached* can be no instrument of their conversion, without this divine and infrustrable impulse, because that only acts by moral suasion." I answer, 'tis very true, that the word read or preached is not, nor can it be an instrument of conversion, without the powerful and efficacious grace of God; and it is abundantly evident, that it is read and preached to multitudes on whom it has no effect, and to whom it is of no use and service. Some persons are, indeed, *begotten with the*

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*word of truth, and thro' the gospel, and are born again of incorruptible seed by the word of God*<sup>x</sup>; but then all this is by and thro' it, not as it comes *in word only*, or as it acts by moral suasion, or as it is a mere moral instrument, but as it comes *in power and in the Holy Ghost, or with the demonstration of the Spirit and of power*<sup>y</sup>. The Spirit of God is the efficient cause of regeneration and conversion, the Word is only a means which he makes use of when he pleases; for tho' he, generally speaking, works upon men by and under the means, yet not always; the work of grace upon the soul is not such an effect as doth entirely depend upon these two causes, so that, without the concurrence of them both, it will not be produc'd: wherefore the argument will not hold, That "he that hath it always in his power to resist, that is, to hinder the operation of the one upon him, must also frustrate the other, and consequently hinder the effect." For tho' the word unattended, with the spirit and power of God, may be resisted, so as to be of no effect, yet neither the operations of the Spirit, nor the Word, as attended with them, can be resisted, so as either of them should be ineffectual. And tho' the work of grace is wrought by an irresistible and unfrustrable operation, and

<sup>x</sup> Jam. i. 18. 1 Cor. iv. 15. 1 Pet. i. 23.

<sup>y</sup> 1 Thess. i. 5. 1 Cor. ii. 4.

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the Word without it is insufficient to produce it, yet it is not unnecessary, for it pleases God, *by the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe*<sup>a</sup>; whereby he confounds the wisdom of the world, and, by making use of weak means, he magnifies his own grace and power, he puts *the treasure of the gospel in earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power*<sup>a</sup> in conversion may appear to be of God, of his operation, and not of man's moral suasion.

II. It is said<sup>b</sup>, "Hence it must also follow, that no motive can be offer'd sufficient to induce the person who believes this doctrine, to enter upon a change of life, or a religious conversation, till he feel this irresistible impulse come upon him." I reply, that internal conversion, and an external change of life, regeneration, and a religious conversation, are different things. Tho' no man can be regenerated and converted without the powerful and efficacious grace of God, yet they may, without that grace, enter upon an outward change of life, and a religious conversation with and before men, tho' no motive can be offer'd sufficient to induce any person, whether he believes or does not believe this doctrine, to regenerate and convert himself; which does not lie in his own power, but

<sup>a</sup> 1 Cor. i. 21.

<sup>a</sup> 2 Cor. iv. 7.

<sup>b</sup> *Whitby*, p. 259. Ed. 2. 252.



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is entirely owing to an unfrustrable operation of grace; yet many motives may be offer'd sufficient, without an irresistible impulse of grace, to induce him to an external reformation and amendment of life, and a religious conversation. Tho' it must be own'd, that a change of life, and a religious conversation, when genuine, are the fruits and effects of regeneration and conversion, nor do men truly and rightly enter upon them, nor are these establish'd upon the best principles, until they are regenerated and converted by the spirit and grace of God.

III. It is further urg'd, That "if man be purely passive in the whole work of his conversion, and it can only be wrought in him by an irresistible act of God upon him, then can nothing be requir'd as a preparation, or a pre-requisite to conversion." I answer; for my own part, I must confess, I know of no works preparatory to conversion. Works are either good or evil; evil works can't be thought to be preparatory to it, and good works, which are strictly and properly so, spring from a principle of grace implanted in regeneration, and so follow upon it, and are not preparatory to it. And, indeed, what things preparatory to conver-

<sup>c</sup> *Whitby*, p. 259. Ed. 2. 252.

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sion can be thought to be in a natural man, that neither knows nor receives the things of the spirit of God? or in a carnal heart, which only minds the things of the flesh? or in a dead man, in order to be made alive? There's no middle state between a regenerate and an unregenerate one; what preparatory works were there in a persecuting, blasphemous, injurious *Saul*? 1 *Tim.* i. 13. or in those mention'd by the Apostle? 1 *Cor.* vi. 9, 10, 11. There are some things, which sometimes precede conversion, and which the spirit of God makes use of for that purpose; such as reading, hearing the word, &c. but then he does not always make use of these for conversion, nor does it always follow upon them. God's exhortations to men to consider and turn unto the Lord, are said to demonstrate that this consideration is a pre-requisite to conversion; what exhortations are refer'd to, I know not, the scriptures, which speak of mens considering and turning from their evil ways, regard that consideration which is requisite to an outward reformation of life, the fruit of regeneration, and internal conversion, and so not preparatory to it; and, indeed, there's want of spiritual consideration and attention in every man, until God opens his heart, by his powerful grace, as he did *Lydia's*, to attend to the things which are spoken, or which regard his spiritual and eternal welfare.

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fare. The parable of the seed sown, instanced in, shews, that the hearts of unregenerate men are unfit and unprepared to receive the word, and therefore it becomes unfruitful to them, and that it is only fruitful where it is received *in an honest and good heart*, made so by the spirit and grace of God in regeneration; whence it follows, that regeneration is rather a preparation for the right hearing of the word, than the hearing of the word is a preparation for regeneration. *Faith*, indeed, often *comes by bearing, and bearing by the word of God<sup>d</sup>*, when that is attended with the spirit and power; and therefore it's no wonder, that the *Devil comes and endeavours to take away the word out of mens hearts*, their minds and memories, by diverting them to other objects, lest *they should believe and be saved<sup>e</sup>*; since he knows not who will believe and be saved, nor to whom the word will be made effectual, and to whom it will not; nay, even where it is attended with an unfrustratable assistance, he'll endeavour to hinder mens believing to salvation, tho' he knows his attempts are in vain; which at once discovers both his folly and his malice.

IV. It is said<sup>f</sup>, that the opinion (of God, working upon men and converting them in

<sup>d</sup> Rom. x. 17.

<sup>e</sup> Luke viii. 12.

<sup>f</sup> *Whitby*, p. 264. Ed. ii. 257.

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a way of moral suasion) tendeth much more to the glory of God than doth the contrary opinion :” and ’tis urged,

• 1. That “ the wisdom of God is most glorified by that opinion which supposeth he acts with man in all his precepts, exhortations, invitations, promises and threats, suitably to those faculties he has given.” I reply ; according to our opinion, God does not act unsuitably to the rational powers and faculties he has given, when he clothes his word with omnipotence, makes it the power of God unto salvation, and attends it with an unfrustrable operation upon the understanding, will and affections ; since no coercive force or violence is offer’d to them, the understanding is wonderfully enlighten’d, the will is sweetly drawn, and the affections delightfully engaged and moved without any injury, yea, with an advantage to these natural faculties, and therefore can be no imputation upon the divine wisdom : nor does our opinion suppose, that God “ uses and appoints means for the recovery of mankind, which he knows cannot in the least degree be serviceable to that end ;” but, on the contrary, that whatever means he uses and appoints, he makes them powerful and effectual to the ends and purposes for which he appoints and uses them, and does not leave them to the uncertain, precarious and impotent will of man : so that our opinion

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is so far from impeaching and depreciating the wisdom of God, that it magnifies and exalts it; nor, according to our *hypothesis*, as is suggested, might he as well send ministers to preach to stones, and persuade them to be converted into men, because his omnipotency can produce such a change in them. There's no doubt, but that God could convert stones into men, and make them his children; but he has no where signified, that he would do this upon mens preaching to them: whereas he has not only signified it as his will, that the gospel should be preached to every creature, but that it shall be the power of God in the conversion of many souls, both among *Jews* and *Gentiles*; wherefore there is not the same reason for sending his ministers, and for their preaching to the one as to the other, tho' equal power is necessary for the conversion of the one as of the other. Not that unregenerate men are altogether like stocks and stones; for tho' they cannot contribute any thing to their regeneration or new birth, yet they are capable subjects of having the grace of God implanted in them, which stocks and stones are not: but nevertheless, if God did not make bare his holy arm, and exert his mighty power in the conversion of sinners, ministers would preach with as much success to stones as to men; and consequently the wisdom of God, according to our scheme,

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being, is greatly distressed in consequence of the word preached with a false interpretation, and an unfruitful mission; so that all his actions design towards his people are ineffectually answer'd, and not having the due force of moral suasion.

2. It is sinners' duty, That "whereas, according to our doctrine (of moral suasion) the truth and faithfulness of God, and the sincerity of his dealings with men, is unquestionable; according to the other doctrine (of efficacious grace) God seems to promise pardon and salvation to all men sincerely, and yet in truth, intends it only to some few persons whom he designs to convert by an irresistible power." To which may be replied, That whatever God promises, he not only seems to promise sincerely, but he really does promise sincerely, and as good as his word; he'll never suffer his truth and faithfulness to fail. But then, according to the doctrine of efficacious and irresistible grace in conversion, God neither seems to promise, nor has he promised pardon and salvation to all men: but promises Christ unto this; To him give all the righteous thereof, that through his name and merits believers be free, both from punishment here, and from all their sinfulness hereafter.

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who is *exalted to be a Prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance and forgiveness of sins*<sup>i</sup>, not to all men, but to *Israel*; how then does this doctrine detract from the sincerity, truth and faithfulness of God? And, on the other hand, according to the contrary doctrine of moral suasion, these things don't appear so unquestionable as is pretended; for if God has promised to any of the sons of men to put his law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, to give them new hearts and new spirits, to take away the stony heart out of their flesh, and give them hearts of flesh, and to put his spirit within them, to cause them to walk in his statutes and keep his judgments, and do them; and yet leave all this to be brought about by the mere force of moral suasion, and power of man's free will, and not exert that powerful and unfrustrable grace, without which he knows none of these things can be done; where's his sincerity, truth and faithfulness in his promises?

3. It is also said<sup>k</sup>, That "whereas the justice of God shines evidently from the doctrine which asserts, that God doth only punish men for wilful sins, which it was in their power to avoid, it never can be glorified by the doctrine which supposes, that he

<sup>i</sup> Chap. v. 31.

<sup>k</sup> *Blitby*, p. 265. Ed. 2. 258, 259.

punisheth

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punisheth men with the extremest and the most lasting torments, for not accepting those offers of grace tender'd by the gospel, which it was not possible for them to comply with or embrace without that farther grace, which he purposed absolutely to deny them." I reply; for my own part, I don't think that any man will be punish'd for not accepting offer'd grace he could not comply with or embrace, for want of further grace; because I don't believe that grace was ever offer'd to them; but then they will be punish'd for their wilful contempt and neglect of the gospel preach'd unto them, and for their manifold transgressions of the righteous law of God, made known unto them; and surely this doctrine can never be derogatory to the glory of God's justice.

4. It is asked<sup>1</sup>, "Is it not for God's glory, that the praise of what good we do should be ascribed to his grace, and the shame of our evil doings should rest upon our selves? But what reason can there be for this, unless we suppose it possible for the wicked to have been converted, or to have ceased to do evil?" And let me ask, in my turn, which doctrine, that of free will or of free grace, does most ascribe the praise of either what good is in us, or is done by us, to the glory of God's grace? Not the former, surely, but

<sup>1</sup> *Whitby*, p. 265. Ed. 2. 258, 259.



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the latter; and if so, the glory of God's grace is more magnified by the one than by the other. And as this doctrine ascribes the praise of all the good that is done by men to the efficacious grace of God, which makes for his glory; so it leaves the shame of evil doings to rest upon the authors of them, who are not partakers of the grace of God; even tho' it is not in their power to convert themselves, or cease to do evil, since this is owing to the vitiosity and corruption of their nature, of which they have reason to be ashamed; from whence all their evil doings spring, which being voluntarily committed, are their faults, tho' conversion-work transcends all the power of man to perform. Our author thinks, that if this be the case, their evil actions may be their misfortunes; but how they should be their faults, it is not easy to conceive: whereas let conversion be by moral suasion, or by omnipotent power, it makes no alteration in the nature of evil actions; they are voluntary transgressions of God's law, and as such, faults in men, as well as misfortunes to them, whether men are turned from them to God by the force of moral suasion, and the power of man's free will, or by the mighty power of God's grace.

I now proceed to mention some arguments in favour of efficacious and irresistible

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ble grace in conversion, and consider the exceptions to them. And,

I. If the grace by which we are converted, does not work with that efficacy, that it cannot but obtain the effect, but the co-operation of free will is required, then grace is not the beginning of every good thing, but the free will of man, yea, the efficacy of grace is made to depend upon the will of man ; and so the good work of faith and conversion, from whence all other good works spring, must be ascrib'd rather to the will of man than to the grace of God ; whereas every good and every perfect gift comes from above, from the grace of God, as the spring and source of it, and not from below, as it must, if it comes from the will of man ; for to say, as is said<sup>m</sup>, that when equal grace is confer'd on two persons, and the one believes, and the other does not, that the reason is, because the one receives it by the right use of free will, excited by the grace of God, and the other rejects it by the wicked abuse of free will, and fresh obstinacy against the grace of God ; what is this but to make the free will of man the chief cause of believing ? when nothing is more certain than that faith is the sole gift of God, and the operation of his power,

<sup>m</sup> Limborch, p. 388.

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II. If God, in the conversion of man, does not make use of that efficacious operation which determines man, but it is in his power to embrace or refuse the grace of God, or to do any thing towards his conversion, which another neglecting to do, is not converted, then he makes himself to differ, and has matter and occasion of boasting. The exceptions to this argument have been consider'd in the *Second Part*<sup>n</sup> of this performance, whither the reader is refer'd.

III. If such determining grace, or such a powerful operation of it, is not requisite to mens conversion, and is not put forth in it, then God does not bestow any singular special grace on them who are converted, than he does on them who are not converted; and so no more grace was given to *Peter* than to *Judas*, to *Paul* than to *Pilate*; whence it follows, that he that believes has no more reason to give thanks to God than he that does not believe. In the reply to this, 'tis own'd<sup>o</sup>, That God, in the ordinary vocation of men, does not give to one more grace than to another, or any special singular grace which he denies to another; but gives equal and sufficient grace to all to obey the call, provided by more grace, is

<sup>n</sup> Page 248, &c. 256, &c.    <sup>o</sup> Limborch, p. 390.

meant,

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meant, the same species of grace, but not the same degree. But if the same degree of grace is not given to one as to another, how does it appear that God gives equal grace to all, and what is sufficient for them to obey the divine call? or that the greater degree of grace is not attended with such an efficacious operation and irresistible power pleaded for by us? Moreover, it is said to be no absurdity, that he who does not believe, has equal reason to give thanks to God as he who does believe, if we respect the first offer of grace. But surely, according to this writer's own scheme, it can never be thought that he, who, tho' he has the same kind of grace bestowed upon him, yet not the same degree of grace, and so does not operate in the same way, nor produce the same effect in him as it does in others, can ever have the same reason to give thanks to God, as such have, who have a greater degree of it, and in whom it is productive of true faith and real conversion.

IV. Such is the method of divine Providence, that second causes should so depend upon God, in their beings and operations, that they cannot determine themselves to any act; but 'tis requisite that they be fore-ordain'd from eternity, and in time be pre-determin'd by God, not only to the act it self, but to the mode of it. The answer to this

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this is<sup>p</sup>, That if this was admitted, a fatal and an inevitable necessity of all things and events negative and positive, and of actions good and bad, would be introduced, and God must be the only cause of all the sins and iniquities committed in the whole world. To which may be replied, That the dependence of second causes upon God, in their beings and operations, and the pre-ordination and pre-determination of them to their acts, do indeed introduce a necessity of the event, that is, that such and such things shall be done, and in the manner appointed by God; but do not introduce a co-active necessity or force on the will of man: neither God's purposes in eternity, nor his pre-determinations in time, infringe the liberty of man's will, nor make God the author or cause of any one sin, as appears from the instances of the selling of *Joseph* by his brethren, and the crucifixion of Christ by the *Jews*.

V. The opinion which makes the grace of God resistible, leaves it uncertain, whether any one will be converted by it or not; or, if God did not work with an irresistible operation of grace upon the hearts of men in conversion, it was possible, that not one soul would have been converted. To this

<sup>p</sup> Limborch, p. 390.

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it is answer'd<sup>a</sup>, "That it leaves it as uncertain, whether any one will be unconverted or not." I reply, Since this resistible grace finds all men unconverted, and considering the resistibility of it, and the state and condition of man, that he is dead in sin, in enmity against God, his heart hard, and his will obstinate and perverse, it is not so uncertain, whether any one will be left by it unconverted, as that whether any one will be converted by it. It is moreover said<sup>r</sup>, That "a man may, notwithstanding this opinion, be infallibly certain otherwise, that many will be found true converts at the last, because he knows that many have already died in the fear of God, and in the faith of Christ; and because the holy scriptures do assure us, that *some shall arise to everlasting life, and receive the end of their faith in the salvation of their souls.*" This is very true, and yet, according to this opinion, it was possible, that not one of these might have been converted, because they might have resisted the grace of God, and made it of none effect. Besides, such who will be found true converts at last, who die in the fear of God, and in the faith of Christ, who shall rise again to everlasting life, and receive the end of their faith, the salvation of their souls, are such who are regenerated

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 302. Ed. 2. 295.

<sup>r</sup> *Whitby*, p. 303.

and

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and converted by the efficacious and irresistible grace of God, and are kept by the power of God, thro' faith, unto salvation. It is further observed, That "to say that it is barely possible, in the nature of the thing, that none may be converted, hath no inconvenience in it, because it tends not to hinder any man's endeavours after his conversion." I reply, supposing it does not, yet it has these inconveniences in it, that if it is possible that none may be converted, then it is possible that God's choice of persons to eternal life may be made void, and all his counsels and purposes concerning his elect frustrated. 'Tis possible, that the purchase and redemption by Christ may become of no effect, and he not see the travail of his soul, and be satisfy'd, tho' it is promised to him; and it is possible, that the spirit and grace of God may have none of the glory which arises from the conversion of a sinner, as well as that the salvation of every man must be very precarious and uncertain.

<sup>f</sup> *Whitby*, p. 303.

C H A P. V.

*Of the Freedom of the Will of Man.*

**H**AVE consider'd the nature of the power and liberty of man's will in the *First Part* of this work, where I have shewn, that the liberty of it does not consist in an indifference or indetermination to either good or evil; that the will of man is free from co-action or force, but not from an obligation to the will of God, the powerful influence of whose grace it stands in need of, to move and act in any thing that is spiritually good, without any infringement of the natural liberty of it; for the opposition we make, is not to the natural, but moral liberty of the will, which is lost by the fall. And tho' we cannot allow that man has either will or power to act in things spiritually good, as conversion, faith, repentance, and the like; yet we really grant, that he has a power and liberty of performing the natural and civil actions of life, and that



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ternal parts of religion: hence all the instances produced by Dr. *Whitby*, to prove the liberty of the will, as opposite not only to co-action, but necessity, are to no purpose, since they relate to such cases as are allow'd to be within the compass of the natural power and will of man<sup>u</sup>; such as chusing and retaining virginity, a power of eating and drinking, giving of alms, and the external ministration of the gospel. I have likewise consider'd, in the same performance, the several passages of scripture which are thought to contain arguments in favour of man's free will and power in conversion<sup>w</sup>, taken from the calls, invitations, commands and exhortations of God to it, as is supposed. In the *Second Part* of this work, I have endeavoured to vindicate such passages of scripture objected to, which represent the depravity, and corruption of human nature, and the disability of man to that which is spiritually good; what remains now, is to consider the arguments taken from reason, to prove the liberty of the will from necessity, that it cannot consist with a determination to one, *viz.* either good or evil; and that it does not lie under a disability of chusing and doing that which is spiritually good. And,

<sup>u</sup> *Whitby*, p. 338, 339. Ed. 2. 329, 330.

<sup>w</sup> See *Whitby*, p. 344, 345. Ed. 2. 335, 336.

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I. It is said<sup>x</sup>, “ That the freedom of the will, in this state of trial and temptation, cannot consist with a determination to one, *viz.* on the one hand, in a determination to good only, by the efficacy of divine grace; seeing this puts man out of a state of trial, and makes him equal to the state of Angels; nor with the contrary determination to evil only, for then man, in this state of trial, must be reduced to the condition of the devil and of damned spirits.” And it is more than once urged<sup>y</sup>, “ That the doctrine which teacheth that man is so utterly disabled by the fall of *Adam*, that, without the efficacious grace, which God vouchsafes only to some few, who are the objects of his election to salvation, he hath no power to do what is spiritually good, or to avoid what is spiritually evil, must be destructive of the liberty belonging to man, in a state of trial, probation, and proficiency.” This seems to be the principal argument, and on which the greatest stress is laid, since it is so often repeated and refer’d to. In my *First Part*<sup>z</sup>, I have consider’d this case, whether man is now in such a state of trial and probation as is contended for; where I have shewn, by several arguments, that man is not in such a

<sup>x</sup> *Whisby*, p. 309, 310. Ed. 2. 301, 302.

<sup>y</sup> *Whisby*, p. 314, 319. Ed. 2. 306, 311.

<sup>z</sup> N<sup>o</sup>. IV. p. 24, &c.

state ;

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state, and have given an answer to those which are brought in favour of it; and therefore am not concern'd to reconcile the doctrine of man's disability to do that which is spiritually good, to the liberty of man in such a state; or what becomes of this imaginary state, and the liberty of man in it. But tho' man is not in such a state, and his will is bias'd and determin'd, either by the efficacy of divine grace, to that which is good, or thro' the corruption of nature, to that which is evil; yet he is not, by the one, made equal to the state of Angels; nor by the other, reduced to the condition of the devil, and of damned spirits: for tho' regenerated persons, when, and while they are under the divine impulse, or powerful operation of grace, are bias'd and determin'd to that which is spiritually good, as the Angels are, without any violation of the natural liberty of their wills; yet they are not in an equal state with them, for they are still liable to sin, and their obedience is imperfect; neither of which can be said of Angels. Besides, at the same time, there is a principle of corruption in them, sin, that dwells in them, the old man, which is as much bias'd and determin'd to that which is evil, as the new creature, or the new man, is bias'd and determin'd to that which is good. And as for unregenerate men, whose hearts are *fully set in them to do evil*, tho' their  
their

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their hearts and inclinations may be as bad as the devils and damned spirits, yet they are not reduced to the same condition with them; for, besides their not being in a state of punishment, and being in the enjoyment of many mercies, and in a capacity of attending to the external ordinances and duties of religion, there is a possibility of their having the grace of God implanted in them.

II. Another argument against the disability of man, is thus formed<sup>a</sup>: "That which disables any man from chusing what is spiritually good, or refusing what is thus evil, and therefore must be destructive to his soul and spirit, must also take away his liberty to chuse what is spiritually good, and to refuse what is spiritually evil." I reply, 'tis certain, that what disables man from chusing what is spiritually good, or refusing what is thus evil, must take away his liberty to chuse and refuse them. Nor do we say that man, thus disabled, has still a freedom in reference to these actions, nor a power of doing otherwise; we deny both: these are the things in controversy between us. We allow, that man has a faculty and power of willing and doing things natural, but not a power and faculty of willing and doing things

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 313. Ed. 2. 305.

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spiritual : we own, that this disability is destructive to his soul and spirit ; if by being destructive, is meant being injurious to the well-being of it, to its spiritual and eternal welfare, unless the grace of God takes place ; but if by it is meant, that it is destructive to the natural powers and faculties of the soul and spirit, this must be denied : for tho' the moral liberty of the will is lost by sin, yet the natural liberty of it remains. Now, the moral liberty of the will is not essential to it, and therefore may be taken away, without the destruction of it. I doubt not, but it will be allowed, that the liberty to chuse what is spiritually good, and refuse what is spiritually evil, is the same liberty which is pleaded for in man's supposed state of trial and probation ; and yet this learned writer freely owns<sup>a</sup>, That that is not essential to man, as man ; and consequently may be taken away, without the destruction of the soul or spirit, or will of man : he owns, that it is no perfection of human nature, yea, that it is an imperfection ; and that it will, with our other imperfections, *be done away*. So that the doctrine of man's disability to that which is spiritually good, is not destructive of any of the natural faculties of the soul or spirit, nor of the will, nor of the moral liberty of it.

<sup>a</sup> *Whist*, p. 307, 308. Ed. 2. 299, 300.

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III. It is further urged<sup>b</sup>, That the doctrine of man's disability, by the fall of *Adam*, to do what is spiritually good, is "inconsistent with the new covenant of grace, establish'd in the blood of Jesus, and tender'd to all to whom the gospel is vouchsafed." Some men, indeed, plead for offers of Christ, and tenders of the gospel; but the offer or tender of the new covenant, is what I never met with in other writers. If this covenant is tender'd, upon the conditions of faith and repentance, to all to whom the gospel is vouchsafed, how can it be said to be *establish'd* in the blood of Jesus? It must be very precarious and uncertain, until the conditions of it are fulfill'd by those to whom it is tender'd. The doctrine of man's disability to do what is spiritually good, may seem inconsistent with the covenant of grace, to such who have no other notions of it, than that it is a conditional one; that faith, repentance, and obedience, are the conditions of it, and that these are in the power of man to perform; but not to those who believe, and think they have good reason to believe, that the covenant of grace is made with Christ, as the head and representative of the elect, and with them in him, and with them only; and that, with

<sup>b</sup> *Whitty*, p. 316. Ed. 2. 308.

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respect to them, it is entirely absolute and unconditional, to whom grace is promised in it, to enable them to believe, repent, and obey. The covenant of grace supposes the disability of man to do that which is spiritually good, and therefore provides for it; for God promises in this covenant, to *put his law in the inward parts, and write it in the hearts* of his people, yea, to *put his spirit within them, and cause them to walk in his statutes*; and says, *they shall keep his judgments, and do them*<sup>c</sup>.

IV. It is argued<sup>d</sup>, That if the will of man is determin'd to one, *viz.* to that which is good, by the grace of God; or to that which is evil, through the disability contracted by the fall; "this must take away the freedom of mens actions: since, then, there is no place for election and deliberation, it being certain, that the liberty of man must be deliberative, if it doth chuse, there being no election without deliberation." To which I reply, Supposing choice necessary to free actions, a determination of the will to some one thing, is not contrary to choice; for the human will of Christ, and the wills of Angels and glorified Saints, are determin'd only to that which is good;

<sup>c</sup> Jer. xxxi. 33. Ezck. xxxvi. 27.

<sup>d</sup> *Wistly*, p. 310, 312, 355. Ed. 2. 302, 304, 346.

and

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and yet they both chuse and do that good freely. And again, all that is done freely, is not done with deliberation and consultation; a man that falls into water, and is in danger of being drown'd, spying something which he can lay hold on to save himself, does not stay to consult and deliberate what he had best to do; but immediately, without any deliberation or consultation, lays hold upon it; and yet this he does freely. Besides, neither the disability of man, nor the efficacious influences of grace, at all hinder the freedom of human actions. A wicked man, who is under the strongest bias, power and dominion of his lusts, acts freely in his fulfilling of them; as does also a good man, in doing what is spiritually good; and never more so, than when he is under the most powerful influences of divine grace.

V. It is observed<sup>c</sup>, That the freedom of man's will, pleaded for, is absolutely requisite, to render our actions worthy of praise or dispraise; and that a determination to one, leaves no room for either of these. I reply; As to good men, they are not solicitous about the praise of their actions, being very willing to give the praise and glory of them to the grace of God, by

<sup>c</sup> *Whitby*, p. 308, 310. Ed. 2. 300, 302.



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which they are what they are, and do what they do; tho' I see not, why these should not be praise-worthy; and the more, for being done in a dependence on the grace of God, and under the influences and by the assistance of it. The good actions of Angels and glorified Saints are praise-worthy; they are commended for doing the commandments of the Lord, for their constant and perfect obedience to his will: hence our Lord taught his disciples to pray, that the will of God might be done on earth, as it is done in heaven; and yet the wills of these celestial inhabitants are only determin'd to what is divine, spiritual and heavenly. And as to the actions of wicked men, notwithstanding their disability to do that which is spiritually good, they are worthy of dispraise; for if bad fruit may be dispraised which comes from a corrupt tree, that brings it forth by a physical necessity, a necessity of nature, much more must the actions of wicked men be worthy of dispraise, who voluntarily chuse their own ways, and delight themselves in their abominations. The actions of apostate angels deserve dispraise, and they have been rebuked for them by the Lord himself; and yet their wills are determin'd only to that which is evil.

VI. It is said <sup>f</sup>, That the freedom pleaded for, is such, as “is absolutely requisite, to render our persons worthy of rewards or punishments;” and that, without such a power and liberty to chuse or refuse what is spiritually good <sup>g</sup>, men are “no more rewardable for chusing it than the blessed Angels, and as little liable to punishment for not doing what is spiritually good, as the devils and damned spirits;” or, as it is elsewhere <sup>h</sup> expressed, “then must all future recompences be discarded, it being sensibly unjust to punish any man for doing that which it never was in his power to avoid; and as unreasonable to reward him for the action which cannot be praise-worthy.” I have already observed, that actions to which men are directed, influenc’d and determin’d, by the grace of God, are commendable and praise-worthy; as the services of Angels and glorified Saints, and so are rewardable by the grace of God, tho’ not thro’ any merit or desert in them; for as the Saints have all they have through the grace of God, and do all they do, that is well done, by the assistance of it, so they expect no other reward but what is according to it. And as to wicked men, they are justly liable to punishment for their wicked

<sup>f</sup> *Whitby*, p. 308. Ed. 2. 300.

<sup>g</sup> *Whitby*, p. 320. Ed. 2. 311, 312.    <sup>h</sup> *Whitby*, p. 15.

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actions, since these are committed by them, against the law of God, voluntarily, with a full will, desire, delight and affection, without any force upon them; tho' they are influenc'd and determin'd to them by the corruption of their nature; which corruption of nature is so far from excusing them from condemnation and punishment, that it is an aggravation of it: even as the devil, are not only liable to punishment for their former transgressions, but to greater degrees thereof, by their daily repeated sins, tho' their wills, through the malice and wickedness of their natures, are only determined to sin.

VII. The learned writer<sup>i</sup>, attended to, argues "from what he had more largely insisted on elsewhere, to shew that God acts suitably to our faculties, by the illumination of our understanding, and by persuading the will by moral causes, and from his having demonstrated the falshood of that supposition, That tho' God has laid no necessity upon man to do evil by his own decrees, yet man lies under a necessity of doing evil since the fall, by reason of the disability he hath contracted by it, to do any thing which is truly good; and from his having shewed, that tho' the evil habits added to our natural corruption, do render

<sup>i</sup> *Whitby*, p. 353. Ed. 2. 344.

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it exceeding difficult, they do not render it impossible for them to do what is good and acceptable in the sight of God." I reply; If no more light was put into the understanding of man, or communicated to him, but what is done by moral causes, he would never be capable of knowing and receiving the things of the spirit of God; and if the will of man was no otherwise wrought upon than by moral suasion, it would never be subject to the law of God or gospel of Christ. Nor has this author demonstrated the falsehood of the hypothesis, That tho' God has laid no necessity upon men to sin by his decrees, yet such is the disability of man, contracted by the fall, that he cannot but sin; for God's decrees do not at all infringe the liberty of the will, as the case of *Joseph's* being sold by his brethren, and the crucifixion of Christ, do abundantly declare; and that such is the state of man since the fall, such the corruption and impotency of his nature, that he cannot do that which is spiritually good, and is fully set and wholly bent upon that which is evil, both scripture and all experience sufficiently testify. I observe, this author allows of the natural corruption of man, which he elsewhere seems unwilling to own; and that evil habits added to it, render it exceeding difficult, tho' not impossible, to do that which is good;

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good : whereas the Prophet represents <sup>k</sup> it as impossible for persons to *do good*, that *are accustomed to do evil*, as it is for the *Ethiopian to change his skin*, or *the leopard his spots*.

VIII. The same <sup>l</sup> author “ argues from the received notion of the word, that that only is said to be free for us to do, which it is in our power to do ; which may be done otherwise than it is done, and about which there is ground for consultation and deliberation.” I reply, That these rules will hold good about the natural and civil actions of life, which, 'tis allow'd, are in the power of men to do, are controulable by his will, upon consultation and deliberation ; and as to outward acts of religion, there are many things in the power of man, which may be done otherwise than they are, upon consultation and deliberation. But as to spiritual things, they are not in the power of man, and yet they may be done freely, under the influence and by the assistance of the grace of God ; and if no actions can be free, but what may be done otherwise than they are, then the actions of the holy Angels and glorified Saints, of Christ as man, yea, of God himself, cannot be free. And as to evil actions, committed by wicked men, they are

<sup>k</sup> Jer. 13. 23.

<sup>l</sup> *Whitby*, p. 354. Ed. 2. 345.

done

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done by them freely; even tho' they are such slaves to sin, so overcome by it, and so much under the power of it, that they cannot do otherwise but sin; and that oftentimes, without consultation or deliberation, the corruption of their natures strongly inclining and pushing them on unto it.

IX. This author goes on <sup>m</sup> to argue from *Le Blanc*, "That all the actions which proceed freely from us, may be subject to a command, and by the law of God or man may be enjoined, or forbidden; but this cannot agree to those acts, *circa quos voluntas immutabiliter se habet*, in which the will is so immutably determin'd, that it never can or could do otherwise." To which may be replied, That the actions of the holy Angels and glorified Saints are subject to a command, and are done in obedience to the will of God, and which proceed from them freely, tho' their wills are immutably determin'd, that they never can do otherwise. On the other hand, the evil actions of devils are forbidden by the law of God, and proceed from them freely, tho' their wills are so immutably determin'd, that they never can do otherwise. And if so, why may not, on the one hand, the good actions of Saints, done in obedience to the law of God, pro-

<sup>m</sup> *Whitby*, p. 356. Ed. 2. 347.

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ceed freely from them, tho' their wills are influenc'd and determin'd by the grace of God to them? And, on the other hand, why may not the actions of wicked men, forbidden by the law of God, proceed freely from them, tho' their wills are influenc'd and determin'd to them thro' the corruption of their nature. This writer <sup>a</sup> further observes, "That if this be the case of lapsed man, his sin cannot proceed freely from him, and so cannot reasonably be forbidden; and that those laws are certainly unjust, which prohibit that under a penalty, which a man cannot possibly shun, or require that which cannot possibly be done:" or, as he elsewhere <sup>b</sup> expresses it, "to make laws for lapsed man, impossible to be perform'd by him, is unsuitable to the divine Wisdom, to punish him for not doing what he could not do; or performing what he could not avoid, is unsuitable to the divine Justice; and to excite them to their duties by motives, which he knows cannot work upon them, is unsuitable to the sincerity of God." I answer, That when God first made and gave laws to man, he was in a capacity to obey them; they were not impossible to be perform'd by him; he was not then in his lapsed estate; and therefore it was not un-

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 356. Ed. 2. 347.

<sup>b</sup> *Whitby*, p. 315. Ed. 2. 357.

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suitable to the divine Wisdom to make and give out the laws he did; nor is it now unsuitable to it to continue them, which is necessary to support his own authority, tho' man has lost his power to obey. Man's present impossibility to fulfill the law of God, does not arise from the nature of that law, nor from his original constitution, but from that vitiosity and corruption which he has contracted by sin: wherefore, it is not unsuitable to divine Justice to punish for that which man cannot do, or cannot avoid, any more than it is unjust in a creditor to demand his just debts, and punish for the same, tho' the debtor is not in a capacity to pay. Nor is it unsuitable to the sincerity of God, nor in vain, that he makes use of motives, as promises and threatnings, to excite men to duty, which he knows cannot work upon them without his powerful grace; since by these he more fully points out the duty of man, admonishes him of it, expresses more largely the vile nature and dreadful consequences of sin, leaves the impenitent inexcusable, and, by the power of his grace accompanying these means, brings his own people effectually to himself.

X. Another argument to prove freedom from necessity, is thus <sup>p</sup> formed: "If wicked

<sup>p</sup> *Whitby*, p. 357. Ed. 2. 348.

men



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men be not necessitated to do the evil that they do, or to neglect the good they do neglect, then have they freedom from necessity, in both these cases; and if they be thus necessitated, then neither their sins of omission or commission could deserve that name." It is elsewhere said<sup>1</sup>, "That the notion concerning the consistence of liberty with necessity, and a determination to one, is destructive of the nature of vice and virtue:" and if this be true<sup>2</sup>, "then vice and virtue must be empty names." I reply; As to the first of these, the definition of sin is not to be taken from the power of man, or from what he can or cannot do, but from the law of God; for *sin is a transgression of the law*, and that action which is voluntarily committed against the law of God, is blame-worthy, and deserves the name of sin or vice, and so punishable; tho' the will may be influenc'd and determin'd to it by the corruption of nature: for sin is no less sinful, because man has so corrupted his way, and implicated himself in sinning, that he cannot do otherwise. The devils can do nothing else but sin; and yet, surely, their actions deserve the name of vice. As to the actions of good men, performed under the influences of the grace of

<sup>1</sup> *Whitby*, p. 322. Ed. 2. 314.      <sup>2</sup> *Whitby*, p. 15.

God,

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God, 'tis certain, that they are called 'vertues in scripture, and are truly and properly so; 'tis strange, that the grace of God, which influences, determines, and enables men to perform an action better, should destroy the goodness of it, and take away both its name and nature. The good actions of the holy Angels may be called vertues, tho' their wills are influenc'd and determin'd by the grace of God to these, and these only.

XI. It is affirmed, "That there is a plain agreement betwixt the doctrine of Mr. *Hobbs* and of us concerning this matter, as to the great concernments of religion." Be it so; if it be truth we agree in, it is never the worse for being held and maintain'd by a man, otherwise, of corrupt principles. Truth is truth, let it drop from what mouth or pen soever; nay, if deliver'd by the devil himself, it ought to be assented to as such: but, perhaps, upon an examination of this matter, it will not appear, that there is such a plain agreement between our sentiments and those of this gentleman. For,

I. The question between Mr. *Hobbs* and Bishop *Bramhall*, as drawn up by the latter, and allow'd by the former, was plainly

<sup>†</sup> Philip. iv. 8. 2 Pet. i. 3, 5.

<sup>‡</sup> *Whitby*, p. 359. Ed. 2. 350.

## 1-5 The Cause of God and Tri

th 1. - Whether all agents and all natural, civil, moral, (for we speak now of the conversion of a sinner, it comes not this question) be pre-determined extrinsically and inevitably, without own concurrence in the determination of all actions and events, which either shall be, cannot but be, nor can be willed, after any other manner, or other place, time, number, measure nor to any other end than they are: this in respect of the supreme cause concurs of extrinsical causes determine them to one." So that the conversion of a sinner did not concern the question of them; whereas this is the main difference between us and the *Arminians*, whether the conversion of a sinner is to be ascribed to the efficacy of the grace of God, or to the power of man's free will.

2. The dispute between Mr. Hobbes and his antagonists, was not about the power of the will, or of man to do this or that, but about the natural liberty of man. Mr. Hobbes allows, That "man is free to do what he wills," but denies that "man is free to will;" and therefore declares whatever is alledg'd to prove that man hath liberty to do what he wills, is

\* The questions concerning liberty, necessity, a cause, chance and accident. p. 3, 34. See 1000.

\* See p. 10.

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tinent to the question<sup>x</sup>; and complains of the Bishop, who “would fraudulently insinuate, says he, that it is my opinion, that a man is not free to do if he will, and to abstain if he will; whereas, from the beginning, I have often declared, that it is none of my opinion; and that my opinion is only this, that he is not free to will, or, which is all one, he is not master of his future will;” which he elsewhere explains thus<sup>y</sup>: Put the case, a man has a will to day to do a certain action to-morrow, is he sure to have the same will to-morrow, when he is to do it? Is he free to day to chuse to-morrow’s will? this is that now in question. Hence it appears, that tho’ he denies the natural liberty of the will, or that the will has a liberty of it self to will, but supposes it is necessitated by preceding causes; yet he affirms, that man has a power of doing whatsoever he will, in which he agrees not with us, but with the *Arminians*; as is more fully manifest, from what he observes concerning the covenant made with man, *do this, and thou shalt live*. ’Tis plain, says he<sup>z</sup>, That if a man do this, he shall live; and he may do this if he will: in this the Bishop and I disagree not. This, therefore,

<sup>x</sup> The questions concerning liberty, necessity and chance, clearly stated and debated, p. 143.

<sup>y</sup> Ibid. p. 310.

<sup>z</sup> Ib. p. 191.

## 1-3 The Cause of God and Truth.

It is not the question; but whether the will to do this, or not to do this, be in a man's own election: whereas, on the other hand, we believe that man has no power to do any thing that is spiritually good, and that if he had a will to keep the law of God, he is not able to do it; we affirm with the Apostle<sup>1</sup>, That *tho' his will is present with us, but he is not able to perform that which is good we find not.*

3. The learned author himself I attend to, has such an observation as this: "Tis no great difference, says he, betwixt the opinion of these men and that of Mr. *Hobbs*; that the one destroys the liberty of all our actions, and the other only destroys our liberty in spiritual and moral actions." This observation implies, that there is *a difference*, tho' it supposes *no great difference* between our opinion and that of Mr. *Hobbs*. The difference must appear considerable to every one that observes, that as the case is here stated, the one *only* destroys our liberty in spiritual and moral actions, the other destroys the liberty of *all* our actions. We say, that the moral liberty of the will is only lost by the fall, but that the natural liberty of it continues, and is even preserved in all those actions, in which man appears to be a slave to his sinful lusts and pleasures.

<sup>1</sup> Rom. vii. 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Whitby*, p. 362. Ed. 2. 354.

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We suppose that man has a liberty of will in things of a natural and civil, but not in things of a moral and spiritual kind.

4. Our opinion is, that the will of man is moved and determined by the special influence of the grace of God, to that which is spiritually good; as it is moved and determined, whilst the man is in a natural estate, by the influence of corrupt nature, to that which is evil. Mr. *Hobbs* will not allow, that the will is determined by special influence from the first cause: "That senseless word *influence*, says he<sup>c</sup>, I never used;" nor will he allow, that the will is *moved* at all; and still less, by any thing *infused*; whereas we suppose, that grace is infused into the soul, and by this the will is moved and determined to that which is spiritually good: his words are these<sup>d</sup>; "And because nothing can move, that is not it self moved, it is untruly said, that either the will, or any thing else, is moved by it self, by the understanding, by the sensitive passions, or by acts or habits, or that acts or habits are *infused* by God; for *infusion* is motion, and nothing is moved but bodies."

5. The necessity we contend for, that the will of man lies under, is only a necessity of obligation to the will of God, and a necessity of immutability and infallibility with

<sup>c</sup> The questions concerning liberty, necessity and chance, clearly stated and debated, p. 190, 231.    <sup>d</sup> Ibid. p. 246.

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respect to the decrees of God, which have their necessary, unchangeable, and certain event, and a necessity of influence by the power of the grace of God, to that which is spiritually good; and by the strength and prevalence of corruption, to that which is evil; all which is consistent with the natural liberty of the will: but then we say, it is <sup>free</sup>, not only from a necessity of co-action or force, but also from a physical necessity, or a necessity of nature; such as that by which the sun, moon and stars, move in their course, fire burns, light things ascend upwards, and heavy bodies move downwards; whereas Mr. *Hobbs* affirms<sup>c</sup>, That “every man is moved to desire that which is good to him, and to avoid that which is evil to him, especially, the greatest of natural evils, death; and that by a certain necessity of Nature, no less than that by which a stone is moved downwards.” And elsewhere he expresses himself thus<sup>f</sup>: “My meaning is, that the election I shall have of any thing hereafter, is now as necessary, as that the fire that now is, and continueth, shall burn any combustible matter thrown

<sup>c</sup> Fertur enim unus quisque ad appetitionem ejus quod sibi bonum & ad fugam ejus quod sibi malum est, maxime autem maximi malorum naturalium, quae est mors; idque necessitate quadam naturae non minore, quam qua fertur lapis deorsum. *Hobbs's de Civitate*, c. i. § Sect. 7. p. 11. Ed. Amsterd. 1657.

<sup>f</sup> The questions concerning liberty, necessity and chance, clearly stated and debated, p. 232.

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into it hereafter; or, to use his (the Bishop's) own terms, the will hath no more power to suspend its willing, than the burning of the fire to suspend its burning; or rather, more properly, the man hath no more power to suspend his will, than the fire to suspend its burning."

6. Mr. *Hobbs's* opinion, makes God the cause of all sinful actions, as well as good; and this is not only a consequence deduced from his principles by his opposers, but is what is allowed by himself; tho' he will not admit that it follows, that God is the author of them. "Author, he says", is he which owneth an action, or giveth a warrant to it: do I say, adds he, that any man hath in the scripture (which is all the warrant we have from God for any action whatsoever) a warrant to commit theft, murder, or any other sin? does the opinion of necessity infer that there is such a warrant in the scripture? Perhaps he (the Bishop) will say no; but that this opinion makes him the cause of sin. But does not the Bishop think him the cause of all actions? and are not sins of commission actions? is murder no action? and does not God himself say, *non est malum in civitate quod ego non feci*? And was not murder one of these evils?

<sup>2</sup> The questions concerning liberty, necessity and chance, clearly stated and debated, p. 175.



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Whether it were or not, I say no more, but that God is the cause (not the author) of all actions and motions; whether sin be the action, or the defect, or the irregularity, I mean not to dispute." But in another place<sup>h</sup>, he will by no means admit of the distinction between the action, and the sinfulness or irregularity of it. Now, tho' our opinion is often charg'd with making God the author of sin; yet we are far from admitting such a charge to be just: and one way of clearing our selves from such an imputation, we take, is by using the distinction of an action, and the ataxy, disorder or irregularity of it, which Mr. *Hobbs* disallows of. And so far are we from making God the cause of sin, that we allow sin to have no efficient, but only a deficient cause; tho' Mr. *Hobbs* is of opinion<sup>i</sup>, "That the distinction of causes into *efficient* and *deficient*, is *Bobu*, and signifies nothing." All these things being consider'd, it will not appear that there is such a plain and manifest agreement between the doctrine of Mr. *Hobbs* and us concerning this matter, as to the great concernments of religion, as is undertaken to be shown. But supposing there is a plain agreement between him and us in this *single*

<sup>h</sup> The questions concerning liberty, necessity and chance, clearly stated and debated, p. 89. See also his *Leviathan*, c. 46. p. 322. Ed. Amsterd. 167c. <sup>i</sup> Ibid. p. 175.

point,

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point, of the consistence of liberty with necessity, why should it be cast upon us in a way of reproach? when it is notorious, that in *many* things, there's a plain and manifest agreement between him and the *Socinians* and *Arminians*; for, not now to give instances of his agreement with the former, about the doctrine of the Trinity<sup>k</sup>, the person<sup>l</sup> and offices of Christ, and his satisfaction<sup>m</sup>, the doctrine of Justification<sup>n</sup>, the Immortality of the soul<sup>o</sup>, its State after death, and the Eternity of the future torments of the wicked<sup>p</sup>, I shall just hint some few things in which he agrees with the latter; by which it will appear, that if any reproach attends an agreement of sentiments with him, it will fall upon them, and not upon us. And,

1. We say that all men are, as *David* was, *shapen in iniquity*, and *conceived in sin*; that they are evil from their birth, and are *by nature children of wrath*. But Mr. *Hobbs*<sup>q</sup> says, "That men are by nature

N 4 evil,

<sup>k</sup> Leviathan, c. 16. p. 81. c. 46. p. 317. Append. ad Lev. c. 1. p. 333, 339, 342, 346. <sup>l</sup> Leviathan, c. 46. p. 317.

App. c. 1. p. 339. <sup>m</sup> Lev. c. 38. p. 217. c. 41. p. 226, 227.

<sup>n</sup> Leviathan, c. 43. p. 287. de Civ. c. 13. p. 12. <sup>o</sup> Le-

viathan, c. 38. p. 211. c. 44. p. 295. App. c. 3. p. 163. <sup>p</sup> Le-

viathan, c. 38. p. 210, 211. c. 44. p. 295, 300, 301.

<sup>q</sup> Objectum porro a nonnullis est, quod omnes homines non modo malos, sed etiam (quod concedi sine impietate non potest) natura malos esse. Quamquam enim a natura, hoc est ab ipsa nativitate, ex eo quod nascentes animalia, hoc habeant, ut

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evil, cannot be granted without impiety; and tho' from their birth, they may have desire, fear and anger; yet they are not to be reckon'd evil on the account of these, since the affections of the mind, which flow from the animal nature, are not evil; but the actions which arise from them are sometimes so, when they are noxious and contrary to duty. Infants, unless you give them all that they desire, weep and are angry, and even beat their parents, and this they have from nature; and yet they are without fault: nor are they evil; first, because they cannot hurt; and next, because, wanting the use of reason, they are free from all duty."

In this the *Arminians* agree with him, who, one and all, deny the doctrine of original sin: it would be needless to refer to authorities in proof of this.

2. We say, that every imagination of the thought of the heart is evil; that the first thought and desire of sin, or inclina-

statim omnia quae sibi placent, cupiant, faciantque quantum possunt, ut quae impendunt mala, aut metu fugiant, aut ira repellant, non tamen ab eam causam mali censurisolent. Nam affectus animi qui a natura animali profiscuntur, mali non sunt ipsi, sed actiones inde provenientes, malae aliquando sunt, nimirum quando & noxae sunt & contra officium. Infantes nili cuncta, quae cupiunt, dederis, plorant atque irascuntur, etiam parentes ipsos verberant, habentque a natura, ut ita faciunt; attamen culpa vacant, neque mali sunt, primo, quia nocere non possunt, deinde quia rationis usu carentes officiorum omnium immunes sunt. *Hobbes Praefat. in Lib. de Cive.*

tion

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tion and motion to it, is sinful. But, says Mr. *Hobbs* ; “ Their opinion, who say the first motions of the mind are sins, seems to me to be too severe, both to themselves and others.” He denies “ that the affections of the mind are evil,” or “ that the passions of men are sins.” And do not the *Arminians* agree with him, when they say, “ that concupiscence, and the first motions of it, are no sins; and that it was not forbidden to *Adam* in his state of innocence ?

3. We say, that men have no good thing in them, but what is put into them by the grace of God ; that they cannot think a good thought of themselves; and that every thing of this nature comes from God. But Mr. *Hobbs* says, That the schools, “ not knowing the nature of the imagination and sense,

<sup>r</sup> Sententia igitur eorum qui motus animi primos peccata esse aiunt, tum aliis tum sibi met ipsis nimirum severa mihi videtur. *Leviathan*, c. 27. p. 138. affectiones animi mali non sunt ipsi. *Praefat. L. de Cive.* Passiones hominum peccata non sunt. *Leviathan*, c. 13. p. 65.

<sup>t</sup> Concupiscentia in primo statu Adamo vetita non est, ac proinde peccatum non fuit. *Episcop* Disp. 20. Thes. 16. Primos concupiscentiae motus quibus assensum non praebeat voluntas, dicunt quidem esse peccata, sed scriptura ita de illis non judicat. *Curcellaeus* de Pecc. orig. f. 35, 36. vid. *Institut. Rel. Christi*. l. 4. c. 16. f. 9.

<sup>u</sup> Est autem hoc opus scholarum — nescientes enim imaginationis & sensationis naturam, docent quae didicerunt, alii imaginationes oriri a seipsis id est sine causâ, alii oriri a voluntate, cogitationesque bonas inspirari in hominem a Deo & malas a diabolo; vel cogitationes bonas infundi in hominem a Deo, malas a diabolo. *Leviathan*, c. 2. p. 8.

teach

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teach what they have learnt; some, that the imaginations arise from themselves, that is, without a cause; others, that, for the most part, they arise from the will; and that good thoughts are inspired into men by God, and evil ones by the devil; or, that good thoughts are infused into men by God, and evil ones by the devil." This he represents as a great mistake, and arising from gross ignorance, that good thoughts are infused by God; and what else do the *Arminians* say, when they affirm<sup>u</sup>, that man, before regeneration, has a power of willing that which is good; and that the will of man is flexible to that which is good, without the grace of God; and observe<sup>w</sup>, that when the Apostle says, *not that we are sufficient to think any thing as of our selves*, that he does not say that they were not sufficient to think any good thing of themselves; intimating, that men are sufficient of themselves to think that which is good.

4. We affirm, that the understanding of man is so darkened by sin, that, without the illumination of the spirit of God, he cannot understand the mind of God in the scrip-

<sup>u</sup> Voluntas hominis post lapsum, ante regenerationem retinuit libertatem seu facultatem liberam sive bonum sive malum volendi. *Remonstr. sex colloc.* Hag. p. 250. an tu negas liberum Arbitrium esse flexibile in utrumque partem, addo & sine gratia? flexibile enim est natura sua. *Armin. contr. Perkins.* p. 604.

<sup>w</sup> Vid. Act. synod. circ. art. 4. p. 168.

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tures. On the other hand, Mr. *Hobbs*\* intimates, that men, without a supernatural revelation, or inspiration, which he calls enthusiasm, may, by mere natural reason, know what God says, and understand the scriptures as much as is necessary, to know our duty to God and man. And do not the *Arminians* teach the same, that the mind and will of God may be easily known from the sole reading of the scriptures, without any illumination of the Holy Ghost; for, say<sup>v</sup> they, a sense super-infused, would be the sense of the Holy Ghost, and not of the scripture; and that men endued with common sense and judgment may un-

\* Ex quibus scripturis per interpretationem rectam, causamque ratiocinationem, praecepta & regulae ad scientiam officiorum nostrorum tum erga Deum, tum erga homines necessariae, sine Enthusiasmo, aut inspiratione supernaturali facile depromi possunt. *Leviathan*, c. 32. p. 176. Quando & quid loquutus sit Deus, id quod ab iis, quibus nulla data est revelatio supernaturalis, sciri non potest nisi per rationem naturalem. *Ib.* c. 33. p. 176.

<sup>v</sup> Sensus ille superinfusus non erit sensus verborum scripturae, sed sensus spiritus Dei, aut si est sensus verborum scripturae quomodo & qua re, differt a sensu grammatico? quorsum superinfunditur? aut ut intelligatur sensus, qui jam intelligitur? Nugae, an ut elatius intelligatur? at sensus in indivisibile consistit, si dicas lumen hoc spiritus sancti praerequiri ut verus sensus intelligatur, auges absurditatem. *Remonstr.* Apolog. pro Confess. c. 1. p. 34. Tanta est claritas & perspicuitas in sensibus imprimis ad aeternam salutem intellectu necessariis, ut omnes lectores non docti tantum sed idiotae (communi quidem sensu ac judicio praediti) quantum satis est, mentem eorum adsequi possint modo prae judicio, vana confidentia, aliisque pravis affectibus, sese occaecari non sinant. *Ib.* Confessio, c. 1. §. 14. p. 6. Vid. *Episcop.* Disp. 3. Thes. 1. 2.

derstand

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derstand the meaning of them; and that there is a natural power, common to all that are endued with reason, to attain unto it.

5. We say, that faith is the gift of God, and does not proceed from natural causes, and that all grace is implanted in us, and infused into us by the spirit of God. Mr. *Hobbs* rejects every thing of this kind, and says<sup>a</sup>, “That these phrases, *infused virtue, inspired virtue*, are insignificant, mere sounds, and are equally as false as, that a four-square is round; and that it is giving the name of body to an accident, to say that faith is infused or inspired, when nothing is fusible or spirable but a body.” He reckons<sup>a</sup> it among the diseases of a body politic, as a seditious opinion, and what makes men apostates from natural reason, “that faith and holiness cannot be acquired by study and reason, but are supernaturally inspired or infused;” and round-

<sup>a</sup> Si falsum sit dicere, *quadratum est rotundum*, nomen illud *quadratum rotundum*, sonus merus est, nihil significans, similiter si falsum sit dicere virtutem fundi vel *flari* posse, verba haec *infusa virtus inflata virtus*, nomina sunt insignificantia. *Leviathan*, c. 4. p. 12. nomina corporum induunt accidentibus—qui dicunt *fidem esse infusum* vel *inspiratum*, cum nihil neque fusile sit, neque spirabile praeter corpus. Ib. c. 5. p. 22.

<sup>a</sup> Fidem & sanctitatem acquiri studio & ratione non posse, sed supernaturaliter inspiratas vel infusas esse, est seditiosa opinio. *L. de Cive*. c. 12. l. 6. & *Leviathan*, c. 29. p. 152.

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ly<sup>b</sup> asserts, that tho' faith and holiness are scarce, yet not miracles; and that they proceed from education, discipline, correction, and other natural causes." And elsewhere<sup>c</sup> he says, "That God disposeth men to piety, justice, mercy, truth, faith, and every kind of virtue, moral and intellectual, by doctrine, example, and other natural and frequent methods." And tho' he is obliged to own<sup>d</sup>, that "faith is the gift of God, which he works in different persons, and in different ways, as seems good unto him, and is what he gives and denies to whom he pleases; yet, he says, when he gives it, he gives it by teachers: and therefore the immediate cause of faith is hearing; as in a

<sup>b</sup> Fides & sanctitas etsi raræ, non ideo sunt miracula, sed procedunt ab educatione, disciplina, correctione aliis que causis naturalibus. Ib. p. 153.

<sup>c</sup> Homines enim ad pietatem, Justitiam, misericordiam, veritatem, fidem & virtutum genus omne tum morale tum intellectuale disponit Deus per doctrinam, exemplum, aliasque vias naturales & quotidianas. Ib. c. 36. p. 200.

<sup>d</sup> Est enim fides donum Dei, *quam* in diversis hominibus viis diversis, prout sibi ipsi visum operatur. — At si fidei causa sit doceri; cur non credunt omnes? nisi quod fides sit donum Dei, quod cui vult dat & negat. Sed tamen quando dat, per doctores dat, & proinde causa fidei immediata est auditus. Quemadmodum in ludo literarum, ubi docentur multi, quidam proficiunt, quidam non proficiunt, differentia non semper a magistro est. Bona omnia a Deo quidem proficiuntur, sed per media plerumque naturalia, non est ergo temere credendum illis, qui doctrinis suis, donum Dei prætendunt supernaturale, doctrina enim eorum examinanda prius est ab Ecclesia. *Levianthas*, c. 43. p. 282, 283.

school,



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## *The Cause of God and Truth. 13.*

ly<sup>b</sup> asserts, that tho' faith and holiness are scarce, yet not miracles; and that they proceed from education, discipline, correction, and other natural causes." And elsewhere he says, "That God disposeth men to piety, justice, mercy, truth, faith, and every kind of virtue, moral and intellectual, by doctrine, example, and other natural and frequent methods." And tho' he is obliged to own<sup>d</sup>, that "faith is the gift of God, which he works in different persons, and in different ways, as seems good unto him, and is what he gives and denies to whom he pleases; yet, he says, when he gives it, he gives it by teachers: and therefore the immediate cause of faith is hearing; as in a

<sup>b</sup> *Fides & sanctitas etsi raræ, non ideo sunt miracula, sed procedunt ab educatione, disciplina, correctione aut quæ causis naturalibus. Ib. p. 153.*

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school, where many are taught, some are proficient, some not, the difference is not always from the master. All good things, indeed, come from God; but most commonly by natural means: therefore we must not rashly give credit to them, who, in their doctrines, pretend to a supernatural gift; for their doctrine is first to be examin'd by the church." Tho' elsewhere, when it serves his purpose, he thinks fit to contradict himself, and asserts\*, That "faith is an act of the mind, not commanded, but wrought by God; which, when and to whom he will, he gives or denies." And moreover, says†, that "the hearts of all men are in the hands of God, who works in men both to do and to will, and without his free grace, no man hath inclination to good, or repentance for sin." And, do not the *Arminians* agree with this man in his other expressions? since they deny\* the infusion of habits, before any act

\* Credere enim animi actus est, non adeo jussus sed factus quem quando & quibus vult, Deus dat negatque. Ib. c. 26. p. 336.

† Pater est misericordiarum—— in cujus manibus sunt corda hominum omnium, qui in hominibus operatur tum facere, tum velle, & sine cujus gratia libera nemo habet neque inclinationem ad bonum neque retipiscenciam a malo. Ib. c. 44. p. 300.

‡ Ea quae de habitum infusione, ante omnem fidei actum dicuntur, negamus & rejiciuntur a nobis *Coroim.* ad *Walachr.* p. 67. nulla est gratia infusa in voluntate — Principium internum fidei a nobis in Evangelio requisitae esse habitum quantum

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act of faith, or that any grace is infused into the will, or that the internal principle of faith is an habit infused by God, or that faith is called the gift of God, in respect of any actual infusion of it into our hearts; and affirm<sup>b</sup>, that no other grace is necessary to draw forth an act of faith, than that which is of a moral nature, or that which uses the word as an instrument to produce faith; which word of the gospel is the sole and ordinary means of conversion, without the concurrence of any internal, efficacious and irresistible act of the Holy Ghost.

6. We say, That that faith which is commonly called justifying faith, or that by which we believe to the saving of our souls, is not a general assent to the person and offices of Christ, and to the truths and doctrines of the gospel; but is that grace by which a soul goes out of it self to Christ, and relies upon him for pardon, righteousness, life, and salvation, by which it appropriates Christ to it

quandum divinitus infusum, cujus vi atque efficacitate voluntas determinatur, hoc negavi. *Grewinchov. contr.* Amef. p. 327. eam non posse donum Dei appellari nisi respectu actualis infusionis in corda nostra id vero nos exserte negamus. *Remonstr.* in Coll. Hag. art. 3. & 4. p. 308.

<sup>b</sup> Fatemur aliam a nobis ad actum fidei eliciendum necessariam gratiam non agnosci quam moralem, sive eam quae verbo tanquam instrumento ad fidem efficiendam utitur. *Acta synod.* circ. art. 4. p. 62. si verbum Evangelii non est solum & unicum conversionis medium ordinarium, sed actio spiritus sancti interna & efficax sive irresistibilis concurrere debeat tum sequitur, &c. lb. p. 128.

self,

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self, and is an holy and humble persuasion and confidence of interest in him, and in the blessings of grace procur'd by him. But Mr. *Hobbs*<sup>1</sup> says, That "the only article of faith which the scriptures make necessary to salvation is, that Jesus is the Christ." And not much different from this, is the definition of faith given by the *Arminians*, who say<sup>2</sup>, That "justifying faith is that by which we believe in Christ as the Saviour of all, and even believers, and of him also that believes by Christ in God that justifies the ungodly;" or, that "it is a fiducial assent to the gospel, by which a man is persuaded that all that is in it is true, and by which he trusts and acquiesces in God through Christ.

7. We affirm, that we are only justified by the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and not by faith or works, as the matter of our justification before God; that faith is that grace by which we receive the righteousness of Christ, as a justifying one,

<sup>1</sup> *Ubiens amicus fidei quem ad salutem aeternam necessarium fidei in scripturis sacris. hic est, quod Jesus est Christus. 1<sup>o</sup> de Trin. c. 4. p. 10. 2<sup>o</sup> de Chr. c. 18. f. 6.*

<sup>2</sup> *Fides iustificans est qua creditur in Jesum Christum tantum in salutem credentium univ. & singulorum, etiam ipsius qui credit & per Christum in Deum justificantem impium. Armin. Artic. respond. de fide art. 6. est autem fides in Christum assensus fiducialis evangelio adhibitus, quo statuo vere esse omnia ea, quae evangelio continentur, inque Deo per Christum confido & acquiesco. Episcop. Disp. 15. Thes. 3.*

by

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by which we have the sense and perception of our justification, and enjoy the peace and comfort which flow from it; and that good works, springing from faith, are declarative of it before men. But Mr. *Hobbs* says<sup>1</sup>, That "both faith and obedience justify, God accepting the will for the deed; that obedience justifies, because it makes righteous, in the same manner as temperance makes a man temperate, prudence makes a man prudent, and chastity makes a man chaste, viz. essentially: faith justifies in the same sense as a judge is said to justify, who absolves by a sentence which actually saves; in this acceptation of justification, faith alone justifies; in the other, obedience alone." And how near does this come to the sentiments of the *Arminians*<sup>m</sup>? who say,

Part III.

O

"that

<sup>1</sup> Quoniam ergo Deus voluntatem pro ipso opere eorum tantum accipit, qui credunt in Jesum Christum, fides sola in hac verbi acceptatione iustificare dici potest; adeo ut fides & obedientia utraque iustificent, sed in diversa significatione *justificare*. *Leviathan*, c. 43. p. 287, 288. Iustificat ergo obedientia, quia facit iustum eo modo, quo temperantia facit temperatum, prudentia prudentem, castitas castum, nimirum essentialiter — iustificat ergo fides eo sensu quo iustificare dicitur Iudex, qui absolvit, nimirum per sententiam quae actu salvum facit, atque in hac acceptatione iustificat fides sola, in illa autem sola obedientia. *L. de Civ. c. 18. f. 12.*

<sup>m</sup> Haec mea sententia est, fidem eamque solum, quanquam sola sine operibus non est, ad iustitiam imputari, hac sola nos coram Deo iustificari, absolvi a peccatis & iustos censeri, pronunciari, declarari a Deo. *Armin. ad Hippol. inter ejus opera, p. 772.* Haec per gratuitam acceptationem Dei in Christo habebatur

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“ that faith only, altho’ it is not alone without works, is imputed for righteousness; and by this alone we are justified before God, absolved from sin, and reckon’d, pronounc’d and declar’d righteous by him:” and, “ that this, by the free acceptance of God in Christ, is reckon’d for the whole righteousness of the law, which we are bound to perform ;” and “ that faith is properly to be taken for the habit, without that obedience which is to be yielded to the gospel ; and by that we are properly, tho’ freely, justified and saved by God.”

Now, not to take any notice of the agreement of these men with Mr. *Hobbs*, about the extent of Christ’s death, and the nature of his sacrifice<sup>a</sup>, the power of man, to do what he will, before observed, and the easy performance of the laws of nature<sup>c</sup>, when these things are seriously considered, the charge of *Hobbism* or *Hobbesianism*, will fall upon them, and not upon us.

XII. It is said<sup>d</sup>, “ That our opinion differs very little, and in things only of little

habeatur pro omni legis justitia, quam nos praeſtare tenebamur. Bert. Discept. Epist. contr. Lubbert, p. 6. Fidem proprie accipiendam esse pro habitu, sine obedientia illa, quae praestatur Evangelio, eaque nos proprie sed tamen gratis justificari a Deo & salvari, ib. p. 81.

<sup>a</sup> Vid. *Leviathan*, c. 38. p. 217, &c. 41. p. 226, 227.

<sup>c</sup> Vid. *L. de Civ. c. 3. s. 30.*

<sup>d</sup> *Wh. sty.* p. 359. Ed. 2. 350.

moment

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moment from the *Stoical* fate, and lies obnoxious to the same absurdities which the *Philosophers* and *Christians* did object against it." To which I reply,

1. That of all the sects of the antient Philosophers, the *Stoicks* came nearest to the Christian religion, has been observed<sup>a</sup> by many; and that not only with respect to their strict regard to moral virtue, but also on the account of principles and doctrines; insomuch that *Jerome* affirms<sup>r</sup>, that in most things they agree with us. They assert the unity of the divine Being, the creation of the World by the *λογος*, or Word, the doctrine of Providence, and the conflagration of the Universe. And it is not to be wonder'd at, that they should have any knowledge of these things, since *Zeno*, the founder of their sect, was a *Phœnician*, as was also *Antipater* of *Sidon*; and others of them were of *Syrian* extract, as *Diogenes Babylonius*, and *Posidonius*, who, doubtless, conversed with and received most of their doctrines from their neighbours, the *Jews*<sup>t</sup>. And certain it is, that several of the first Christian writers were either of this sect, or much inclined to it, and greatly favour-

<sup>a</sup> Vid. *Gataker*. Praeloqu. ad Marc. Antonin.

<sup>r</sup> Stoici qui nostro dogmati in plerisque concordant. *Hieron.* in *Esaiam*, c. 11. p. 22. L.

<sup>t</sup> Vid. *Gale's* Court of the *Gentiles*, par. 2. b. 4. c. 3. § 1, 5, 8.



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ed it; as *Pantaenus*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Tertullian*, *Arnobius*, and others'. 'Tis an observation of *Lipsius*", That "divine Providence, before it would spread the first light of wisdom among us, by sending wisdom it self, that is, the Son of God, thought good to send first such as these, meaning the *Stoicks*, and their writings, to light up the sparks thereof, and drive away some *Cimmerian* darkness of vice and error." And should it appear, that we agree with them in the doctrine of God's decrees, I know no other consequence that will follow upon it but this, that our doctrine is consonant to the light of nature, and far from being repugnant to the natural reason of mankind. It is, indeed, not very easy, to settle their true sense and meaning of fate, since they do not seem to agree one with another, nor to write consistently with themselves; did they, we should not be ashamed to own an agreement with them. And it must be allowed, that there are some things said by them, which have an affinity with some tenets of ours; as,

Vid. *Lips. Manuduct. ad Stoic. Phil.* l. 1. diff. 17. p. 100,

101.

"Quid dissimulandum est? divina providentia priusquam lucem sapientiae plenam, missa ipsa sapientia (id est Filio) nobis spargeret, hos tales praemisisse videtur, ut Scintillas ejus adducerent & errorum vitiorumque cimmerias quasdam tenebras accerent. *Lips. ib.* diff. 16. p. 91.

(1.) When

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(1.) When they say that fate is God himself, to whom all things are subject, and by whom they are all determined, ordered and directed as he pleases. This is mention'd by *Laertius*\*, as one of the positions of *Zeno*, the author of this sect, "That there is one God, who is called the mind, fate, *Jupiter*, and by many other names." And, says *Seneca*†, who was one of the best writers among them, "If you call him (God) fate, you will not be mistaken, since fate is nothing else but an implicated series of causes, and he is the first cause of all on which the rest depend." And a little after †, "if you call him nature, fate, fortune, they are all the names of the same God, using his power in a different way." *Panaetius*, the *Stoick*, also expressly asserts fate to be God‡; with whom agrees *Phur-*

\* Εἷς τὸ εἶναι θεόν, καὶ πᾶν, καὶ ἀπαρμένον, καὶ διὰ πολλὰς τῶ ἐτεροῦς ὀνομασίας προσμαζέσθαι, *Laert.* in vii. *Zen.* l. 7.

† Quid enim aliud est natura quam Deus? — hunc eundemque & fatum si dixeris, non mentieris, nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit, quam series implexa causarum, ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua caeterae pendent. *Seneca de beneficiis*, l. 4. c. 7.

‡ Si hunc naturam vocas, fatum, fortunam, omnia ejusdem Dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate, ib. c. 8. vid. *Nat. Quaest.* l. 2. c. 45.

§ Vid. *Gale's Court of the Gentiles*, par. 2. b. 4. c. 3. f. 12.

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*nutus*, another of the same sect, who says <sup>a</sup>, that *Jupiter* is called fate, because of the invisible distribution or ordination of things which befall every man in this life." Now, setting aside the language in which these things are expressed, there is nothing but what is agreeable to our sentiments, namely, that God is he who has fixed and determined all things in their own order, place and time, according to his good will and pleasure; and that God's decree, is God himself decreeing: and therefore we also agree with them, when

(2.) They represent fate as no other than the will, purpose and decree of God: This *Homer* calls <sup>b</sup> the counsel, or good will and pleasure of God; and *Seneca* <sup>c</sup>, a divine law, and an eternal law, which is no other than the eternal will of God, and so agreeable to the derivation of the word <sup>d</sup>, *fatum a fando*.

<sup>a</sup> Ο Ζεύς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ μοῖρα, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁραμένη διακρίσεις εἶναι τῶν ἐπιβαλλομένων ἐκαστῷ. Phurnutus de natura Deorum, p. 19. Vid. Chrysippum apud Cicero de nat. Deorum, l. 1.

<sup>b</sup> — Διὶ δ' ἐτελείῃς βολή. *Homer. Iliad.* 1. lin. 5.

<sup>c</sup> Omnia certa & in æternum dicta lege decurrere. *Seneca* cur Bon. vir. Mal. Fiant. c. 5. non externa cogunt Deos, sed sua illis in legem æterna voluntas est. *Ib. de Benef.* l. 6. c. 23. Sciēt, enim id accidisse lege divina, qua universa procedunt. *Ib. Ep.* 76.

<sup>d</sup> Fatum autem dicunt, quicquid dii fantur, quicquid Jupiter fatur; a fando igitur fatum dicunt, id est a loquendo. *Isidor. Hisp. Orig.* l. 8. c. 11. p. 72.

very one of us. And if we  
allow the thing to be done, we  
say; "human government is estab-  
lished by divine Providence, and he-  
fore any one will affirm to that,  
if he calls the will to power of God  
that name, let him hold his opinion,  
correct his language." And when the  
pagans charged the doctrine of grace, as  
obtained by him, with being the same  
as the Stoical fate, he replied, "under  
the name of grace we do not affirm fate,  
because we say, that the grace of God is not  
preceded by any merits of men: but if

Vox enim Jovis factum est. dicitur in Regi. 1. 1. 1.

Quid enim aliud est factum, quam quod de omnipoten-  
tiam Deus factus est? Non. Jovis. Officiis, p. 10.  
Propter divinas providentia regna constituitur homines,  
si propitius quisquam fuit trinitas, qui ipse deus est  
vel potestatem fari nomine opellat, immensum totum  
sam corrigat. Aug. de civ. dei. l. 1. c. 1. et vol. 1. c. 1.

... Eadem officium nonnulli habent

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any please to call the will of the omnipotent God, by the name of fate, we shun, indeed, the use of new profane words, but do not love to contend about them." So our *Bradwardine*, who was a second *Austin*, says<sup>i</sup> concerning the *Stoicks*: "They spoke of fate according to the efficacy of the divine Will, wherefore they were free from all real, tho', perhaps, not from verbal error; for the word fate is suspected with *Catholics*, tho' the thing it self is right."

(3.) We agree with them, when they assert, that all things that happen<sup>k</sup>, are determined by God from the beginning, or from eternity<sup>l</sup>; and that they happen very justly<sup>m</sup>, and always for the best<sup>n</sup>; and there-

<sup>i</sup> *Ipsi enim loquebantur de fato secundum efficaciam voluntatis divinae; quare & ab omni errore reali, etsi non vocali, forsitan sunt immunes. Haec enim vox fatum apud catholicos est suspecta; licet res ipsa sit sincera, Bradwardin. de causa Dei, l. 1. c. 28. p. 267.*

<sup>k</sup> Συμβαίνει τι μοι; δεχομαι, επι της θεας αναφερατ, των παντων πανην, αφ' ης παντα τα γινόμενα συμβησονται. M. Antonin. l. 8. f. 23.

<sup>l</sup> Ει μεθευχε σοι τι καλως; εκ των ολων απ' αρχης σοι συκθε:μεροσ και συ:εκλωδεσθω παν το συμβαινον. Ib. l. 4. f. 26. ο τι εν συμβαινει, τω σοι εξ αιωνος προκα:σκειυαλεισθω. Ib. l. 10. f. 5.

<sup>m</sup> Παν το συμβαινον, δικαιοσ συμβαινει, ο εαν ακριβαν ποσ:ευκασσης, ευησσεισ & λεγω μονον καλα το εξης, αλλ' ει καλα το δικαιον. Ib. l. 4. f. 10.

<sup>n</sup> Ει μη εν ευλευσανθω πτει εμε και των εμοι συμβησται ηφαισθω οι θεοι, καλως ευλευσανθω. Ib. l. 6. f. 44. μονον ελεω το εαλεισθω συμβαινον και συκλωδομενον, τι γαρ αρμο:εισθω. Ib. l. 7. f. 57.

fore advise men to give themselves up willingly to fate, or patiently and quietly to submit to the will of God<sup>o</sup>: all which entirely agree with many passages of scripture<sup>s</sup>, and with the practices of the best of men, both among *Jews* and *Christians*<sup>s</sup>, and of our Lord and Master *Jesus Christ* himself<sup>r</sup>.

(4.) Some of them were very careful to preserve the natural liberty of the will of man, as we are. *Chrysippus*, one of the principal among them<sup>r</sup>, was of opinion, "That the mind was free from the necessity of motion; which, in this case, he disapproved of; and tho' it was his sentiment, that nothing happen'd without preceding causes; yet, that he might escape necessity, and retain fate, he distinguish'd causes; some of which, he said, were *perfectae* &

<sup>o</sup> Vid. *Epist.* *Enchirid.* c. 38, 77, 78, 79. & *Arrian.* l. 2. c. 17. & l. 3. c. 26. *Antonin.* l. 3. f. 16. & l. 4. f. 34. & l. 10. f. 28. & *Seneca*, Ep. 107.

<sup>p</sup> *Act.* xv. 17, 18. *Psal.* cxlv. 17. *Rom.* viii. 28. *Jam.* iv. 15. *Psal.* xlv. 10.

<sup>q</sup> 1 *Sam.* iii. 18. *Job* i. 21. *Psal.* xxxix. 9. *Act.* xxi. 14.

<sup>r</sup> *Luke* xxii. 42.

<sup>s</sup> *Chrysippus* — applicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus animos liberatos volunt — *Chrysippus* autem cum & necessitatem improbare & nihil veller hae propositis causis evenire, causarum genera distinguit, ut & necessitatem effugiat & retineat fatum; causarum enim, inquit, aliae sunt perfectae & principales, aliae adjuvantes & proximae; quamobrem cum dicimus omnia fato fieri causis antecedentibus, non hoc intelligi volumus causis perfectis & principalibus, sed causis antecedentibus, adjuvantibus & proximis, *Cicero* de fato.

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*principales*; others, *adjuvantes* & *proximæ*: and therefore, when he asserted, that all things were by fate from preceding causes, his meaning was, that they were so, not by the former, but the latter sort of causes." And, says *Seneca*, men know not what they may will, but in the very moment in which they will; for to will, or nill, is not entirely decreed to any man. Indeed, they seem too jealous of the liberty of the will, and fear, where no fear or cause of fear was; as if liberty could not consist with any kind of necessity: and therefore *Austin* blames them; when he says, "hence it appears, That that necessity is not to be feared; by fearing which, the *Stoicks* have labour'd so to distinguish the causes of things, as to withdraw some from, and put others under necessity; and among those which they would not have to be under necessity, they place our wills, lest they should not be free, if put under necessity;" and goes on to prove, that the will may be subject to some sort of necessity, without any disadvantage to it; so

\* Nesciunt ergo homines quid velint, nisi illo momento quo volunt, in totum nulli velle aut nolle decretum est, *Seneca*. Ep. 20.

“ Unde nec illa necessitas formidanda est, quam formidando stoici laboraverunt causas rerum ita distinguere, ut quasdam subtraherent necessitati, quasdam subderent; atque in his quas esse sub necessitate noluerunt, posuerunt etiam nostras voluntates, ne videlicet non essent liberae, si subderentur necessitati. *Aug.* de civ. Dei. l. 5. c. 10.

that



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that in this he, with whom we agree, in some respect, exceeded the *Stoicks* themselves.

(5.) It must be allow'd, that much the same objections were made against the *Stoical* destiny, as are made against the decree of election, and met with like success, and were refuted in much the same manner. As our opponents argue, that if a man is chosen to salvation, he need not be concerned about the means; whether he has them, and uses them or no, he shall certainly be saved: but if he is not chosen to it, let him be never so careful and concerned about means, he shall not be saved. So the opposers of the *Stoicks* argued against them thus: "If it is thy fate, that thou shalt recover of this disease, thou shalt recover, whether thou makest use of a physician or no; but if thy fate is, that thou shalt not recover, whether thou usest a physician or no, thou shalt not recover." This argument, in *Cicero*, is represented agreeable to the philosophers; as, *αργὸν λόγον*, *ignava ratio*, *iners genus interrogationis*, an idle way of reasoning. *Cicero* observes, That if there was any thing in this argument, it would hold equally good, if fate was never mention'd: his words are these "You may change, and not use the word fate, and yet hold the same opinion, in this manner; if this was true from eternity, that thou shalt recover of this



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this disease, thou shalt recover, whether thou usest a physician or no; but if this was false from eternity, that thou shalt recover of this disease, whether thou usest a physician or no, thou shalt not recover." And then proceeds to shew in what manner *Cbrysippus*, the *Stoick*, answered and refuted this argument, by distinguishing things into *simplicia* & *copulata*; which are illustrated by the instances of *Oedipus* being begotten by *Laius*, and *Milo's* wrestling in the *Olympic* games; where he shews, that it is a mistake, to suppose that it was destin'd that *Laius* should beget *Oedipus*, whether he had carnal knowledge of a woman or no; or that *Milo* should wrestle, whether he had an adversary to wrestle with or no; for these things, he observes, are *confatalia*, equally included in fate, to which *Cicero* assents, and says, that in this way all captious arguments of this kind are refuted: and, upon the whole, *Carneades* himself, a violent opposer of the *Stoicks*, disapprov'd of this kind of reasoning, and thought the argument was too inconsiderately concluded, and therefore pressed *Cbrysippus* in another way, and left off calumny\*.

In

\* Nec nos impediet illa ignava ratio quae dicitur. Appel-  
latur enim quidam a philosophis αἰσῶν καὶ μοῖρα, cui si pa-  
reamus, nihil est omnino, quod agamus in vita. Sic enim  
interrogant, si fatum tibi est, ex hoc morbo convalescere,  
sive medicum adhibueris, sive non, convalesces. Item, si fa-  
tum tibi est, ex hoc morbo non convalescere, sive tu medicum  
adhibueris,

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n like manner, we say, that the means, justification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth, or faith, holiness, &c. are, to use *Chrysippus's* phrase, *confatalia*, equally with the end included in the decree of election, as they are left out of the decree of reprobation; and therefore pronounce it a captious and idle way of talking, to say, that if a man is elected to salvation, he shall be saved, whether he is sanctified or no,

adhibueris, sive non, non convalesces. Et alterutrum fatum, medicum ergo adhibere nihil attinet. Recte genus hoc interrogationis ignavum atque iners nominatum est, quod eadem ratione omnis a vita tollitur actio. Licet etiam immutare, ut facit ximen non adjungas & eandem tamen teneas sententiam, hoc modo; si ex aeternitate verum hoc fuit, ex isto morbo convalesces, ve adhibueris medicum, sive non, convalesces. Itemque si ex aeternitate, hoc falsum fuit, ex isto morbo non convalesces, ve adhibueris medicum, sive non, adhibueris, non convalesces, inde caetera. Haec ratio a Chrysippo reprehenditur; quaedam nim sunt, inquit, in rebus simplicia, quaedam copulata. Simplex, morietur eo die Socrates, huic sive quid fecerit, sive non fecerit, finitus est moriendi dies. At si fatum sit, nascetur Oedipus Laio, non poterit dici sive fuerit Laius cum muliere sive non fuerit, copulata enim res est & confatalis; sic enim appellatur quia ita fatum sit & concubitorium cum uxore Laium & ex ea Dedipum procreaturum. Ut si esset dictum luctabitur Olympiis Milo & referret liquis, ergo sive habuerit adversarium, sive non habuerit, luctabitur, erraret; est enim copulatum, luctabitur, quia sine adversario nulla luctatio est. Omnes igitur alius generis, captiones, eodem modo refelluntur, sive tu adhibueris medicum sive non adhibueris, convalesces, Captiosum, nam enim est fatale, medicum adhibere quam convalescere; haec, ut dixi, confatalia ille appellat. Carneades hoc totum genus non probabat & nimis inconsiderate concludi hanc rationem putabat, itaque premebat alio modo, nec ullam adhibebat calumniam. *Cicero* de fato.

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or whether he believes or no; and if he is not elected, he shall not be saved, let him be never so much concerned for faith and holiness, Again; it was objected to the *Stoicks*, that they made God the author of sin, and particularly by *Plutarch*<sup>w</sup>, to *Chrysippus*, that, according to him, "there was no intemperance or fraud, but what *Jupiter* was the author of;" and by others<sup>x</sup>, to the same *Stoick*, "That if all things were moved and governed by fate, and could by no means be avoided, then the sins and transgressions of men were not to be ascribed to their own wills, but to a certain necessity which arises from fate, and is the governess of all things, by which that must needs be which shall be; and therefore the punishment of transgressions is unrighteously fixed by laws, if men do not willingly commit sin, but are drawn to it by fate." To this *Chrysippus* answers, and the substance of his answer is

<sup>w</sup> Vid. Lipf. Physiolog. Stoic. l. 1. Diff. 14.

<sup>x</sup> Aliarum autem opinionum disciplinarumque auctores huic definitioni, ita obstreperunt. Si Chrysippus, inquit, fato putat omnia moveri & regi, nec declinari transcendique posse agmina fati & volumina, peccata quoque hominum & delicta non sustentanda neque condicenda sunt ipsi voluntatibusque eorum, sed necessitati cuidam & instantiae, quae oritur ex fato, omnium quae sit rerum domina & arbitra, per quam necesse sit fieri quicquid futurum est, & propterea nocentium poenas legibus inique constitutas, si homines ad maleficia non sponte veniunt, sed fato trahuntur, *A. Geil. Noët. Attic.* l. 6. c. 2.

this

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this<sup>y</sup>, "That tho' all things are connected with fate, yet the dispositions of our minds are only subject to it, agreeable to the property and quality of them; for if they are first wholesomely and profitably formed by nature, they more inoffensively, and tractably get over all that force which extrinsically comes upon them by fate; but if they are rough, ignorant, and uncultivated, and not assisted by the help of wholesome arts, tho' they may be moved by little or no force of fatal disadvantage; yet, thro' their own badness and voluntary impetus, fall into daily sins and mistakes. This he exemplifies<sup>\*</sup> by the rolling of a stone downhill; the man that pushes it, gives it its first motion, but not its volubility; and its continuing to move downwards, does not arise from him that first moved it, but from its own volubility. So, says he, the necessity of fate moves the kinds, and principles of causes; but it is our own will that moderates, go-

<sup>y</sup> Quanquam ita sit, inquit, ut ratione quadam principali necessario coacta atque connexa sint fato omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa mentium nostrarum proinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietates eorum est ipsa & qualitas; nam si sunt per naturam primitus salubriter utiliterque facta, omnem illam vim quae de fato extrinsecus ingruit, inoffensus tractabiliusque transmittunt. Sin vero sunt aspera incita & rud<sup>a</sup>, nullisque artium bonarum adminiculis fulta, etiam si parvo sive nullo fatalis incommodi confictu urgeantur, sua tamen scaevitate & voluntario impetu in assidua delicta & in errores ruunt. lb.

<sup>\*</sup> lb. Vid. etiam *Cicero*. de fato.

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This may be further illustrated by the instance of *Zeno* and his servant. *Zeno* caught his servant playing the thief, and beat him for it. The fellow, agreeable to his master's doctrine, as he thought, and in vindication of himself, says, that he was destin'd by fate to steal. Yes, replies *Zeno*, and to be beaten too<sup>c</sup>. When it is objected to us, that we make God the author of sin, we deny it, and clear our selves, by distinguishing between the action and the disorder of it; for, tho' God is concerned in all motion and action, for in him we live, move, and have our being, and he is the first cause and mover of all things; yet the ataxy, disorder and iniquity of any action, arise from our selves, and our own corrupt will and affections; and whatever concern we suppose the decrees of God have about sin, yet they do not excuse the wickedness of men, or exempt them from proper punishment: the same decree which permits sin, provides for the punishment of it.

(6.) How far soever the *Stoicks* carried their doctrine of fate or destiny, it is certain, they never thought it had a tendency to looseness of life; nor does it appear to

<sup>c</sup> Δυλον επι κλοπῇ (φασιν) μαστιγῇ τε δ' εἰποι]θ', εἰμαρτο μοι κλεψαι, και δαρηναι, εφη. *Laert.* l. 7. in vita *Zenon*.

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have had any such influence upon them, for, of all the sects of the philosophers, none were more addicted to, in the love and practice of, moral virtue, than this sect. The *manual of Epictetus*, his *commentaries*, digested by *Arrianus*, the writings of *Seneca*, and of the Emperor *Mark Antonine*, do abundantly declare their strict regard to the worship of God, and the doing of Justice among men. This made *Josephus* say<sup>d</sup>, that the sect of the Pharisees, which was the strictest sect among the Jews for morality and external holiness, was very much like to that of the *Stoicks*. 'Tis, indeed, said<sup>e</sup> of *Tiberius Nero*, that he was more negligent of God and religion, being fully persuaded that all things were done by fate; but then the historian observes, that he was addicted to the mathematicks, so that the fate he gave into, was not the *Stoical* fate, as asserted by the best writers of that sect, but the mathematical fate, which depended upon the influence of the stars. Now of these things in which we agree with them we are not ashamed, and what advantage our opponents are able to make of all this, I see not. But others of this sect, or the

<sup>d</sup> Η ζαριστιανὴ ἀρεστὴ παροπλισθεῖσι τῇ παρ' Ἑλλήσι  
ἐκείνῃ λεγομένη. *Joseph.* in vita sua.

<sup>e</sup> Circa Deos & religiones negligentior, quippe addictus  
mathematicae, persuasionisque plenus, cuncta fato agi. *Sueton.*  
Nero. c. 69.

same

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same writers, by either contradicting themselves, or one another, or as they have been understood by others, very greatly differ from us in their doctrine of fate or destiny; as when,

(1.) And as far as they agree with the *Chaldeans* and astrologers, who placed fate in the position and influence of the stars. The wiser sort of them, indeed, rejected the dreams and follies of judiciary astrology<sup>f</sup>, and were far from making fate wholly to consist in these things; and yet it seems as tho' they were more or less included by them in their series and connexion of causes which they make fate to be: however, it is certain that the vulgar sort had no other notion of fate than this, which made *Austin*<sup>g</sup> say, "That when men hear fate spoken of according to the usual custom of speech, they understand nothing else but the influence of the position of the stars; such as it is when a man is born or conceived." Now between this notion of fate, and our doctrine concerning God's decrees, there is no manner of agreement. We deny any such influence of the stars, which work by a necessity of nature, upon the

<sup>f</sup> Vid. *Cicer.* de divinatione, l. 2.

<sup>g</sup> Nam id homines quando audiunt, usitata loquendi consuetudine, non intelligunt nisi vim positionis syderum, qualis quando quis nascitur sive concipitur. *Aug.* de civ. Dei, c. 1.

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wills and actions of men ; and therefore, when this was objected to the doctrine of grace, taught by the above writer, he answers<sup>b</sup>, “ They that assert fate, says he, contend, that not only actions and events, but that our wills depend upon the position of the stars, at the time that a man is conceived or born, which they call constellations ; but the grace of God not only exceeds all the stars and all the heavens, but even all the angels. Moreover,<sup>!</sup> the assertors of fate, ascribe both the good and evil things of men unto it ; but God prosecutes the sinful demerits of men with their due reward, and gives good things with a merciful will, thro’ undeserved grace ; doing both, not according to the then present consort of the stars, but according to the high and eternal counsel of his severity and goodness: wherefore we see, that neither belong to fate.”

<sup>b</sup> Fatum quippe qui affirmant, de syderum positione ad tempus quo concipitur quisque vel nascitur, quas constellationes vocant, non solum actus & eventa, verum etiam ipsas nostras voluntates pendere contendunt. Dei vero gratia non solum omnia sydera, & omnes coelos, verum etiam omnes angelos supergreditur. Deinde fati assertores & bona & mala hominum fato tribuunt. Deus autem in malis hominum meritis eorum debita retributione prosequitur, bona vero per indebitam gratiam misericordie voluntate largitur, utrumque faciens non per stellarum temporale consortium, sed per suae severitatis & bonitatis aeternum altumque consilium. Neutrum ergo pertinere videmus ad fatum. *Aug. contr. duas Epist. Pelag.* l. 2. c. 6.



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(2.) When they make fate to be something distinct from the divine Being, something without him, and by which he himself is bound and governed, and which he cannot obstruct nor alter, such laws being put in the nature of things, that he cannot change. *Seneca* says<sup>1</sup>, "The same necessity binds both God and man, the irrevocable course carries equally things divine as human. The maker and governor of all things himself has, indeed, ordained the fates; yet follows them, and always obeys, having once commanded." 'Tis said<sup>k</sup>, that it is not lawful for him to alter the connexion, or turn the course of causes, or go contrary to the laws which he has fixed, and by which he himself is bound; yea, that it is impossible<sup>k</sup> for him to avoid the destined fate. So *Jupiter* is introduced in

<sup>1</sup> Eadem necessitas & Deos alligat, irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor, rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur, semper parat, semel iudic, *Seneca* de Provid. c. 5.

<sup>k</sup> Non illa Deo vertisse licet  
Quae nexa suis currunt causis,  
*Seneca*. Oedipus, act. 5. Chorus.

Finxit in aeternum causas, qua cuncta coercent,  
Se quoque lege tenens & saccula iussa ferentem,  
Fatorum immoto divisiſt limite mundum.

*Lucan*. Pharsal. l. 2. c. 9, &c.

<sup>k</sup> Τὴν περὶ μέγαν μοῖρην ἀδύι ἀγέει ἀπορῶσαι καὶ θεῶ.  
*Herodot*. l. 1. c. 91.

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*Homer*<sup>1</sup>, complaining that he could not deliver his son *Sarpedon* from death, which was appointed by fate for him. But we say, that God's decree is within himself, and that whatsoever is in God, is God; and that his decree is nothing else but himself decreeing, which flows from his sovereign free good will and pleasure, and that whatsoever he does in heaven or in earth, he does freely, and as he pleases; and can, and does when he thinks fit, interrupt, stop or change the natural order and course of things; he can make the sun to stand still, stop the course of waters, and make them to stand up as a wall, hinder the burning of fire, open rivers in high places, and fountains in the midst of the vallies, make the wilderness a pool of water, and dry land springs of water. If, indeed, they meant no more than that God is immutable in his purposes, unalterable in his decrees, and will *stare decreto*, stand by his decree, and never repent *primi consilii*, of his first counsel

<sup>1</sup> Ω μοι εγων οσι μοι Σαρπηδονα ριχ[α]λον ανδρα,  
Μοις' υπο Πηλεελλοιο Μενοιτιαδαο δαμνηται.

*Homer. Iliad. 16.*

Hoc sentit *Homerus* cum querentem *Jovem* inducit, quod *Sarpedonem* filium a morte contra fatum eripere non posset, hoc idem significat *Graecus* ille in eam sententiam versus,

Quod fore paratum est id summum exuperat *Jovem*.

*Cicer. de Divin. l. 2.*

and

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and thoughts, as *Seneca*<sup>m</sup> says; we are of the same mind with them: but otherwise, as *Lactantius*<sup>n</sup> observes, “If such is the power of the destinies, that they can do more than all the celestial Beings, than even the Lord and governor himself, why may not they be rather said to rule, whose laws and statutes necessity obliges all the Gods to obey?”

(3.) When they make fate to be a series of causes, whose connexion is natural, or which are, in their own nature, fitly and unalterably joined and connected together; for, according to *Chrysippus*<sup>o</sup>, fate is a natural order or connexion of all things from eternity, one following upon another, such being the complication of them, that it is entirely unalterable:” whereas we say, that all second causes are governed, directed and disposed of by the will of God, and entirely depend upon his free good will and pleasure; and that, when he pleases, he can break the chain and connexion, and can act

<sup>m</sup> Nec unquam primi consilii Deos poenitet. *Seneca* de Benef. l. 6. c. 23.

<sup>n</sup> Si parcarum tanta vis est, ut plus possint quam caelestes universi, quamque ipse rector & dominus; cur non illae potius regnare dicantur, quarum legibus ac statutis parere omnis Deos necessitas cogit? *Lactant.* de fals. relig. l. 1. c. 11.

<sup>o</sup> Ειμαρμένη φυσικὴν συνῆλξιν τῶν ὅλων ἐξ αἰτίᾶς τῶν ἐξείρων τοῖς ἐξέροις ἐπακολουθῶσαν, καὶ μὴ πολλοὺς μὲν ἢ ἀπαράβατος τῆς τῆς αὐτῆς συμπλοκῆς. *Chrysipp.* apud A. Gell. Noct. Attic. l. 6. c. 2.

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without them, besides them, and above them. The sentiments of the *Stoicks* in this respect, seem to have the nearest affinity with those of a certain generation of men who have lately risen up among us, who talk of *the nature and fitness of things* by which God himself is bound, to which he conforms, and according to which he acts: tho' one would think, if this was the case, the nature and fitness of things should rather be called God, than he whom they call so.

(4.) When they assert, as *Cbrysippus* does in the above definition, that fate is a series of all causes and things from everlasting; whereas, tho' we believe that whatsoever comes to pass, was known and determined by God from all eternity, and comes to pass in the way and manner, with, without, or besides second causes, just as he pleases; yet neither the things nor their causes, nor the series of them, were from eternity, but arise and proceed in time, according to the eternal will of God.

(5.) When they seem to say that all causes act naturally, and by their own natural strength produce their effects necessarily, and so destroy all contingency in any sense: whereas we suppose, that as there are some

<sup>p</sup> Quid fies? quid, opas? perdis operam. *Desine fata Deum flecti sperare precando.* Rata & fixa sunt atque magna & aeterna necessitate ducuntur. *Senec. Epist. 77.*

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causes which act naturally and necessarily, others are free, and produce their effects freely; others are contingent, and produce their effects contingently, in respect of themselves, tho' with respect to the decree of God they act necessarily.

(6.) When they intimate that the will of man may be forced, tho' this is sometimes strongly denied by them<sup>9</sup>; and, indeed, they talk much of free will, and say<sup>r</sup>, "A wise man does nothing unwillingly, and escapes necessity; but then it is, because he wills what he would otherwise force him to." And even in that famous wish or prayer of the *Stoick Cleanthes*<sup>c</sup>, so often mention'd by themselves and others, where, tho' he desires that fate and *Jupiter* would lead him to what he was ordained; yet observes, that if he did not follow, whether he would or no, he must: for,

<sup>9</sup> Vid. *Arrian. Epictet.* l. 1. c. 6, 17, 19. & l. 2. c. 2, 15, 17, 23. & l. 3. c. 26.

<sup>r</sup> Nihil invitus facit sapiens, necessitatem effugit, quia vult quod ipsa coactura est. *Senec.* Ep. 54.

<sup>c</sup> Ἀγὼ δὲ με ὡς ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ ἡ πεπρωμένη, οἱ ποτ' ὕμῃς, εἰμι διατίταγμένῳ, ὡς εἴομαι γὰρ ἀσπνῶ, ἣν δὲ γὰρ μὴ θέλω, κακῶς γανομένῳ, εὐδὲν ἡττον εἴομαι. Quod sic reddidi. *Senec.* Ep. 107.

Duc me parens, celsique dominator poli,  
Quocunque placuit, nulla parendi mora est,  
Adsum impiger: fac nolle, comitator gemens,  
Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt,  
Malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.

says

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says he, the fates lead him that is willing, and draw him that will not, that is, by force, whether he will or no. Now, we deny that the will of man, tho' it is in the hand of the Lord, and is influenced and determined by his grace to that which is good, has any violence offer'd to it, or is forced and compelled unto it. But, supposing there was a greater likeness between our sentiments and those of the *Stoicks* concerning fate, why should it be thought so reproachful in us to agree with that sect of Philosophers, when it is notorious, that in many things the *Pelagians* and *Arminians* agree with them? as will appear from the following hints. As,

(1.) When they ' affirm it to be a mistake, that sin is born with us, or we in sin, or that it comes into the world with us; and say, that nature allures us to no vice; that we are born whole and free; that man is by nature led to that which is convenient and proper for him<sup>u</sup>; that nature has implanted the matter and seeds of virtue in man; that all are born unto it<sup>w</sup>, and that

\* Erras enim si existimas nobiscum vitia nasci, supervenerunt, ingesta sunt—nulli nos vitio natura conciliat, nos illa integros, ac liberos genuit. *Senec.* Ep. 94.

<sup>u</sup> Εγω γὰρ πεφυκα πρὸς τὸ ἐμοὶ συμφέρον. *Arrian.* Epict. l. i. c. 22.

<sup>w</sup> Omnibus natura dedit, fundamenta semenque virtutum, omnes ad omnia ista nati sumus, cum irritator accessit, tunc illa animi bona, velut sopita excitantur. *Senec.* vid. Ep. 73. & 90.

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if we look within, there is a fountain of good, which would continually spring up, if we would but dig <sup>x</sup>. And do not the *Pelagians* and *Arminians* agree with them in these things, when they cry up the purity of human nature, and deny original sin? But, on the other hand, we, with the scriptures, say <sup>y</sup>, That men are *shapen in iniquity, and conceived in sin*; and that in us, that is, in our *flesh, dwells no good thing, and that there is none righteous, no not one*, of themselves.

(2.) When they talk of their *ορθὴ λογική*, *recta ratio*, right reason, and ascribe so much to it as they do. They say <sup>z</sup>, it is the nature of God, and the same in man as in God <sup>a</sup>; only with this difference, that it is in him consummate, in them consummable <sup>b</sup>; that to follow it, is the same as to follow God himself <sup>c</sup>; that it is implanted in nature to live according to it <sup>d</sup>; and that

<sup>x</sup> Εἰδὼν βλέπε, εἰδὼν ἡ πηγὴ τῆ ἀγαθῆ αἰ ἀναδύειν δυναμένη, εἰς ἀκαταπύχης. Antonin. l. 7. f. 59.

<sup>y</sup> Psal. li. 5. Rom. vii. 18. and iii. 10.

<sup>z</sup> Τίς ἂν ὕστα δεῖ; σαρξ; μὴ γενοῖτο, ἀγέρῃ; μὴ γένοιτο, φημὶ; μὴ γένοιτο, νῦν, ἐπιστήμη, λογική ορθή. August. Epist. l. 2. c. 8.

<sup>a</sup> Ἐστὶν οὐρθὴ λογική, διὰ πάντων τρεχομένη, ο αὐτὴ ἐν τῷ δι. Laert. in Zeno. l. 7.

<sup>b</sup> Ratio vero diis hominibusque communis, haec in illis consummata est, in nobis consummabilis. Senec. Ep. 92.

<sup>c</sup> Περίεστι ἐπὶ τελευταίῳ, τὸ ἐπιδεῖν τῷ λογῷ, καὶ δεῖν. Antonin. l. 12. f. 31.

<sup>d</sup> Το κατὰ λόγον, ζῆν ορθῶς γινεῖσθαι τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν. Laert. in Zeno. l. 7.

this

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this compleats a man's happiness, yea, that this alone perfects a man, and alone makes him happy<sup>c</sup>. And do not the *Pelagians* and *Arminians* likewise extol it, as the rule of all doctrine and practice, and the measure of happiness?

(3.) When they speak so much concerning τα ἐρ ημιν<sup>f</sup>, the things that are in our power, and the free will of man. They say<sup>g</sup>, it is in a man's power to be sincere, grave, patient, without love of pleasure; to be content with one's state and condition, to want but little, to be meek, free, without luxury, serious and sublime; to avoid our own wickedness, yea, to be wholly without any, to live well, to do no other but what God approves of, and chearfully receive what he appoints. They affirm<sup>h</sup>,

<sup>c</sup> Quid in homini proprium? Ratio. Haec recta & consummata felicitatem hominis implevit — nam cum sola ratio perficiat hominem, sola ratio perfecta beatum facit. *Senec. Ep. 76.*

<sup>f</sup> Vid. *Ephes. Enchirid. c. 1, 2.*

<sup>g</sup> Εκείνα ἐν παρὲχς, ἀπὲρ οὐκ εἰν ἐνσὺς τὸ ἀκισθῆλον, τὸ σέμνον, τὸ φρεσύνον, τὸ ἀφιλῆδονον, τὸ ἀμειψιμοῖον, τὸ ολιγοδέες, τὸ ευμένες, τὸ ἐλευδερὸν, τὸ ἀπειρῶσον, τὸ ἀφύσσον, τὸ μεγαλειον. *Antonin. l. 5. f. 5.* Τέλειον ἐστὶ τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν κακίαν μὴ φεγγειν, ο καὶ δύνατον ἐστὶ, *Ib. l. 7. f. 71.* vid. etiam *l. 8. f. 29.* Καλλις α ζην, δύναμιν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. *Ib. l. 11. f. 16.* Ἡλικὴν ἐξυσιαν ἐχέει, μὴ φερωπῶ, μὴ ποιεῖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅπερ μέλλει ὁ θεὸς ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ δεχέσθαι, παν ὁ ἀν νερὴν αὐτῷ ὁ θεός. *Ib. l. 12. f. 11.*

<sup>h</sup> Τὸ ἀγαθὸν τε ἀνδρωτι ἐν πραίρεισει, καὶ τὸ κακὸν. *Arian. Epist. l. 1. c. 25.* vid. *l. 4. c. 10.* Τέρον νομὸν ὁ θεός τιθεῖται. καὶ φησιν, εἰ τι ἀγαθὸν θέλεις, παρὲς σεαυτοῦ λαβε. *Ib. c. 29.* Τὴν πραίρεισιν δέ, καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς νικῆσαι δύναται. *Ib. f. 1.*

that



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that both good and evil are in the power of man's will; that if he desires any good thing, he may have it from himself; and that such is the nature of his will, that God himself cannot conquer it; yea, they are bold to say<sup>i</sup>, that God can do no more than a good man, and that there is something in which a wise man exceeds him; since he is wise, not of himself, but by the indulgence of nature. And in this *Cicero* himself seems to agree with them, when he says<sup>k</sup>, "No man ever looked upon himself obliged to God for virtue, and that very rightly; we are justly praised for virtue, and rightly glory in it, which could not be, if we esteemed it a gift of God, and not of our selves. Did ever any man give thanks to God, that he was a good man? but that he was rich, or honoured, or in health and in safety." It is easy to observe, how near all this comes to the *Pelagian* and *Arminian* tenets; only these Philosophers are, perhaps, somewhat more bold

<sup>i</sup> Solebat Sextius dicere, Jovem plus non posse quam bonum virum. *Senec.* Ep. 73. Est aliquid quo sapiens antecedit Deum, ille naturae beneficio, non suo, sapiens est. *Ib.* Ep. 53.

<sup>k</sup> Virtutem autem nemo unquam acceptam Deo retulit, nimirum recte, propter virtutem enim jure laudamur & in virtute recte gloriamur, quod non contingeret, si id donum a Deo non a nobis haberemus — cum quis quod bonus vir esset gratias diis egit unquam? at quod dives, quod honoratus, quod incolumis. *Cicero* de natura deor. l. 3. prope finem.

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and free in expressing themselves than the *Pelagians* and *Arminians* are, tho' many of them have used great liberty of speech.

(4.) When they represent it as possible for a man to live without sin, and arrive to perfection. They say<sup>1</sup>, that wise men are without sin, and cannot fall into it. *Epictetus*<sup>m</sup> used to say, that if a man had but these two words at heart, and took care to observe and obey them, he should be, for the most part, impeccable, and live a most quiet life: the words were, *bear* and *forbear*." And, said another<sup>n</sup> of them, "It is now in my power, that there should not be any iniquity or lust, or any perturbation at all in this soul of mine." *Zeno*, the founder of the sect, in a letter to King *Antigonus*, tells him<sup>o</sup>, "That a good genius, with moderate exercise, and by the help of a candid preceptor, might easily attain to perfection of virtue." Now this entirely agrees with

<sup>1</sup> Ἐγὼ καὶ ἀναμαρτήτης, τὴν ἀπεριπίπτουσι εἶναι ἀμαρτή-  
ματι. Laert. l. 7. in vit. Zeno.

<sup>m</sup> Siquis haec duo verba cordi habeat, eaque sibi impe-  
rando, atque observando curet, is erit pleraque impeccabilis,  
vitamque vivet tranquillissimam, verba haec duo dicebat,  
ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι. A. Gellius. Noct. Attic. l. 17. c. 19.

<sup>n</sup> Νυν ἐπ' ἐμοὶ ἐστίν, ἵνα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ψυχῇ μηδεμίαν  
παρανομίαν, ἢ μηδὲ ἐπιθυμίαν, μηδὲ ὅλως ταραχὴν τις. Antonin.  
l. 8. f. 29.

<sup>o</sup> Φύσις δὲ εὐγενὴς μέλειαν ἀσκήσιν προσλαβούσα, ἐπὶ τῇ  
τῶν ἀφθονῶς διδάσκοντῶν, ῥαδίως ἐρχέσθαι, πρὸς τὴν τελείαν  
ἀγαθὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς. Laert. l. 7. in Zeno.

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the notion of the *Pelagians* concerning impeccability and perfection, which they supposed persons might easily arrive to by the mere strength and power of nature, as appears from the writings of *Augustine* and *Jerom*; the latter of these observes<sup>p</sup>, that the *Pelagians* “embraced the poisons of all hereticks, which, says he, flow from the fountain of the Philosophers, and especially of *Pythagoras* and *Zeno*, the Prince of the *Stoicks*, who assert, That by meditation, and the daily exercise of virtue, sin may be so extirpated out of the minds of men, that no root nor fibre of it may remain.”

(5.) When they intimate that virtue may be lost: they are not all of them, indeed, agreed in this point. *Chrysippus*<sup>q</sup> was of opinion, that virtue might be lost. *Cleanthes* differed from him, and affirmed it could not be lost, but remained firm and constant. *Seneca*<sup>r</sup> seems to be of his mind, when he

<sup>p</sup> Omnium hæreticorum venena complecti, quæ de philosophorum & maxime *Pythagoras* & *Zenonis* principis stoicorum fonte manarunt; illi enim asserunt, extirpari posse de mentibus & nullam fibræ radicemque vitiæ in homine omnino residere, meditatione & assidua exercitatione virtutum. *Hierom.* adv. Pelag. Tom. 2. p. 83. M.

<sup>q</sup> Καὶ μὲν τὴν ἀρετὴν χρευσισπικῶ, ἀποβλήσιν, Κλεανθὸς δὲ, ἀναποβλήσιν. *Laert.* l. 7. in *Zeno*.

<sup>r</sup> Sed eo majore animo ad emendationem nostri debemus accedere, quod semel traditi boni perpetua possessio est, non dediscitur virtus — virtus secundam naturam est, vicia inimica & infesta sunt, sed quemadmodum virtutes receptæ exire non possunt, facilisque earum tutela est, ira initium ad illas eundi arduum. *Senec.* Ep. 50.

asserts,

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asserts, that virtue is natural, cannot be unlearned, being once received, never departs : the preservation of it is easy, and is a perpetual possession. But others of them incline to the opinion of *Chrysippus*, and suggest<sup>f</sup>, that modesty, meekness, integrity, &c. may be entirely destroyed. Upon the whole, it is certain, that there is a very great affinity between *Pelagianism* and the *Stoick* philosophy; and it is more than probable, that the former took its rise from the latter. There is one expression of *Seneca's*, which is the very life and soul of *Pelagianism*; he says<sup>g</sup>, "There is one good thing, which is the cause and security of a blessed life, and that is, to trust to one's self." *Pantaenus* and *Clemens of Alexandria*, were both addicted to the *Stoick* philosophy, which led the latter especially, to say many things which seem to favour free will. *Origen* greedily sucked it in, in the school of *Alexandria*, where the Christian religion received its first taint, or began to be corrupted; and this paved the way for the reception of the positions of *Pelagius*, when he published them in the world.

<sup>f</sup> Vid. *Arrian. Epist.* l. 1. c. 28. & 2, 10. & 4, 9.

<sup>g</sup> Unum bonum est, quod beatæ vitæ causa & firmamentum est, sibi fidere. *Senec. Ep.* 31.

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XIII. And lastly, it is objected, "That our notions of liberty are contrary to the sense, and repugnant to the common reason of mankind, as will be evident by the rules laid down by them, who were guided only by the light of nature." To which I answer; our case is very hard indeed, for if we seem to agree with the *Stoicks*, who were governed only by the light of nature, we are reproached with holding a *Stoical* fate, and charged with the absurdities of it. If we differ from them, we are cried out against as maintaining notions contrary to the sense, and repugnant to the common reason of mankind; for, I observe, that the authors this writer refers to, by whom the rules were laid down he produces, were all, excepting *Aristotle*, of the *Stoick* sect, or inclined to it. And as for the rules themselves; as, that a law-giver must act absurdly to command what is impossible; that vice and virtue are in our own power, and are voluntary, otherwise not worthy of praise or dispraise, reward or punishment; that it is no fault not to do that which we have no power to do; that what is natural to all men, cannot be evil; and that there can be no deliberation or consultation about things which are not in our power;

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 334. Ed. 2: 325.

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I say, as to these rules laid down, and which are objected to us, I have already considered them, and replied to them, so far as they concern the argument before us. What now remains, is only to subjoin some arguments, proving that liberty does not consist in an indifference to good and evil; and that it is consistent with some kind of necessity, and a determination to one, and a vindication of them.

I. God is a most free agent, and liberty in him is in its utmost perfection, and yet does not lie in an indifference to good and evil; he has no freedom to that which is evil, he cannot commit iniquity, he cannot lie, or deny himself, his will is determined only to that which is good; he can do no other, he is the author of all good, and of that only; and what he does, he does freely, and yet necessarily. It is said\*, that this argument is vain, "since he is in no state of trial, nor can he be tempted to do evil." I reply, neither is man in a state of trial, as has been before shewn; he may be, indeed, and is tempted to do evil; and there is a propensity in his nature, nay, he is only determined to it before a principle of grace is wrought in him; which shews that the liberty of his will lies in a determination

\* *Whitby*, p. 308. Ed. 2. 300.

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to one. Moreover, since God cannot be tempted to evil, nor is it possible that he should ever commit it, it follows, that true liberty does not consist in an indifference to good and evil.

II. The human nature of Christ, or the Man Christ Jesus, who as he was born without sin, and lived without it all his days on earth; so was impeccable, could not sin. He lay under some kind of necessity, from the purpose of God, the command of God, the covenant between God and him, as well as from the purity of his nature, to fulfil all righteousness; and yet he did it most freely and voluntarily, which proves that the liberty of man's will, in its greatest perfection, which is so in the Man Christ Jesus, does not lie in *equilibrio*, in an indifference to good and evil; but is consistent with some kind of necessity, and with a determination to that which is good only. The objection to the former argument can have no force here, for tho' Christ was not in a state of trial, as men in common are not; yet he was liable to be tempted, and was tempted to evil, tho' he had no inclination to it, nor was it possible that he should be prevailed upon to commit it.

III. The good Angels, holy and elect, who are confirmed in the state in which

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they are, and by the confirming grace of God are become impeccable, cannot sin, or fall from that happy state; yet perform their whole obedience to God; do his will and work cheerfully and willingly. The freedom of their wills is not lost, nor in the least curtailed by their impeccability, confirmed state, and determination to that which is only good. To say, "there was a time when they were not confirmed in goodness as now they are, and have lost that liberty *ad arbitrium*, they then had", is more than can be proved; since, for ought we know, they might be confirmed in goodness from the original of their creation; and the reason why they fell not when others of the same species of creatures did, might be because they were thus confirmed, and the rest left to the weakness and mutability of creatures. I have, indeed, in the *First Part* of this work, allowed the good angels to have been in a state of probation, antecedent to their confirmation, which I am now tempted to retract; but since we know so little of angels, I chuse to be in silence about it. When it is said that being thus confirmed, they were in a state of trial; it must be understood, not in the manner of man. We know that they are not under temptation, as man is, in saying

more



more than can be made good. But, supposing it true, as it is certain, that there is no propensity in them to sin, nor can they, by any temptation, be induced to it, it serves but to confirm what is contended for, that liberty does not consist in an indifference to good and evil. When it is further asserted\*, that their actions are not now rewardable, it is nothing to the purpose, since this no ways affects the liberty of their actions; tho' I see not why their actions, which are taken notice of with commendation, may not be rewarded now by the grace of God.

IV. The devils and damned spirits have no inclination to, nor capacity of, doing that which is good, but are wholly determined to that which is evil; and yet do all they do freely and voluntarily. It is true, they are not in a state of trial, no more are men. But to say<sup>2</sup>, they are not subject to any farther punishment for the evil they do, is not consistent with the justice of God, and the dreadful expectation of the devils themselves, who are not as yet in full punishment.

V. The liberty of the will is not in every state he has been in, or shall be in; but not in an indifference to good and evil.

\* *Philos.* p. 728. *Lib. de gen.* \* 16.

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his state of innocence, as he was made after the image, and in the likeness of God, so the bias of his soul was only to that which is good, which he performed willingly, in obedience to the will of God. In his fallen state, he is averse to all that is spiritually good, and is a slave to his sinful lusts and pleasures, is wholly set upon them, and given up to them; and yet serves and obeys them with the utmost willingness and freedom. In his regenerate state, there is, indeed, an inclination both to good and evil; but this arises from two different principles in the regenerate man. The new man, or principle of grace, is inclined, bent and determined to that which is good only; and yet freely serves the law of God. The old man, or corrupt nature, is inclined, bent and determined to that which is evil only; and yet freely serves the law of sin. In the state of glorification, the saints will be impeccable, cannot sin, can only do that which is good; and yet what they do, or will do, is and will be done with the utmost freedom and liberty of their wills. Whence it follows, that the liberty of man's will does not lie in an indifference or indetermination to good or evil; but is consistent both with some kind of necessity, and a determination to one.

VI. If

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VI. If liberty is not consistent with necessity in any sense, then it is not consistent with the decrees of God, nor even with the foreknowledge of God; from whence must follow some kind of necessity, not, indeed, a necessity of co-action or force upon the will of man, but of event; for if there is not a necessity of the things coming to pass, which are foreknown and decreed by God, then his foreknowledge is uncertain, and is but mere supposition and conjecture, and his decrees must be frustrable and precarious. It is said<sup>c</sup>, this “was of old the chief argument of the *Fatalists*, espoused of late by Mr. *Hobbs*, and is still made the refuge of the *Predestinarians*.” Be it so; if the *Fatalists* and Mr. *Hobbs* meant no more by necessity than we do, namely, a necessity of the immutability and unfrustrableness of God’s fore-knowledge and decrees, and not of co-action or force upon the will of man; we have no reason to be ashamed of the argument they made use of; and, instead of making it a refuge, or mere shift, shall think our selves obliged to defend it, and abide by it.

*Whitty*, p. 371. Ed. 2. 362.



## C H A P. VI.

### *Of the Perseverance of the Saints.*



Now proceed to consider the arguments taken from reason, against the doctrine of the saints perseverance: to which will be added, those that proceed upon rational accounts, in favour of it; with a vindication of such as are excepted to. I shall begin with the arguments or objections against it. And,

I. It is objected<sup>d</sup>, that this doctrine “gives a great encouragement to those, who have once gotten an opinion that they are the children of God, to indulge themselves in the like iniquities, (that is, such as *Lot, David, Solomon,* and *Peter* committed) as being never able to *separate them from the love of God.*” To which may be replied, That tho’ the sins committed by the persons mentioned, were of such a nature, that those who do the like, and die

<sup>d</sup> *Whitby*, p. 487. Ed. 2. 466.

without

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without repentance for them, and faith in the blood and sacrifice of Christ, *have no inheritance in the kingdom of God and Christ*, to which the law of *Moses* threatned death, without admission of any atonement by sacrifice, and the severest of God's judgments; yet the persons of these men being high in the favour of God, remained so, when these sins of theirs were abominable in his sight, displeasing to him, and resented by him. He *visited their transgression with a rod, and their iniquity with stripes*; nevertheless his loving-kindness he did *not utterly*, nor at all, *take from them, nor suffer his faithfulness to fail*<sup>c</sup>. These instances of the falls of good men, are not recorded to encourage men in sin, but to caution against it, and to set forth the free, unchangeable, and everlasting love of God, in pardoning and accepting his people, notwithstanding their aggravated transgressions, and so to encourage souls distressed with sin. What use such persons may make of this doctrine, to indulge themselves in sin, who have only gotten an *opinion* that they are the children of God, I know not; however, I am sure, that those who are the children of God by *faith*, or who have reason to believe, and do believe that they are so, or who have received the spirit of adoption, witnessing their son-

<sup>c</sup> Psal. lxxxix. 32, 33.

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ship to them, under the influence of that spirit, neither can nor will make any such use of it. Nothing has a greater tendency to promote holiness of heart and life, than the absolute promises of God, respecting grace and glory, the assurance of adoption, the certainty of perseverance to the end, and the sure enjoyment of eternal life. *Now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know, that when he shall appear we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is, and every man that hath this hope in him, purifieth himself, even as he is pure*<sup>†</sup>. The force of the prohibitions of sin, of exhortations to avoid it, and of cautions to resist and flee from temptations to commit it, is not abated by this doctrine of the saints perseverance; seeing these things are made use of by the spirit of God with great energy and power, as means in order to the thing it self. How preposterous and irrational must it be in a man, who thinks himself to be a child of God, and believes he shall persevere to the end, from this consideration to indulge himself in all manner of sin, as resolving that he will persevere no longer?

II. It is said<sup>‡</sup>, that this doctrine “lessens the force of all the motives offered in the scrip-

<sup>†</sup> 1 John iii. 2, 3.      <sup>‡</sup> *Whitby*, p. 488, Ed. 2. 467.

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ture, to engage us to persevere in righteousness and goodness, and *to have our fruit unto holiness; that the end may be eternal life.*" I answer, The doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, and the absolute promises of God concerning their everlasting safety and happiness, are so far from lessening the force of scripture motives to righteousness and holiness, that they are made use of in scripture to encourage the saints to the practice of them, and to engage them to continue in them. The apostles did not judge it irrational to argue from them to this purpose; nor did they think that hope and fear were excluded by them, when they reason after this manner: *Having therefore these promises (dearly beloved) let us cleanse our selves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God<sup>h</sup>.* Should it be asked what promises these were? they were such as these; *I will dwell in them, and walk in them, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people, and I will be a father unto you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty<sup>i</sup>.* So the apostle Peter, having asserted that the elect of God, and such as are begotten again through abundant mercy, are *kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation*, proceeds to exhort them to *gird up the loins of*

<sup>h</sup> 2 Cor. vii. 1.

<sup>i</sup> 2 Cor. vi. 16, 18.

*their*

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some mind as to their end, and here to the end, and to give the sum of their *flattering* *desires* *rejoice*, not once imagining that the force of these exhortations was lessened or weakened by the doctrine he had before advanced: or that this left no room for hope and fear, and the proper exercise of them.

III. It is urged, That "it seems not well consistent with the truth, righteousness and holiness of God, to give an absolute assurance of his favour, and the fruition of himself for ever to any creature, tho' he fall into the sins fore-mentioned." For God to give an absolute promise of his favour, and the fruition of himself for ever, can never be inconsistent with his truth, righteousness and holiness. The seeming inconsistency lies in his giving such assurance to any of his creatures, tho' they fall into sin. That God has given an assurance of his everlasting favour and loving-kindness to his children, tho' they fall into sin, is certain. *If his children, says he, forsake my law, and walk not in my judgments, if they break my statutes, and keep not my commandments, then will I visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with scourges; nevertheless, my loving-kindness I will*

<sup>k</sup> 1 Pet. i. 2, 3, 5, 13, 17.

<sup>l</sup> *Whist*, p. 486. Ed. 2. 457.



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*not take from him, nor suffer my faithfulness to fail. My covenant will I not break, nor alter the thing that is gone out of my lips<sup>m</sup>. Tho' he sometimes chides his people in a providential way, and hides his face from them on account of their sins; yet with everlasting kindness will he have mercy on them. The mountains shall depart, and the hills be removed, but his kindness shall not depart from them, neither shall the covenant of his peace be removed<sup>n</sup>. Nothing shall ever be able to separate from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord<sup>o</sup>. Nor is this at all inconsistent with the truth, righteousness and holiness of God, since the same covenant which gives this assurance, and contains these absolute promises, not only provides fatherly chastisements for sin, but a full and compleat Saviour from it; who, by the sacrifice of himself, has made such an entire satisfaction for it, that the purity and holiness of God, in the abhorrence of sin, the truth of his threatnings against it, and his strict justice and righteousness in the punishment of it, are perfectly reconciled to the everlasting standing of these persons in the love and favour of God. As for the promises and declarations of the old and new testament concerning this point,*

<sup>m</sup> Psal. lxxxix. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34.

<sup>n</sup> Isa. liv. 8, 10. <sup>o</sup> Rom. viii. 38, 39.

they

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they have been taken notice of in the *two former Parts* of this work; and what was the sense of the antient writers upon this head, will be considered in another. I shall only add a few arguments in favour of this doctrine. And,

I. It seems not agreeable to the perfections and attributes of God, that he should take any into his love and favour, shew grace and mercy to them, send his Son to die for them, and his Spirit to begin a good work in them, if any of them should fall short of eternal glory and happiness. It would be contrary to his immutability, should he cease to love those whom he once loved, with-hold his grace from them, and shew no more mercy to them, let it be on what account soever: it would be contrary to his justice, to take satisfaction at the hands of his Son for their sins; and yet punish them eternally for them: and it would greatly reflect upon both his wisdom and power, to begin a work of grace upon the souls of any he does not go through with, and which does not spring up unto and issue in eternal life.

II. That the saints should not persevere to the end, is not consistent with the purposes and counsels of God, which are absolute, unchangeable, and unfrustrable: for  
if

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if God has chosen and appointed any unto salvation, and these should miscarry of it upon any account, he must be disappointed of his end ; which disappointment must arise either from want of foresight of those things which obstruct the attaining of the end, or from want of power to accomplish it : neither of which are to be once thought of him, whose understanding is infinite, and who is the Lord God Almighty.

III. The defectibility, or total and final apostacy of the saints, is contrary to the promises of God, which are absolute, unconditional, and all, yea, and amen, in Christ Jesus: for if God has promised, as he certainly has, that he will put his fear into the hearts of his people ; that they shall not depart from him ; that they shall hold on their way, be preserved blameless to the coming of the Lord, and be eternally saved ; and yet some of them at last eternally perish ; the reason must be, either because he could not, or because he would not fulfil his promises: to say he could not fulfil his promises, is to impeach his wisdom in making them, and his omnipotence, in not being able to keep them ; to say he would not make them good, is to reflect upon his truth and faithfulness.

IV. The glory of Father, Son and Spirit, is greatly concerned in the final perseverance

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rance of the saints. Should any of them come short of eternal happiness, the glory of the Father in election, of the Son in redemption, and of the Spirit in sanctification, would be entirely sunk; for the purpose of God, according to election, would not stand; the price of Christ's blood would be paid, and the purchase by it, made in vain, and the work of grace upon the soul come to nothing; and consequently, Jehovah must be frustrated of his grand and ultimate end in choosing, redeeming, and sanctifying of persons, even his own glory; which is not reasonable to suppose.

V. That saints may totally and finally fall away from grace, is obstructive of the peace and comfort of believers, impairs their humble confidence in God, and fills them with continual fear and dread of falling from their happy state. To this last argument, many things are excepted; as,

1. In general<sup>p</sup>, That the doctrine of the saints apostacy truly teacheth, with the holy scriptures, that a well-grounded peace is *the fruit of righteousness*; that all true peace and comfort arise from the testimony of an upright conscience; that then only have we ground of confidence with God, when *our heart doth not condemn us* of wilfully

<sup>p</sup> *Whisby*. p. 482. Ed. 2. 461.

departing

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departing from him ; that we ought *to work out our salvation with fear and trembling, and to pass the time of our sojourning here in fear* ; and that *happy is the man that feareth always* with the fear of caution, which renders him more watchful against sin." To which I reply, That a well-grounded peace is, indeed, the fruit of righteousness ; but not of our own, which is polluted and imperfect, but of Christ's ; for, *being justified by faith* in his righteousness, which for ever secures from all condemnation, *we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ*<sup>9</sup>. True peace and comfort do not arise from the testimony of conscience, which, being thought to be upright, speaks a false peace ; but from the blood of Christ, by which *the heart*<sup>r</sup> is *sprinkled from an evil conscience* ; and tho' then have we confidence towards God, when our hearts do not condemn us ; yet our confidence in him does not arise from the non-condemnation of our hearts, but from the freedom from condemnation, which we apprehend we have through the blood, righteousness and sacrifice of the Son of God. The fear, which the scriptures referred to, speak of, is not a fear and dread of falling from a state of grace, and into hell-fire and everlasting damnation ; but an holy, filial, reverential

<sup>9</sup> Rom. vi. 1.

<sup>r</sup> Heb. x. 22.

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fear of the divine Majesty, which is consistent with an humble dependence upon him, strong confidence in him, full assurance of his favour, and of final perseverance in grace.

2. It is objected 'more particularly, "That a doctrine is not therefore true, because it is comfortable, if it be liable to just exceptions on other accounts; for very comfortable was the doctrine of the *Rabbies* to the *Jews*; of *Simon Magus*, and the *Valentinians*, to their followers; and of *Antinomians*, and other *Solifidians* to men of carnal minds; but very opposite to, and destructive of the doctrine which is according to Godliness." I reply; As to the doctrine of the *Jewish Rabbies*, *Simon Magus*, and the *Valentinians*, I have nothing to say in the defence of; but as to those who are reproachfully called *Antinomians* and *Solifidians*, who, with the apostle, assert<sup>t</sup>, That *a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law*; I know of no doctrines they hold which are opposite to, and destructive of that which is according to godliness. However, let it be observed, that our argument does not proceed upon the comfortableness of the doctrine we plead for, but upon the uncomfotableness of the opposite to it; for tho' a doctrine may not be true, which is seemingly comfortable to a carnal mind; yet that

<sup>t</sup> *Whitby*, p. 483. Ed. 2. 462.      <sup>s</sup> *Rom. iii. 28.*

doctrine

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doctrine is certainly not true, which is really uncomfortable to a sanctified heart, or which manifestly breaks in upon the true peace and comfort of a believer, as the doctrine of the saints falling away from grace evidently does.

3. It is said, "That a possibility of falling into a very great evil, tho' it be such an one into which I see daily others fall, and to which I may be obnoxious, creates no trouble or anxiety to any man, provided he knows he cannot fall into it, unless he will and chuseth so to do; and unless he acts contrary to all the rules of reason and discretion, and the strongest motives and sufficient means vouchsafed to avoid it." I answer, That if the evil is of such a nature, as threatens at once an entire deprivation of the grace of God, and a total and final apostacy from him, of which there is a possibility of a man's falling into, which he sees others fall into, and he himself is obnoxious to; it must needs create great trouble and anxiety in one sensible of the weakness of human nature, the strength of temptation, and the insufficiency of moral suasion; if his preservation from it depends upon his own fickle and mutable will, and the power of it, and his conformity to the rules of reason and discretion, under the influence of that; notwithstanding all the motives and

<sup>a</sup> *Whitly*, p. 483, 484. Ed. 2. 462, 463.

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means vouchsafed to avoid it : whereas, on the other hand, tho' there is a possibility of falling into such an evil, thro' the corruption of nature, and the temptation of satan; yet if preservation from it is secured by the power of God, which is promised to be engaged, and is engaged for that purpose, it creates no trouble and anxiety; tho' it puts a man upon the diligent use of those means, which, by the will of God, are signified to him, and which the power of God makes use of to that end.

4. It is observed, That this doctrine of the impossibility of saints falling finally from grace, cannot be truly comfortable, for two signal reasons<sup>w</sup>.

(1.) Because tho' it seems comfortable to a man, who thinks himself a good Christian, to believe he ever shall continue so; yet the reverse of this doctrine is as uncomfortable, *viz.* That he who does not so continue to the end, let him have been never so fruitful in the works of righteousness, or in the labour of love, or in religious duties, or in a zeal for God and goodness, was never better than an hypocrite." To which may be replied; it is certain that such who have made a profession of religion, and drop it, and do not continue to the end, appear to be hypocrites, formal professors, and such

<sup>w</sup> *Whitby*, p. 483, 484. Ed. 2. 462, 463.

who



who never received the grace of God in truth; yet it will not be easy to prove that ever any, fruitful in the works of righteousness, which I think a man cannot be without the grace of God, did not continue to the end, or ever proved an hypocrite: nor has such an one, who acts from an internal principle of grace, any reason to doubt either of his sincerity, or of his continuance in the way of righteousness; for tho' he cannot prove the truth of his faith by better works than an hypocrite may do in shew; yet he is conscious to himself of inward principles of love to God, and regard to his glory, from whence he acts, which an hypocrite is an utter stranger to. It is, indeed, uncomfortable for a man to doubt either of his sincerity, or of his continuance in the way of righteousness, and a true believer may be left to doubt of both, and yet his final perseverance be certain; which does not depend upon his frames, but the power of God, the consideration of which may yield him relief and comfort, when the contrary doctrine must be distressing.

(2.) "Let men hold what doctrines they please, yet, as it is with them who question Providence and a future Judgment, their impious persuasions cannot remove their fears, arising from the dictates of a natural conscience; so neither can mens theological persuasions remove the fears and doubts

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ings, which do as naturally arise from the dictates of a conscience enlightened by the word of God." We are obliged to this writer, for the kind and good-natur'd comparison he makes between us and the disputers of Providence and a future Judgment; between their impious persuasions concerning these things, and our theological ones, as he calls them, about the doctrine of perseverance, and between their fears, arising from the dictates of a natural conscience, and those of others, arising from the dictates of an enlightened one. Tho' it should be observed, that the doubts and fears of believers concerning falling from grace, do not arise from the dictates of a conscience enlightened by the word, but rather from a conscience darkned by sin, and loaded with the guilt of it, upon which a wrong judgment is formed of their state and condition. A believer may fall into sin, and conscience may pronounce him guilty of it, and condemn him for it, whereby his peace may be broken, and his comfort lost; which are restored, not by sincere repentance, removing the guilt, as is intimated, but, by the application of the blood of Christ, which speaks peace, yields comfort, and encourages confidence in God, notwithstanding all the condemnations of his heart and conscience. It is in this way he only desires to have peace and comfort; nor does the word of  
God

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God deny it him this way, but gives it, and he receives it, tho' his heart cannot afford it, but suggests the contrary: *for if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart and knows all things*<sup>2</sup>. And tho' a believer may lose the comfort of the divine favour, when his interest in it remains firm and inviolable; yet his loss of comfort does not necessarily cut off his assurance of being a child of God, and of his perseverance to the end; nor has he any reason, upon every fall into sin and condemnation of conscience for it, to suspect his fall from grace, and the truth of his sincerity: nor does this doctrine of perseverance make men less careful, but more so, to avoid all wilful violations of the law; nor less speedy, but more so, in their application to the blood of Christ for pardon and cleansing, in the exercise of faith and repentance, and in the performance of every religious duty; since these are means of their holding out and persevering to the end.

<sup>2</sup> 1 John iii. 20.



## C H A P. VII.

### *Of the Prescience and Providence of God.*



**I**N the controversy between the *Calvinists* and *Arminians* concerning the decrees of Election and Reprobation, the Freedom of man's will, and the Specialty of God's grace, it is observed by the former, that many of the arguments of the latter seem as strongly to conclude against God's foreknowledge of future contingencies, as against his absolute decrees; that what is said in favour of the freedom of mens wills, and against the determination of them by a divine influence, weakens the providence of God, and that the case of the heathens being left without a revelation, cannot well be reconciled to the doctrines of universal Grace and general Redemption. The learned writer, attended to, proposes, in his *sixth Discourse*, an answer to these three objections, which he easily saw lay against the doctrines he had asserted in his former discourses, and the arguments by which he endeavoured to confirm

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firm them, which I shall consider and reply to in this and the following chapter. And,

I. It must be, and is generally allowed, that God had from eternity a preference or fore-knowledge of all future events; of all future contingencies, even of the free actions of mens wills; of every thing that should be done in time, to the end of the world, and to all eternity. He fore-knew what all men would do, or would not do; who would believe and repent, and who would not; and who would perish, and who would be eternally saved: which fore-knowledge is not conjectural, uncertain, and precarious; but is real, certain, and infallible; whence it must follow, that whatsoever arguments are advanced upon the attributes of God, his wisdom, justice, holiness, truth, sincerity, goodness and mercy; or upon the methods and dealings of God with the sons of men, against the absolute decrees of God, are as much opposed unto and lie as strongly against the fore-knowledge of God; since that as much requires the certainty, and secures the infallibility of the event, as his absolute decrees do; otherwise his fore-knowledge would not be knowledge, but conjecture. The answer to this is,

<sup>2</sup> *Wiley*, p. 491. Ed. 2. 4:7.

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1. "That tho' this argument be offered in favour of the decrees of absolute Election and Reprobation, yet doth it plainly overthrow them, or render them superfluous: for be it, that these decrees were made from eternity; yet seeing that God's fore-knowledge of the events of all men, was also from eternity, must he not know what was the condition of all men when he made these decrees? And what need then would there be of a decree for that event, which was infallible by virtue of his fore-knowledge, without that decree." To which I reply, That the fore-knowledge of God is so far from overthrowing or rendering superfluous the decrees of God, that the decrees of God are the foundation of his fore-knowledge of future events; for he fore-sees and fore-knows all things that come to pass in himself, in his own will, and the decrees of it. The reason why God decrees this or the other thing, is not because he fore-knew they would be, whether he decreed them or no; but he fore-knew they would be, because he decreed they should be. God fore-knows all things possible in his own power, and all things future in his own will, and the determinations of it; he willed things, and then knew what he willed; tho' there is neither first nor last in God, yet we are obliged to consider one thing after another. God's decrees are not to be

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conceived of without his knowledge, nor his knowledge without his decrees; wherefore it follows, that God's fore-knowledge does not evert or render his decrees superfluous, nor do his decrees destroy his fore-knowledge, or render that insignificant; of the two, the latter might rather be supposed, tho' it ought not by any means, since God's fore-knowledge of future events necessarily arises from himself, his will, and the decrees of it, and are strictly, closely and inseparably connected with them.

2. It is said<sup>a</sup>, That "this argument is obnoxious to these dreadful consequences, that it plainly renders God the author of sin; and prescience thus stated, must be attended with a fatal necessity." To which may be replied, That the fore-knowledge of God can never reasonably be thought to make him the author of sin, when even the decrees of God, respecting sinful actions, from whence his fore-knowledge of sin arises, and upon which it is founded, do not make him so. God determined the selling of *Joseph* into *Egypt*, the betraying of *Christ* by *Judas*, and the crucifixion of him by the *Jews*; and yet was the author of neither of them. Nay, should it be allowed what is suggested<sup>a</sup>, That "to say, God only doth foresee things future, because he

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 492. Ed. 2. 476, 471.      <sup>a</sup> *Ib.*

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hath decreed they should be so, is to say God moves and pre-determines the wills of men to those things which are evil ;” tho’, I think, the difference is very wide between God’s decrees of future events, within himself from eternity, and his motions and pre-determinations of the wills of men to any actions in time. But, supposing such motions and determinations of the wills of men to that which is evil ; since he *moved David* to *number* the people, and *put* it into the *hearts of the Kings of the earth* to fulfil his will, and to agree to give their Kingdom to the beast ; \* even these do not make God the author of sin : for the divine pre-determination, motion, and providential concurrence respecting men, do not at all alter the liberty of the will ; men, under them, feel no power or force upon them ; they freely will, and voluntarily do what they do, of which not God, but they are the authors. If therefore neither the pre-determinations of the wills of men in time, nor the decrees of God from eternity, make him the author of sin, much less his fore-knowledge. God fore-knew that *Adam* would fall, as Christ did that *Judas* would betray him, for he told him of it before-hand ; and yet God was no more the author of the sin and fall of *Adam*, than Christ was of his

\* 2 Sam. xxiy. 1. Rev. xvii. 17.

betray-



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betraying by *Judas*; nor did either *Adam* or *Judas* feel any force or constraint from this fore-knowledge, obliging them to sin; nor do they ever complain of it, or impure their sin and fall unto it. Prescience, thus stated, introduces no fatal necessity: it is, indeed, attended with a necessity of infallibility respecting the event; but not with a coactive necessity upon the wills of men, which are left hereby entirely free, and so they find themselves in the commission of every action; neither the decree of God, nor his fore-knowledge, necessitate men, or oblige and compel them to do the things decreed and fore-known; nevertheless, whatever is decreed and fore-known by God, is certainly, infallibly and immutably brought to pass according to his will.

3. It is urged<sup>b</sup>, "That if there were any strength in this argument, it would prove that we should not deny the liberty supposed in all the arguments used against these decrees, but rather, prescience it self; for if those two things were really inconsistent, and one of them must be denied, the introducing an absolute necessity of all our actions, which evidently destroys all religion and morality, would tend more, of the two, to the dishonour of God, than the denying him a fore-knowledge." It is easy to observe,

<sup>b</sup> *Whitby*, p. 493. Ed. 2. 471, 472.

that

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that this author was rather disposed to deny the fore-knowledge of God, than to part with his favourite notion concerning the liberty of man's will lying in an indifferency to good and evil, and as opposed to any sort of necessity. The *Socinians*, upon this principle, have come into a denial of it; and the *Arminians* have shewn a good inclination to it. Their champion, *John Goodwin*<sup>c</sup>, has roundly declared, that there is no fore-knowledge, properly so called, in God. This has been always the way of these men, that, if their notions would not comport with the being and perfections of God, they will shape God and his perfections agreeable to their notions. Tho' it may be a considerable difficulty to reconcile the prescience of God, and the liberty of man's will; yet there is no need to deny either of them: not the natural liberty of the will; this would be to destroy the will it self, which liberty is no ways infringed either by the fore-knowledge or decrees of God; tho' the moral liberty of the will, since the fall, without the grace of God, must be denied: nor the prescience of God; which introduces no such necessity of our actions, which destroy religion and morality, or tends to the dishonour of God; since it puts no coactive necessity upon us.

<sup>c</sup> Redemption Redeemed, c. 3, s. 2. p. 27.

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leaves us free to the commission of our actions; for to deny this perfection of God, would be to deny God himself; and, one should think, if either of these must be denied, it would be more eligible to deny man what may be thought to belong to him, than to deny that which so evidently belongs to God.

4. It is observed<sup>d</sup>, "That if these *Decretalists* may take sanctuary in the fore-knowledge God hath of things future, the *Hobbiſts* and the *Fatalists* may do the same; that the *Hobbiſts* do found their doctrine of necessity upon the *ninth chapter* to the *Romans*, and the *Fatalists* upon the certainty of divine prescience and predictions; and that it was the fear of this, that the liberty of man's will could not be preserved, which made the *Greeks* embrace this impious doctrine, that God did not fore-know things future and contingent: whereas it is said from *Le Blanc*, that the truest resolution of this difficulty is, that prescience is not the cause that things are future; but their being future, is the cause they are foreseen." I reply, That if the sentiments of the *Hobbiſts* and *Fatalists* were the same with those who are called *Decretalists*, they might justly take, what this author stiles, sanctuary in the fore-knowledge of God; or, in other

<sup>d</sup> *Wicibby*, p. 493, 494, 495. Ed. 2. 472, 473, 474.

words,

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he, is so contrary to reason and constancy as fortune; that, to me, it does not seem even to belong to God, to know what shall be by chance and fortune: for if he knows certainly, it will come to pass, and if it will certainly come to pass, there is no such thing as fortune; but there is fortune, therefore there is no foresight of fortuitous events: or, if you deny that there is fortune, and say that all things which are or shall be, were from all eternity fatally determined; change the definition of divination, which, you said, is a foresight of fortuitous events; for if nothing can be done, nothing happen, nothing come to pass, but was certain from all eternity, should be in the fixed time, what fortune can there be? which being removed, what room is there for divination? which is said by you to be a foresight of fortuitous events." The *Greeks*, it seems, upon the same principle on which the *Socinians*, and

ut sciat, quid casu & fortuito futurum sit; si enim scit certe, illud eveniet, si certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est. Est autem fortuna, rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla praesensio; aut si negas esse fortunam, & omnia quae fiunt, quaeque futura sunt, ex omni aeternitate definita dicis esse fataliter, muta definitionem divinationis, quam dicebas praesensionem esse rerum fortuitarum; si enim nihil fieri potest, nihil accidere, nihil evenire, nisi quod ab omni aeternitate certum fuerit esse futurum rato tempore, quae potest esse fortuna? qua sublata, qui locus est divinationis? quae a te fortuitarum rerum est dicta praesensio. *Cicero* de divinat. l. 2.

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others since have proceeded, fearing lest the liberty of man's will could not be preserved, embraced this impious opinion, That God did not foreknow things future and contingent; whereas it is said with *Origen*, it must be owned, *Not that God's prescience is the cause of things future, but that their being future is the cause of God's prescience, that they will be.* And this, saith *Le Blanc*, is the truest resolution of this difficulty, *That Prescience is not the cause that things are future; but their being future is the cause they are foreseen.* Which, so far, is very right; but then, what is it that gives these things their futurity? Nothing less than the will of God, and his decrees, from whence the foreknowledge of them arises. For, as it is the power of God that gives possibility to things possible, it is the will of God that gives futurity to things that shall be. Nothing that is in time can give futurity to things in eternity; for the futurity of things was from all eternity, or all things which are or shall be in time, were future from all eternity; which futurity could arise from nothing else but the will and decrees of God, which of things possible made them future. Now whatsoever God has determined shall come to pass, he certainly foreknows will come to pass: wherefore it is as absolutely  
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necessary that whatsoever God foreknows will be, should be, as it is that what he has decreed shall come to pass, should. Hence it follows, that whatever arguments lie against the absolute decrees of God, lie against the prescience of God, and the certainty of it.

5. It is further <sup>†</sup> observed, "That God's prescience hath no influence at all upon our actions." It is true, it has no causal influence upon the actions of men, nor lays any coactive necessity upon them to perform them, nor at all impairs the freedom of them; no more do the decrees of God. There is no need of the plain reasoning of Mr. *Hobbs*, or the more nice and subtle argumentation of Mr. *Baxter*, to prove this. But then, tho' neither the foreknowledge of God, nor the decrees of God, have any causal influence upon the actions of men, nor do they lay any compulsive necessity upon men, nor in the least impair the freedom of their actions; yet the latter are the cause of the futurity of such and such actions, and the reason of God's foreknowledge of them as future, and both lay a necessity of infallibility upon them with respect to the event, that is to say, not necessary that the things determin'd

<sup>†</sup> *Whitby*, p. 495. Ed. 2. 474.

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foreknown, should certainly come to pass, tho' every thing in its own way; necessary actions, necessarily; free actions, freely; and contingent ones, contingently; yet all certainly. Neither the decrees of God, nor the foreknowledge of God, put any thing in men; nor is there that signal difference between them as is suggested<sup>s</sup>: a difference there is between them, the one belonging to his understanding, the other to his will; and so the one can be no more deceived, than the other can be frustrated, but not as is intimated; the decrees of God are no more active and powerful, and lay no more a necessity on our actions than his foreknowledge. The decrees of God, indeed, include both end and means; and God sees both in the determinations of his will. In the decree of election, God determines to give both grace and glory to the objects of it, and it is a preparation of both for them; but puts neither in them, or them into the possession of either of them; and God, in his infinite knowledge, sees this preparation of both in the determinations of his will, and foresees that both will be certainly bestowed upon them. In the decree of reprobation, God determines to deny both grace and glory to the objects of it;

<sup>s</sup> *Whistly*, p. 496. Ed. 2. 475.

but

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but then this decree is not active, or it does not put any thing in man to render him deficient or sinful of necessity, but leaves him as it finds him ; and God, in his infinite knowledge, sees this denial of both to them in the determinations of his will, and foresees and foreknows that neither of them will be bestowed upon them. Thus the decrees of God and his foreknowledge go hand in hand together, and exactly agree with each other.

6. It is said<sup>s</sup>, That “ God’s knowledge reaches not only *τα μελλοντα*, to *future contingencies*; but also *τα δυνατα*, *future possibilities*, viz. He knows that such things may be, tho’ they never will be, that I might will and do, what I neither do nor will, and abstain from that I do not abstain from ; and that I will this, when I might will the contrary.” I reply, *future possibilities* I do not understand ; whatsoever is *possible*, may be, and it may not be ; but what *future*, shall be, and so not barely possible, but certain. A future possibility seems to be a contradiction, as is the instance of one of these future possibilities, viz. “ That he (God) knows that such things may be, tho’ they never will be.” For, how can he now they may be, tho’ they never will be ?

<sup>s</sup> *Whisby*, p. 497. Ed. 2. 476.



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when, if they never will be, he must know they never will be, and therefore cannot know that they may be. He knows whatever is possible for himself to do, that is, he knows what his power can do, as well as what his will determines to do, or shall be done, the former is called *possible*, the latter *future*; and God's knowledge reaches to both : but then, every thing that is possible, is not future ; all that God knows, might be accomplished by his power, he has not determined that it shall be, and whatsoever is future, ceases to be barely possible. God also knows what is possible for man to do, that he might will and do this, and abstain from that, when he does neither ; that is, he knows that he has a power to will, do, and abstain. These future possibilities, as they are called, which men may do, and may not do, are no other than future contingencies ; which are so not with respect to God, but with respect to men ; for it cannot be said of God, that he knows that so it *may be*, that man may will or do this, or abstain from that, which he knows he never will do or abstain from ; or that so it may be, that he may not do, what he knows he will do ; for then " those puzzling enquiries must be made, how can God certainly know I will do, what he sees I may not do ? or how can that be certainly known, which neither in it self, nor in its causes, hath any

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any certain being, but may as well not be, or not be done, as be, or be done?" Which rings this author,

7. To observe, "That this argument only poseth a great difficulty, arising from a mode of knowledge in God, of which we have no idea, against all the plain declarations of his revealed will, produced in great abundance, against the imaginary decrees which men have imposed upon God without just ground." To which I reply, That the mode of knowledge in God is such, indeed, that we can have no adequate idea of, nor have we of God himself, of the manner of his being, subsistence, or any of his perfections; but then the thing itself is certain, that God has a foreknowledge of future contingencies, as is evident from the word of God, which ascribes it to him; from the many predictions of coming events is from the infinite perfection of God, his compleat happiness, and the immensity and infinity of his understanding, and therefore we may be allowed to silence argument upon it in this controversy, but we do not use it, and are far from doing it, against the plain declarations of God's revealed will. In the *first Part* of the work, have shewn, that there are no declarations of God's revealed will against the decree

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of Election and Reprobation, which are called imaginary ones; and in the *second Part* of it, that there are many declarations and testimonies of scriptures in favour of 'em: so that they are not what men have imposed upon God, nor do they depend on a single argument founded upon the foreknowledge of God.

II. That the world is made by the power, and governed by the providence of God, none but *Attheists* and *Epicures* will deny. Now much of the providence of God lies in the government of men, in moving of their wills, and ordering of their actions, to bring about his great designs and his own glory. For, as he has made all things for himself, for his own glory, so he orders and disposes all things to answer to that end. *The Lord looketh from heaven, he beholdeth all the sons of men, from the place of his habitation, he looketh upon all the inhabitants of the earth, he fashioneth their hearts alike, he considereth all their works*<sup>a</sup>. And as he has made and fashioned the hearts of all men, it is as certain that the hearts of all men are under his government; he can move, influence and determine them to this and the other action at his pleasure, without offering any violence to them; for not only *the King's*

<sup>a</sup> Psal. xxxiii. 13, 14, 15.

*heart,*

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*heart*, but every other man's, *is in the hand of the Lord as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will*<sup>b</sup>. God has not made a creature that he cannot govern, or possessed man of a will that is independent of his own. If man was in such sense a free agent, or lord paramount of his own will, or had such an *αὐτεξουσίαν*, such a power over himself, as not to admit any divine motion, influence, or pre-determination of his will, a very considerable branch of Providence is lost, and God is shut out from having any concern in the most considerable affairs and events of this lower world; or, as the learned writer attended to, has stated our objection<sup>c</sup>, this doctrine must "weaken the providence of God; for if he doth not order and effectually move the wills of men, he cannot compass the designs of Providence." To which several answers are returned: as,

1. That<sup>d</sup> "this objection will receive the shorter answer, because it falls into this great absurdity, that it makes God as much the author of all the evil, as of all the good that is done in the world." To which may be replied; That the providence of God has for its object evil actions as well as good, or God's providential concurrence attends sinful

<sup>b</sup> Prov. xxi. i.    <sup>c</sup> *Whitby*, p. 505. Ed. 2. 483.

<sup>d</sup> 1b. Ed. 2. 484.

actions,

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actions, tho' not as such, as well as good, and that God orders and moves the wills of men to each, must be allowed; since he moved *David* to number the people, and put it into the hearts of the Kings of the earth to fulfil his will, and give their kingdom to the beast. But then this does not make him as much the author of all the evil as of all the good that is done in the world; for God, when he moves and influences the wills of men to that which is good, puts his own grace and goodness into them, or stirs up and excites what he had put there before; and not only his providential concurrence attends and assists in the performance of the action as natural, but his grace is concerned in the goodness of it, and attends and assists in the performance of it as a good one; *for it is God that worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure*; whereas when he moves the wills of men to evil actions, he puts no sinfulness into them, only leaves them to the sinfulness he finds, and moves the natural faculty of the will to these actions, not as sinful, but as natural; and his providential concurrence only attends and assists in the performance of the action as natural, and is no ways concerned in the viciousity of it: whence it follows, that since God puts no sinfulness in men, nor moves them to sinful actions as such, nor does his providential concurrence assist in the per-

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performance of them as such, he cannot be at all, in any sense, the author of sin, as has been fully made to appear by that learned and excellent writer *Theophilus Gale*, in his *Court of the Gentiles*, part. 4. book 3. of *divine Pre-determination*; which is well worth the reader's consulting.

2. The more particular answer is, That "these things seem only necessary to accomplish all the designs of Providence; that God hath a perfect prospect of the events of all actions, as well of those which proceed from the free will of man, as of those which issue from natural causes; — that he hath infinite wisdom to direct these actions to their proper ends; — that he hath power to restrain from the execution of those purposes which would thwart the designs of his providence, — without laying any force or necessity upon the wills of men." To which I reply, That the things mentioned are necessary to accomplish the designs of Providence, will be allowed, but not that they are *only* so; for the perfect prospect or foresight which God has of all actions and their events, arises from the determinations of his will that they shall be; wherefore it is not proper that they should be left, nor are they left, to depend upon the will of man, whether they shall be, or shall not be. Hence

<sup>c</sup> *Whistly*. p. 506. Ed. 2. 485.

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it is necessary, that as God has the hearts of all men in his hands, and can turn them as he pleases, he should move, influence and pre-determine the wills of men to such and such actions ; and that the concurrence of his Providence should attend the performance of them, which he has willed shall be, in order to accomplish his designs ; which motions, influences and pre-determinations of God, may be, and are, without laying any compulsive necessity or force upon the wills of men, with respect either to good or evil actions. *David*, tho' moved to it, freely numbered the people ; and the Kings of the earth, tho' it was put into their hearts to give, yet did voluntarily give their kingdom to the beast ; so all good actions which men are moved and influenced to, and assisted in, by the grace of God, are yet freely and voluntarily performed.

3. It is said<sup>f</sup>, “ Tho' this argument from Providence doth not concern us (the *Arminians*) in the least ; yet it seems evidently to overthrow the contrary doctrine : for, what answer can they return to these enquiries ? ”

(1.) Is it consistent with the justice of Providence to wrap up all men's fate in that of *Adam's* ? ” I reply, It highly concerns all that have a regard to the doctrine of Provi-

<sup>f</sup> *Whitby*, p. 507. Ed. 2. 485.

dence,

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dence, that it is not in the least curtailed or weakened in any part or branch of it; which it seems to be, by exempting the actions which spring from the free will of man, from divine influx and pre-determination; nor are we in any pain lest our doctrine should be overthrown by it; nor are we at a loss to return an answer to the enquiries made, and to this, in the *first* place. For by the fate of all men, is either meant their state of happiness or misery in the other world to all eternity; and then it must be replied, that all mens fate is not wrapt up in *Adam's*; some being saved, as it is reasonable to suppose *Adam* is; and others lost, when he is not: or, by the fate of all men, is meant their passing under a sentence of condemnation in *Adam*, whereby they became liable to everlasting punishment. This can never be inconsistent with the justice of Providence, that such who sinned in *Adam*, should die in him. If it was consistent with the justice of Providence, that if *Adam* had continued righteous, he having all human nature in him, his posterity would have partook of all the blessings and privileges arising from his continuance in such a state; it cannot be inconsistent with it, that all mankind being in him, both as their common root and parent, and as their federal head and representative, and so sinning in him, should be involved in all  
the



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the miseries and consequences of his fall, If it was consistent with the justice of Providence, to *visit the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, to the third and fourth generation of them that hate the Lord*; it cannot be inconsistent with it to visit the sin of *Adam* upon all his posterity, their carnal minds being enmity against God. As for *Adam's* repentance being made ours, as his sin is, and we be restored by it to the grace and favour of God, as we became the objects of his wrath by his sin; there is this reason lies against it, the justice of God; which was so far from admitting *Adam's* repentance to be satisfactory, on the account of his posterity, that it would not admit of it as such upon his own account: wherefore God reveals his Son, and the satisfaction to law and justice he had provided in him, *the seed of the woman*, that should bruise the serpent's head.

(2.) "Is it not one great part of Providence, to give men laws for the direction of their actions, prescribing what he would have men do, and leave undone; and that under a promise of reward to the obedient, and a declaration, that he will certainly and severely punish the wilful and impenitent offender? Now, do not they destroy both the justice and wisdom of this Providence,

<sup>2</sup> *Whitby*, p. 507, 508. Ed. 2. 486.

who

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who introduce God, after the fall, giving laws positive and negative for the direction of his (man's) actions, with threats of the severest and most lasting punishments, if he neglect to do what is required, and to avoid what is forbidden; and that after his own decree of with-holding from him the assistance absolutely necessary to his doing the good required, or avoiding the forbidden evil?" I answer, That it is one great part of the wise and just Providence of God, to give men laws for the direction of their actions, prescribing what he would have done, and left undone, is readily granted. Now, inasmuch as all laws, which are of a moral nature, and serve for the direction of human actions in things moral, were given to, and written upon the heart of man before his fall, when he had sufficient strength and power to keep them; the wisdom and justice of Providence cannot in the least be injured, much less destroyed, by the continuance of them after the fall; tho' man has lost his power to obey them, and cannot obey them without the assistance of divine grace, which is absolutely necessary to his doing any thing that is truly good; and tho' God with-holds, having decreed to with-hold that assistance of grace from some men, which he is not obliged to give; God's with-holding, and his decree to with-hold that assistance, being neither of them the  
cause

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cause of man's disability, but his own viciousity; since the continuance of them is necessary to keep up the authority of the Law-giver, to assert his dominion over man, to declare his will, to shew the vile nature of sin, and what satisfaction is requisite for it; to discover the impotency of man, without the grace of God; for the direction of such who have it in their walk and conversation; for the restraint of others under the influence of common Providence; and for the declaration of his displeasure and indignation against sin, and his strict justice in punishing of it.

(3.) "Is it consistent<sup>h</sup> with the justice of Providence, to aggravate the sins of reprobates on this account, that they *knew their Lord's will, and did it not*, provided that knowledge rendered them no more able to do it than the most ignorant of men? or, to make it such an aggravation of the sins of *Christians*, that they are committed against greater light and stronger motives to perform their duty, than ever was vouchsafed to the *beathen* world; if after this, they of them who lie under God's decree of Preterition, are as unable to perform that duty as the worst of *beathens*?" To this may be replied, that tho' the knowledge of the will of God does not give men power

<sup>h</sup> *Whitby*, p. 507, 508, Ed. 2. 486.

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and ability to do it; yet it puts men in a better situation, and in a better capacity of doing it, than men wholly ignorant of it are; and it may be more reasonably expected, that such should be disposed to do it, be desirous of it, and implore that assistance which is necessary to it: and therefore, when on the contrary; such persons *bate* the very *knowledge* they have, and *chuse not the fear of the Lord*, but say, *depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of thy ways*; it can never be inconsistent with the justice of Providence to aggravate the sins of these men on this account. So the sins of men who enjoy the gospel-revelation, being committed against greater light and stronger motives to perform their duty, than ever were vouchsafed to the *beathen* world, must be an aggravation of them, notwithstanding their inability to perform it; since that inability does not arise from the decree of Preterition, but from their own wickedness: tho' that any of them, who are truly *Christians*, lie under God's decree of Preterition, or are as unable to perform their duty as the worst of *beathens*, is never said by any, and must be denied.

(4.) "Is it suitable<sup>1</sup> to the holiness of Providence, or to that purity which is essential to the divine Nature, and makes it ne-

<sup>1</sup> *Whitby*, p. 509. Ed. 2. 487.

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cessary for him to bear a strong affection to, and to be highly pleased with, the holiness of all that are thus like unto him, and to reward them for it with the enjoyments of himself, notwithstanding, absolutely to decree not to afford, to the greatest part of them to whom he hath given his holy commandments, that aid which he sees absolutely necessary to enable them to be holy, and without which they lie under an absolute incapacity of being holy?" I answer, That holiness is essential to the divine Nature, whence he necessarily bears a strong affection to, and is highly pleased with, the holiness of all that are like him, whom he blesses with the enjoyment of himself, is certain; but then, this is no contradiction to any decree of his not to afford his grace, which he is not obliged to give. Certain it is, that he could make all men holy if he would; and it is as certain, that he leaves some destitute of that grace which is absolutely necessary to enable them to be holy, and without which they cannot be so: now, if it is not unsuitable to the holiness of Providence, to leave men destitute of that grace, which only can make them holy, it cannot be unsuitable to the holiness of Providence to decree to leave them so.

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(5.) "Is it reconcileable<sup>k</sup> to the goodness of Providence, or to the kindness, philanthropy, the mercy and compassion of our gracious God, in all his providential dispensations, so highly magnified in holy scripture, to deal with men according to the tenor of these doctrines?" I reply, That the doctrines of absolute Election and Reprobation, which are here refer'd to, are entirely reconcileable to the goodness, kindness, mercy and compassion of God, which abundantly appear in his saving, and determining to save, some of the sinful race of mankind, when he could, in strict justice, have damned them all, as he has the whole body of apostate angels: but since this has been argely considered in this *Part* already, under the head of *Reprobation*, I shall add no more; especially, since nothing new is offered in this enquiry.

(6.) "Doth it comport<sup>l</sup> with the wisdom of Providence, to promise or to threaten upon impossible conditions, an impossible condition being, in true construction, none at all? how much less will it comport with the same wisdom, to tender the covenant of grace to all mankind, to whom the gospel is vouchsafed upon conditions which the most part of them, before that covenant was

<sup>k</sup> *Whitby*, p. 510. Ed. 2. 487.

<sup>l</sup> *ib.* p. 509. Ed. 2. 488.

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established, were utterly unable to perform; and who, by God's decree of Preterition, were inevitably left under that disability?" I answer, That the covenant of works, which, I suppose, is referred to in the former part of this question, by what follows in the latter part of it, being made with man in his state of innocence, did not promise life, and threaten with death, upon an impossible condition, but upon one that was possible, and which man was then capable of performing; and therefore no ways incompatible with the wisdom of Providence. And tho' man, by breaking this covenant, has lost his power of fulfilling the condition of it, perfect obedience; yet it entirely comports with the wisdom of Providence, that he should be subject to the penalty of it, from which he can have no relief, but by the provision made in the covenant of grace; which covenant of grace is not a conditional one, as is suggested; nor is it tendered to any, much less to all mankind, to whom the gospel is vouchsafed, or to any left by God's decree of Preterition, under the disability of the fall; but is a covenant made with Christ on the behalf of God's elect; is established in him, on better promises than conditional ones, depending on the power and will of man, being absolute and sure to all the seed.

(7.) "On

(7.) "On the other hand", can it accord with the same wisdom of Providence, to threaten the severest judgments to them, *if they repented not, or if they turned away from their righteousness, or fell away from their own steadfastness, or endured not to the end*, whom he had absolutely decreed to give repentance to; and, *by continuance in well-doing*, to preserve them to a blessed immortality; or to caution them not to do so, or to enquire whether temptations had not prevailed upon them so to do, or bid them fear lest they should do so." I answer, That the threatnings, cautions, and exhortations referred to, will appear to accord perfectly with the wisdom of Providence, when it is considered that they are made to societies and bodies of men under a profession of religion; some of which were real, others nominal professors; some true believers, others hypocrites, men destitute of the grace of God; and, perhaps, with a particular view to the latter, were these things given out, to whom God had never decreed to give repentance and perseverance. Besides, allowing that these threats, cautions and exhortations are made to such to whom he had decreed to give repentance and perseverance, they are to be considered as means leading on, and blessed, in order

<sup>m</sup> *Whitby*, p. 511. Ed. 2. 489,



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to the enjoyment of what God had determined to give; and therefore it must accord with the wisdom of Providence to make use of them.

(8) "Is it suitable" to the sincerity of his providential dispensations, of which his dealings with men, by his revealed will towards them, make so great a part, to move them to the performance of their duty only by motives, which he knows cannot work upon them, without that farther aid he, from eternity, hath determined to deny them?" I reply, That if by performance of duty, is meant that men should convert themselves, repent of sin, and believe in Christ, to the saving of their souls, it will not be easy to prove, that God makes use of any motives to move any persons to do these things of themselves; and still more difficult to prove, that he makes use of any to induce such persons thereunto, to whom he does not give that grace which only can enable them to do them. If by performance of duty, is meant moral obedience to the law of God, this is every man's duty, whether he has any motives to it or no; and if God makes use of any motives to induce unto it, which, without his grace, do not, and cannot work upon them, the insufficiency of them does not arise from any thing in the

<sup>a</sup> *Wmly.* p. 511. Ed. 2. 489.

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motives themselves, nor from the denial of God's grace, nor from his determination to deny it; but from the perverseness and wickedness of mens hearts; wherefore, it is not unsuitable to the sincerity of Providence, to make use of such motives, tho' they do not, and he knows they cannot, influence without his grace, which he is not obliged to give, and which he has determined to deny; since thereby, the perverseness and wickedness of men are more fully discovered, and they left inexcusable. Besides, the instances referred to, regard not all mankind, but the people of *Israel*, and God's dealings with them, not in relation to their spiritual and eternal welfare, but their civil and temporal estate, as a body politic, as has been shewn in the *first Part* of this work.

(9.) "Is it suitable ° to the same wisdom and sincerity, to move such persons by promises, to repent and believe, and to require them, *having such promises*, to cleanse themselves from all filthiness of flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God? —

What wit of man can shew, how God can be serious in calling such men to faith and repentance, much less in his concern that they might do so, or, in his trouble that they have not done so; and yet be serious and in good-earnest in his antecedent decree to de-

° *Whitby*, p. 512. Ed. 2. 490.

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ny them that aid, without which they never can believe or repent ?" To which may be replied, That God is serious in calling men to faith and repentance, and as serious in his decrees either to give or deny that grace, without which none can ever believe or repent, is certain; and it must be owned, it would appear unsuitable to his wisdom and sincerity, should he move such persons by promises, and call such to faith and repentance, to whom, by an antecedent decree, he had determined to deny that grace, without which they could never believe and repent: but then, it remains to be proved, which, I think, can never be proved, that God calls any persons, and moves them by promises to believe in Christ, to the saving of their souls, or to evangelical repentance, to whom he does not give grace to believe and repent, or such who are not eventually saved.



C H A P. VIII.

*Of the State and Case of the Heathens.*

**I**N favour of the doctrines of Absolute Election and Reprobation, particular Redemption, and special Grace in Conversion, we observe, That, for many ages, God suffered the heathen world to walk in their own ways, leaving them without a revelation of his mind and will, without the gospel, and means of grace, and which has been, and still is the case of multitudes to this day. This, it cannot reasonably be thought, he would have done, had it been, according to the counsel of his will, that all the individuals of mankind should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth; or had Christ died for and redeemed them all; or was it the will of God to bestow on all men sufficient grace, whereby they may be saved. Nor can it be thought that God deals more severely with men, according to the above doctrines, than he seems to have done with the heathen world in this respect:

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particularly, in favour of God's decrees, it is observed, that if God conveys his gospel to, and bestows the means of grace on some people, and not on others, when the one are no more worthy of it than the other, and so must arise from his free grace, sovereign pleasure, and the counsel of his will; why may not the decree of the end of bestowing salvation on some, and not on others, as well as the decree of the means of sending the gospel to some, and not to others, be thought to be equally free, absolute and sovereign? And seeing it is in fact certain, that the greatest part of mankind have been always left destitute of the means of grace, we need not wonder why that God, who freely communicates the knowledge of himself, by the gospel, to some nations, denying it to others, should hold the same method with individuals that he doth with whole bodies; for the rejecting of whole nations by the lump, for so many ages, is much more unaccountable, than the selecting of a few to be infallibly conducted to salvation, and leaving others in that state of disability, in which they shall inevitably fail of it. Now to this is replied<sup>u</sup>:

I. "That this objection doth by no means answer the chief arguments produced against

<sup>u</sup> *Whitby*, p. 515. Ed. 2. 493.

these

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these decrees, — which are all taken from the inconsistency of them with the truth and sincerity of God's declaration; with his commands to repent; his exhortations and desires that they would; threats of ruin to them that do not; and with all the promises, motives and encouragements to induce them unto it." I observe, That this writer himself seems to be convinced that this objection answers *some*, tho' not the *chief* arguments produced against the absolute decrees of God. And as for those which are taken from the supposed inconsistency of them with the truth and sincerity of God, in his declarations, they have been replied to already, in this *Part*, under the article of Reprobation, to which the reader is referred; where it is made to appear, that there is no inconsistency between these decrees and the truth and sincerity of God, in his declarations. It is much we should be called upon to shew the like inconsistency, as is here pretended, between God's declarations, touching the heathen world, and his dealings with them; when it is agreed on both sides, he has made no declarations of his mind and will to them. This author goes on, and allows<sup>a</sup>, that there is a greater depth in the divine Providence, and in his dispensations towards the sons of men, than

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p 516, 517. Ed. 2. 494, 495.

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ideas and imperfect notions of divine goodness, we do make against them?" But, pray, what are these plain and frequent, clear and copious revelations of divine goodness? and what the things that are not so clearly revealed? why, we are told, that to apply these things to our subject,

1. We know from scripture, how dreadful for quality, how endless for duration, will be the punishment of every *Christian*, who fails of the salvation tendered; — but we know so little of the future state of *beathens*, — that we are uncertain both as to the measure and duration of their punishment." Now, not to take notice, that salvation is not tendered, and that a *Christian*, or one that truly deserves that name, cannot fail of it, or be liable to endless punishment; it is strange, that the dreadful punishment of any, and the endless duration of it, should be mentioned among the plain and frequent, clear and copious revelations of divine goodness, when it belongs to the plain and frequent, clear and copious revelations of divine justice. Besides, tho' we know so little of the future state of *beathens* from the scripture, yet we are not altogether at an uncertainty about either the measure or duration of their punishment; for as to the former, we are told<sup>1</sup>, that *it shall be more*

<sup>1</sup> Mat. xli. 21, 22.

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*tolerable for Tyre and Sidon, for the inhabitants of these places, who had not the advantage of Christ's ministry and miracles, at the day of judgment, than for the inhabitants of Chorazin and Bethsaida, who were favoured with them ; and it is reasonable to conclude, that this will hold good of all men, without a divine revelation ; and as to the latter, it is certain, when our Lord shall descend from heaven, he will take vengeance on them that know not God, the Gentiles, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, meaning such who have enjoyed, but have neglected and despised the means of grace ; who, one as well as another, shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and the glory of his power<sup>u</sup>. Moreover, whereas it is suggested, that Providence may put the heathens into a better state before their final doom, since God overlooked the times of their former ignorance<sup>w</sup>, there being the like reason for his still overlooking them ; it should be observed, that God's overlooking the times of heathen ignorance, was not an instance of his kindness and goodness, but of his disregard unto them : the meaning is, that he looked over them, took no notice of them, made no revelation to them ; but left them in their blindness and ignorance, with-*

<sup>u</sup> 2 Thel. i. 8, 9.      <sup>w</sup> Act. xvii. 30.



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out giving them any helps, or sending them any persons to instruct and teach them.

2. It is<sup>x</sup> said, "We know that God hath made a tender of the covenant of grace, upon conditions of faith and repentance, to all that live under the gospel-dispensation; and that these decrees of absolute Reprobation, and of denying the help necessary to the performing these conditions, are inconsistent with that tender: whereas we know of no such tender made to the heathen world; but rather, that they are still *strangers to the covenant of promise*, Eph. ii. 12." I answer, we know, indeed, from the scriptures, that God has made a covenant of grace, which is a considerable instance of his divine philanthropy and goodness; but then, this covenant of grace is neither made with, nor tendered to all, that live under the gospel-dispensation; it's only made with God's Elect in Christ, and that not upon conditions of faith and repentance; for these are blessings of grace secured for them in this covenant. Hence the decrees of absolute Reprobation, and of denying the aid of grace to some persons, are not at all inconsistent with this covenant, and the promulgation of it in the gospel. We also know of no such covenant made with, nor of any tender of it, nor of any publication of it to

<sup>x</sup> *Whitby*, p. 519. Ed. 2. 437.

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the *heathen* world; but rather, that all that are destitute of revelation, are *strangers to the covenant of promise*, Eph. ii. 12. which passage likewise acquaints us, that such as are *without* the knowledge of *Christ*, and *God* in *Christ*, are *without hope*; and that such who live and die so, have no good ground of hope of eternal life and salvation; which plainly points out the state and case of the *heathens*, and leaves us at no great uncertainty about it: wherefore, we freely own, what is further alledged<sup>y</sup>, that,

3. "We know not any promises God hath made to them;" and we know as little of any promises, or tenders of promises, God has made to the reprobate part of mankind, either with or without conditions, or upon possible or impossible ones: as also, that,

4. "We know<sup>z</sup> from *scripture*, that the *Heathens*, who never heard of *Christ*, and never had *Christ* preached to them, are not bound to believe in him." This is readily granted, and to it may be added, that they will not be condemned and punished for their unbelief, but for their sins committed against the law and light of nature. And tho' "we know from the same *scripture*, that *this is the command of God to all that have heard of Christ, that they believe in the Son*

<sup>y</sup> *Whitby*, p. 419. Ed. 2. 497.

<sup>z</sup> *Whitby*, p. 520. Ed. 2. 498.

of God; yet we know that the faith enjoined and required is proportionate to the revelation that is made of Christ; for no man is bound to believe more than what is revealed. If evidence is given of Christ's being the Son of God, the Messiah and Saviour of the world, as was to the *Jews*, credit should be given thereunto; which the *Jews* should and could have given, tho' they could not believe unto salvation, without superior power and grace: if Christ is represented to any persons as a proper object of faith, trust and confidence; it becomes such persons to believe in him, and rely upon him, and such are, by the grace of God, enabled so to do. If the spirit of God reveals to a man his particular interest in the death of Christ, or that Christ died for him in particular, he ought to believe it. All which perfectly accords with the doctrine of particular Redemption, and is no ways inconsistent with God's decrees of giving the necessary aid of his grace to some, to enable them to believe unto salvation, and of denying it to others.

5. It is added<sup>a</sup>, "We know that God sent his *prophets* and *messengers*, *apostles* and *evangelists*, to move the *Jews* unto repentance, and those *Gentiles* to whom the gospel was offered, to embrace it; and that

<sup>a</sup> *Whitby*, p. 520. Ed. 2. 498.

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under both these dispensations, he established an order of men to call all men indifferently to repentance; — but we know not that any thing of this was done towards those *Heathens* to whom the gospel never hath been preached, nor ever any messenger or prophet sent." Be it so, as it will be allowed, that proper persons were sent to move the *Jews* to repentance, and the *Gentiles* to embrace the gospel, who were blessed to the conversion of God's elect, which lay among them both; and that nothing of this was ever done to the *Heathens*, to whom the gospel was never preached; for, indeed, how should any thing of this kind be done to them, this being their case? yet this is not at all inconsistent with God's decrees of Election and Reprobation, since it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that God ever called any person to evangelical repentance, to whom he has not given the grace of repentance; or that he calls all men indifferently to repentance, or any to whom he denies the grace of repentance. Though, admitting he does externally call such persons to repentance, this may be done to expose the vile nature of sin, declare man's duty, and leave him inexcusable, tho' he denies him, and has determined to deny him grace to enable him to repent, which he is not obliged to give; all  
which

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which is consistent with the truth, sincerity and design of the call.

II. A *second* Answer to this Argument of ours is<sup>1</sup>, That "this objection supposeth it to be the same thing to be without a gospel-revelation, and to be without any means of grace at all ; — which supposition seems plainly contrary to the declaration of the holy scripture, touching the heathen world. For,

1. As God plainly saith, even in respect to their justification, *That he is the God not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles*, Rom. iii. 29. and that *he is the same Lord who is rich unto all that call upon him*, Rom. x. 12. So has he also, by St. Peter, taught, that *he is no respecter of persons ; but that in every nation he that feareth God, and worketh righteousness, is accepted of him*, Acts x. 34, 35. Whence it appears, that some of all nations, owning the true God, not only might, but actually did *fear God and work righteousness*, and that God accepts men only because they do so : whence it follows, that *those Heathens* who have at any time attained to the knowledge of the true God, may, in that state, perform those righteous actions which shall be acceptable in his sight." To which I reply, That *until the law was given, it*

<sup>1</sup> Rom. 1. 16. Gal. 3. 23. 1 Cor. 9. 11.

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nature, by which men may have some knowledge of a divine Being, tho' they know not who he is, and of the difference between good and evil, and unless the motives from providential goodness, to serve and glorify God, can be thought to be means of grace, the *Heathens* must be without any, who are destitute of the gospel-revelation; and then to be without a gospel-revelation, and without any means of grace at all, must be the same thing; seeing the gospel-revelation, the word and ordinances, are the common and ordinary means of grace. It will not be denied, that God may make use of extraordinary means; send an angel from heaven to acquaint men with the way of salvation, by Jesus Christ, or by some other secret method, unknown to us; yet from the possibility of things to the certainty of them, we cannot argue: and though we would be far from judging of and determining the final state of such who are destitute of revelation; yet, according to the scripture-account of them, we cannot but conclude, that as such, and while such, they are without the means of grace, *being without Christ, aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no hope, and without God in the world.* Nor do the scriptures alledged prove, that they have the means of grace,

..<sup>c</sup> Vid. Curcellacus, p. 389. Limborch, p. 363.

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as will appear from a particular consideration of them. Not, *Rom. iii. 29.* God was, indeed, equally the God of the *Gentiles* as of the *Jews*, as the God of nature and providence, being the common creator and preserver of them, and provider for them; but not as the God of grace, or in point of special grace and peculiar privileges, or before the gospel-dispensation took place. Now, indeed, the middle wall of partition between *Jew* and *Gentile* is broken down; the gospel has been sent and preached to one as to another; and some of both have been brought to believe in Christ; and so God is the God of one as of the other, and stands no more distinguished by the God of *Israel*. And to this the apostle has respect in the place before us; when he puts the question, *is he the God of the Jews only? is he not also of the Gentiles?* Which he answers, in the affirmative, *yes, of the Gentiles also.* The argument proving this, follows; *seeing it is one God which shall justify the circumcision by faith, and the uncircumcision through faith.* Whence it is manifest, that the *Apostle* is not speaking of the justification of heathens, by their obedience to the law and light of nature, nor of them as heathens, or of God being their God, considered as such; but of their justification by faith in Christ, and so of them as believers, and of God being their God as such, equally with the believing *Jews*. Could it

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be proved, that God justifies the heathens by their obedience to the law and light of nature, as he justifies others by faith in the blood and righteousness of Christ, it would be much to the purpose, but since this text gives no such intimation, but the contrary, it must be impertinent to the present argument. Nor, *Rom. x. 12.* *There is, indeed, no difference between the Jew and Greek under the gospel-dispensation, for the same Lord over all, who has made them, and has a sovereign dominion over them, is rich in the distributions of his grace unto all that call upon him, be they Jews or Gentiles.* And; for their encouragement, it is observed, *v. 13.* *That whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved.* But then it is added, *v. 14.* *How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher?* Which manifestly shews, that tho' the Lord plenteously distributes the riches of his grace to all that call upon him, without distinction of nations; yet to them only that call upon him aright, that is, in faith; of which faith, the preaching and hearing the word are the ordinary means; *Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God, v. 17.* Now the *Gentiles* being without these means, and so destitute of faith, cannot rightly call upon God, there  
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being



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being no true invocation of him without faith in him ; it follows, that they are not only without the means of grace, whilst this is their case, but even without any hope or likelihood of enjoying the blessings of grace ; since these, in the text, are limited to them that call upon the Lord, and that call upon him in faith. Nor, *Acts* x. 34, 35. The character given of *Cornelius* is, indeed, very great, and, no doubt, very just ; when he is said to be *a devout man, and one that feared God with all his house, which gave much alms to the people, and prayed to God alway*, v. 2. Whose prayers and alms were greatly taken notice of, approved and accepted of with God ; for the angel said unto him, *thy prayers and thine alms are come up for a memorial before God*, v. 4. i. e. they were grateful to him, and were remembered by him. But then, it is not so evident, that he was now in a state of *Heathenism*, destitute of divine revelation, of that particularly which was made to the *Jews*, or destitute of faith in the *Messiah*, especially, as to come, or in a state of unregeneracy. He was, indeed, of *heathen* extract ; was now a *Roman* soldier, and his falling down at *Peter's* feet, and worshipping of him, v. 25, may look like acting the part of an idolatrous *Heathen* ; when it was no other than an instance of civil respect, which *Peter* would not receive, lest the standers-by, or those that

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came with him, should think more was designed by it. It is moreover said, that *Peter* should tell him words whereby he and all his house should be saved, c. xi. 14. Which may seem to intimate, as if he and his family were not in a state of salvation; which sense, tho' it would prove that heathens may do many things which are materially good, tho' they have not all the circumstances of a good action; yet, so far as they are good, may be taken notice of and regarded by God; so that on the account of them they may be saved from temporal ruin, as the *Ninevites*, upon their repentance, were, and enjoy temporal good, and their future punishment be lessened: but then, this sense would prove what is quite beside and contrary to the scheme of our author, namely, that persons in a state of *Heathenism*, tho' they may be very devout and religious in their way, and do a great many good things; yet are not in a state of salvation. But I am inclined to think, that the meaning of them is this, That whereas *Cornelius* and his family were seeking after, and were very desirous of knowing the way of salvation, of which they had some knowledge from the writings of the old testament, upon *Peter's* coming to them, they should be more clearly led in to it, and become thoroughly acquainted with the promised *Messiah*, by whom alone they could be saved: for that *Cornelius* and his

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his family were *Profelytes of the Gate*, this writer himself owns<sup>d</sup>; since the same titles which belonged to the *Profelytes of the Gate*, are given to them. It is evident that *Cornelius* attended to and complied with the rituals of the *Jews*, as appears from his observing the same hour of prayer with them; the *ninth hour*, v. 30. compared with ch. iii. 1. and from his being *of good report among all the nation of the Jews*, v. 22. He, no doubt, read the prophecies of the old Testament, attended the synagogues of the *Jews*, believed in the *Messiah* to come<sup>e</sup>; so that his faith was of the same kind with the saints before the coming of Christ, and in this faith he did all the good works he did, which became acceptable to God through Christ; *for without faith it is impossible to please him*<sup>e</sup>. And now God is no respecter of persons, he makes no difference between nation and nation; but in every nation, whether they be *Jews* or *Gentiles*, be that feareth him, which includes the whole of religion internal and external, and so faith in Christ, and from such

<sup>d</sup> *Whitby*, Ib. So *Hammond* in Acts x. 2.

<sup>e</sup> Falluntur enim vehementer, qui Cornelium arbitrantur, vera fide non fuisse praeditum, quum *eversus* & Deo tam gratus fuisse ipsius precibus aperte dicatur. Hoc autem ipsi decrat ut eum venisse crederet, cui tanquam venturo credebat, licet carne iniquumcibus. *Boza* in Act. x. 4. vid. etiam in v. 35. & *Piscator*. in Act. x. 4.

<sup>f</sup> Heb. xi. 6.

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*his principle worketh righteousness, is accepted with him; tho' let it be observed, that notwithstanding God accepts of such who fear him, and work righteousness, without any regard to their being circumcised or uncircumcised, to their being of this or the other nation; yet their fear of him, and working of righteousness, are not the ground of their acceptance; but are to be considered as descriptive of the persons who are accepted in Christ; for there is no acceptance of persons or services but in Christ the beloved. From the whole, it does not appear that heathens, as such, and while in that state, may, and actually do fear God in the true sense of that phrase, as it imports the whole of internal and external religion; to both which, in the truth of them, they are utter strangers, and consequently, cannot, and do not work righteousness, or what deserves that name, or what springs from the principles of the fear of God, and faith in him; and hence it follows not, that Heathens may, in that state, perform those righteous actions which are acceptable in the sight of God, since what they perform, is not done in faith, nor directed to the glory of God; and especially in such sense, as that for the sake, and upon the account of them, their persons should be accepted, and they be everlastingly saved by him. For if the works of true believers, which spring from*  
*love,*

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love, are done in faith, in obedience to the will of God, and with a view to his glory, cannot, and do not render their persons acceptable to God, nor procure their salvation; how should it be thought that the actions of heathens should do all this, were they even ten thousand times more and better than they are?

2. It is said<sup>c</sup>, That “this (that the heathens are not without any means of grace at all) may be gathered from these words of St. Paul, *God, who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways, nevertheless left not himself without a witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, &c. Acts xiv. 16, 17.*” I reply, That God’s giving of rain and fruitful seasons to the *Heathens*, and filling them with food and gladness, were, indeed, testimonies of his providence and goodness; in which respect he *left not himself without a witness*; but then, tho’ these were instances of providential goodness; yet not means of grace. It is true, that the works of creation were means of mens knowing that there is a God, and that he is to be worshipped; so that the heathens were without excuse because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their

<sup>c</sup> *Whitby*, p. 523. Ed. 2. 500.

*foolish*

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*foolish heart was darkned*<sup>f</sup>: but then, these were not sufficient means of knowing who this God was, and in what manner he was to be worshipped. So that frequent instances of rain and fruitful seasons, and the daily supplies of food for the bodies of men, are proofs of a divine Being, who is kind and good, and of a divine Providence, and lay men under obligation to be thankful, and to seek after God, and serve him; but are not means of grace, or of eternal life and salvation: for these very persons, to whom God gave rain and fruitful seasons, whose hearts he filled with food and gladness, he *suffered to walk in their own ways*; which unavoidably lead to ruin and destruction. What means of grace could these men have? who were thus entirely left of God, to do that which was right in their own eyes; though he did not leave himself without a witness. How blind, ignorant, and superstitious were they, that, when they saw what the Apostle Paul had done, cried out, *the gods are come down to us in the likeness of men*? and brought out their oxen and garlands, and would have done sacrifice; from which the Apostle scarcely restrained them by these sayings of his. What means of grace could these be supposed to have? when, as this author himself observes,

<sup>f</sup> Rom. i. 20, 21.

<sup>g</sup> *Whistly*, p. 523. Ed. 2. 501.

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God "so far permitted this, as that he sent them no prophet to instruct them better, and gave them no positive revelation of his will, no written instructions of the way in which he would be worshipped, as he had done unto the Jews."

3. The same, it is observed, may be gathered<sup>b</sup> "from those words of the same Apostle; God, *that made the world and all things in it — made all nations of one blood, and hath determined the times before appointed* (i. e. the fixed seasons of the year) *and the bounds of their habitations, that they might seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him*, Acts xvii. 24, 26, 27.

Whence we learn, that God made the world with this design; that men, by contemplation of the power, wisdom and goodness, visible in the creation of it, might *seek* after the Author of it, and, seeking, *find* him. That, to *seek after God in the scripture phrase*, is so to seek him out, that we may give him that worship which is due to him; and, to find him, is to obtain his grace and favour. —

That sinners cannot thus hope to seek or find God, unless they can expect to find him merciful in the pardon of those sins they confess and forsake; all which must depend on this foundation, that God is the maker of heaven and earth, and all

<sup>b</sup> *Whitby*, p. 524, 525, 526. Ed. 2. 502, 503, 504.

that

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that is therein; whence it follows, That men, guided only by the light of nature, may so acceptably seek God, as to find him gracious and merciful towards them." To which may be replied, That the making of the world, and all things in it, with the suitable provisions for all creatures, is a glorious display of the power, wisdom and goodness of God; and it will be allowed, that men, by the light of nature, may, as these *Athenians* might, to whom the Apostle speaks, so seek after God, and find that there is one, and such an one as *dwells not in temples made with hands, neither is worshipped with mens bands, as though he needed any thing, seeing he giveth to all life and breath, and all things, v. 24, 25.* which was sufficient to convince them of, the gross idolatry they were guilty of, and that they ought not to think, as they did, *That the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art, or man's device, v. 29.* But then, it must be denied, that the heathens did, or could, by the light of nature, seek God acceptably, or so as to find him gracious and merciful unto them; for he is only sought acceptably, and only found gracious and merciful, in Christ Jesus our Lord. And tho' propitiatory sacrifices did very early, and long, and generally obtain among them; yet, as these were not taught them by the light of nature, but were either some broken, mangled traditions, which  
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originally sprung from divine revelation, or *Satanical* imitations of that kind of worship God had appointed; so they were performed in such a manner, as abundantly declared the wretched barbarity, ignorance and stupidity of the worshippers; nor was God ever acceptably sought in them, or ever found to be propitious, gracious and merciful through them. Besides, let it further be observed, that though the *passage* before us shews, that it is possible for men, by a contemplation of the power, wisdom and goodness of God, visible in his works of creation and providence, so to seek after him and find him, as to know that there is a God who has made all these; to be convinced of the vanity, and falshood of all other gods, and to see the folly, wickedness and weakness of idolatrous worship; yet, at the same time, it very strongly intimates to us, how dim and obscure the light of nature is; since those who have nothing else to direct them but that, are like persons in the dark, who *feel* and grope about after God, whom they cannot see; and after all their search and groping, there is only an *haply*, a peradventure, *perhaps*, that they find him. Add to this, that the *Heathenism* are called in

etiam accipitur pro perferuari,  
qui palpando viam quaerunt, ut  
veniant in loc.

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a 30. *Times of ignorance*, which God winked at, *overlooked*, disregarded; took no notice of, and gave them no means of spiritual light and knowledge. In short, these words, in most, only declare what is the end of man's creation, which is, *to seek the Lord*, and glorify him; and not what man can do, or the heathens have done, by the mere light of nature, and are far from being a proof of their having any means of grace.

1. It is said. That "this may be proved from these words, *Heb. xi. 6. He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.* Where, *obscurely*. That *to come to God*, is to *come* and throughout the tenor of the *scripture*, and more especially in this *Epistle*, where it signifies, to come to his throne of grace or favour, by the solution of sacrifices, or the performance of any other duty; yea, from the context it appears, that it is *expressed*, *as if* that which is *well-pleasing* to him. — That all men may *so seek God*, is *so* to want is well-pleasing to him, if they diligently endeavour to to do. — That if they do so, they shall be rewarded by him. — That the *reward* may have grounds sufficient to believe, that they shall be re-

\* *1. 2. Examinatio loc.*

\* *Alleg. p. 504, 505. Ed. 2. 504, 505.*

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warded for serving him diligently, according to the light which God had given them.— The inference is, That *Heathens* may have faith in God, even that faith, which is *the expectation of things hoped for*, and may encourage them to seek him diligently.” I answer, It is strange that this *passage of scripture* should be a proof of *heathens* having the means of grace, or of their being capable of seeking and serving God acceptably, and of their having faith in God, even that faith, which in *ver. 1.* is said to be, *the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen*; when the *Apostle* is only speaking of such a faith as is founded upon the word of God, and of such persons only who were favoured with a divine revelation, of the *Patriarchs* before and after the flood, the fore-fathers of the *Jews*; various instances of whose faith he produces, partly to prove the above definition of faith, and partly for the imitation, example and encouragement of the *Hebrews*, to whom he writes; men who also enjoyed the oracles of God, had plenty of the means of grace, and were blessed with a gospel-revelation. Besides, let it be observed, that since to come to God, as this author explains it from the context, is *to do that which is pleasing to him*; and since it appears, from the *former part* of this text, that *without faith it is impossible, εως οτου, to do that which is well-*

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pleasing to God; and from the words themselves, that believing is absolutely requisite to coming to him, not only that he exists, but *that he is*, in Christ, a God gracious and merciful, and a rewarder, in a way of grace, *of all them that diligently seek him* in his Son, in whom only he is to be so found; and since *heathens* are without any knowledge of him or faith in him, as such; for, *how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher?* it follows, that this passage of *Scripture* proves the reverse of what it is brought for, namely, that it is impossible for *heathens* to come to God aright, to serve him acceptably, or to do what is well-pleasing to him, because they are destitute of faith, and *whosoever is not of faith, is lost*. Moreover, there is no such thing as coming to God but through Christ, he is the only way of access to God for *Jews and Gentiles*; *for through him we both<sup>a</sup>, Jew and Gentile, have an access by one spirit unto the Father*. But since the *heathens*, destitute of divine revelation, are *without Christ*, and the knowledge of him, as the way to the Father, they must be *without hope*, and *without God in the world*, and know not how to come to him, nor can they come to him aright;

<sup>a</sup> Rom. x. 14.

<sup>c</sup> Rom. xiv. 23.

<sup>b</sup> Eph. ii. 18.

<sup>d</sup> Ver. 12.

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nor, indeed, are they capable of seeking and finding him as the God of grace, or as a God gracious and merciful ; since he is only to be sought and found as such in Christ Jesus our Lord. It is true, indeed, that they may and should, by the light of nature, seek after God ; and they may find him, as the God of nature, and should glorify him as such ; yea, they may do many things materially good, which, though they may not be thoroughly well-pleasing to God, the circumstances of a good work being wanting in them, and also being without a Mediator to render them acceptable to God ; yet, may be so far approved of by him, as to avert temporal judgments from them, and to lessen their future punishment : so that the heathen world, according to our sentiments of them, is not, as is suggested, exempted from all obligations to seek God, or deprived of any motive to do what appears, by the light of nature, to be the will of God. From the whole, it follows not, that *heathens* may have that faith in God, which is *the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen* ; for how should they, who are *strangers from the covenants of promise*, hope, look for, and expect those things, of which they have no promise, on which to ground their hope and expectations ?

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5. It is, moreover, said<sup>f</sup>, That “this may be further evident from those words: *The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness*”. Where, observe, that the Apostle is speaking of the *Heathen* world, of the *Gentiles*, ver. 16, 23, 25. — That this wrath of God was revealed from heaven *against* their *ungodliness*, i. e. their impiety, in robbing God of his honour, and giving it to them which, by nature, were no gods, and in being ungrateful to him, who was the author of their blessings; and against their *unrighteousness*, i. e. the violation of the laws of justice, charity, and mercy, towards one another. — That they did this against sufficient evidence and manifestation of the truth discovered to them, *holding the truth in unrighteousness*. — That the great reason of *the wrath of God revealed against them* was this, that they thus sinned against the knowledge and conscience of their duty. — The inference is, That all the acts of ungodliness and unrighteousness here mentioned, (as things too commonly practised in the *Heathen* world) were done against sufficient light and conviction, that they did these things against the natural light of their own consciences, and the knowledge of that duty which was due from

<sup>f</sup> *Whitby*, p. 527, 528, 530. Ed. 2. 505, 506, 507, 508.

<sup>g</sup> *Rom.* i. 18.

them

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them both to God and man." I reply,; It is not so evident, that the Apostle is speaking, either in the text or context, especially in *ver. 16.* of the heathen world, destitute of a divine revelation; where the Apostle says, *I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ, for it is the power of God unto salvation, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek.* In which words he intimates, that not only the gospel was now preached to *Gentiles* as well as *Jews*; but that it was *the power of God*, or the power of God had accompanied it, to the conversion of some among the *Gentiles*, as well as of some among the *Jews*; and since *therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith*, he signifies, that it became all such who were blessed with this revelation, who embraced this gospel, and made a profession of it, to live by faith; *as it is written, the just shall live by faith*; which faith is productive of good works, for otherwise, *faith without works is dead*: wherefore, such who live wicked and ungodly lives, notwithstanding their profession of the gospel, may expect the vengeance of God; for, even under the gospel-dispensation, *the wrath of God is revealed from heaven* in various awful instances and examples, *against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men*; sins against the first and second table of the law, which are no more countenanced under the evangelical, than under the legal

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oeconomy, and especially against the ungodliness and unrighteousness of such *who bold the truth, & aduna, with unrighteousness, i. e.* who hold and profess the word of truth, the gospel of our salvation, and yet live unrighteously in their conversations, or hinder the spreading of it by their ungodly lives. In this view of things, the words have no reference to the heathen world, as such; but to persons, whether *Jews* or *Gentiles*, enjoying the gospel-revelation. It is true, the following part of the context seems to regard the *Gentiles*, as only having the light of nature, and their abuse of it; tho' Dr. *Hammond* understands the whole context, of *Judaizing Christians*, of the *Gnosticks*; and, indeed, the whole account well enough agrees with them, who not only had, in common with the *Gentiles*, the advantages of the light of nature, the works of creation and providence to lead them to the knowledge of God, whereby they were left without excuse; but even boasted of superior knowledge to other Christians, from whence they had the name of *Gnosticks*; and yet these men, who *professed themselves to be wise, became fools*, ran into the idolatry of the *heathens*, partook with them in their idol-feasts, and particularly worshipped the images of *Simon Magus* and *Helena*, and were guilty of all the obscenities, impurities, unnatural lust, and horrible wickedness,



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nels, mentioned to the end of the chapter ; the last words of which may be more properly true of them, than of the *beathen* world, *who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.* But, admitting that the *beathen* world, as such, is here spoken of, it will only prove what will be readily granted, that the *beathens*, by the visible works of creation, may know that there is a God, and the invisible perfections of Deity ; that he, who is the creator of all things, ought to be worshipped and adored, and not the creature ; that they ought to acknowledge him as the author of their being, and mercies ; to glorify him on the account of them, and to be thankful to him for them ; and, should they do otherwise, are inexcusable, since they must act against the natural light of their own consciences. But how does this prove them to have any means of grace, or means of obtaining eternal life and salvation ? So far from it, that it proves, that men being left to the light of nature, even such as are of the highest form, *profess themselves* to be the *sophi*, the *wise* men of the world, sink into the greatest blindness and stupidity, fall into the grossest idolatries, become guilty of the vilest ingratitude, and commit the most abominable and unnatural iniquities that were ever heard of,

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6. It is further urged<sup>b</sup>, That “*this also seemeth evident from what the *Apostle* hath declared touching the *Gentiles*, who had not the law, to wit, that God would judge them according to their works, Rom. ii. 6.— And when the *Apostle* adds, that *the Gentiles which knew not the law of Moses, did by nature, i. e. by virtue of the law of nature, written in their hearts, the things contained in the moral law*, he must insinuate, that they had the natural principles of good and evil discovered to them, by their own reason and discretion.” To which may be replied, That what the *Apostle* hath declared touching the *Gentiles*, that God would judge them according to their works, is not to be understood of his justification and acceptance of them, on the account of their works, or of his rewarding them with eternal glory and happiness for the sake of them; for, *by the deeds of the law*, whether of nature, or of *Moses*, *there shall no flesh be justified in his sight*<sup>i</sup>; but of the righteous condemnation of them, according to their evil works, which, by the light of nature, they knew to be so, and ought to have avoided, as he himself explains it, *ver. 12. As many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law*: which, surely, can never be*

<sup>b</sup> *Wootty*, p. 530, 531. Ed. 2. 508, 509.

<sup>i</sup> *Rom.* iii. 20.

thought

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thought to be a proof of their having means of grace ; but rather the contrary. Indeed, it is true, that they did, by the mere light of nature, know the difference between good and evil in many cases ; and, by the mere strength of nature, did many things which had the appearance of moral goodness ; but then, as their knowledge was very imperfect, and their strength but weakness, there were many things which should have been done, were left undone, and multitudes of sins were committed against the direct law and light of nature : so that they were far from being hereby in a state of justification and acceptance with God, and which occasioned great turmoils of conscience, and restlessness and disquietude of their thoughts within them ; all which is largely expressed by the *Apostle*, ver. 14, 15. *For when the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves, which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another.*

III. Having considered the arguments from *scripture* in favour of the *heathens* having means of grace, we now proceed to consider such as are taken from reason. And,

I. It

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1. It is observed<sup>k</sup>, That "it seemeth evident from reason, that if God would be worshipped, served and obeyed by his rational creatures, he must have given them sufficient knowledge of that being whom they are to serve, worship and obey, and of those laws which he requires them to obey; and also must have given them abilities to do them as far as he requires this to their acceptance, and motives sufficient to induce them thus to serve and to obey him." I answer, That whereas there is a God, and this God is to be served and obeyed, so he has not left himself without a witness to the very *Heathens*, he has given to them means of knowing his being and perfections. The things that are made, are sufficient proofs of his eternal Power and Godhead, so that in this respect, they are without excuse; nor are they altogether without the knowledge of those laws he requires them to obey; for though they are strangers to the instituted worship and positive laws of revealed religion, for the neglect of which they will not be condemned; yet not to the laws of natural religion: for though they have no written law in their hands to guide and direct them; yet they have the work of the law written on their hearts, to which their conscience bears witness, and their thoughts

<sup>k</sup> *Witby*, p. 551, 532. Ed. 2. 509, 510.

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accuse or excuse, as they do good or evil works, and, no doubt, but they are able to do more than they do in a way of natural obedience to these laws; nor are they without motives, from the providential goodness of God, to induce them to a regard to them. We do not say the *heathens* want the means of knowing the natural duties owing to God and man; and so are far from destroying natural religion, or absolving the *heathens* from obligations to perform it. We say, indeed, that neither they, nor any others, without the grace of God, can *love the Lord their God with all their heart, and their neighbour as themselves*; which are the main parts of the law; but then it does not follow from hence, that these are no duties of natural religion, or that God does not require them, or that men are not under obligation to them, because, through their own viciousity, they have lost their power to obey them as they ought. We also say, that those actions of the *Heathens* which are materially good, are yet formally evil, because they are not done out of love to God as the principle, and to God's glory as the end; and, indeed, how should they do any thing out of love to God, and with a view to his glory, when they know him not? for though they have means of knowing the being and perfections of God, yet they know not who the true God is; but, being left to the mere light of nature,

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nature, fix upon that which is not God, to be so, and consequently can have no true love to the only true God, nor true faith in him, or a true regard to his glory. And we say the same of the works and actions of all men in a state of nature, before conversion, who are destitute of love to God, and faith in Christ; and so says *the Church*, of which this author was a member, in her *thirteenth Article*, "Works done before the grace of Christ, and the inspiration of his spirit, are not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they spring not of faith in Jesus Christ; neither do they make men meet to receive grace, or (as the school-authors say) deserve grace of congruity; yea, rather, for that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done, we doubt not but that they have the nature of sin." But, after all, supposing that the *Heathens* have sufficient means of knowing God, and the duties of natural religion, and that they do know God, and do perform the duties of natural religion, are these the means of grace, life and salvation? when *it is not by works of righteousness*, works done according to a righteous law, and from a principle of grace and holiness, *which we Christians, believers in Christ, have done after conversion*, in the faith of Christ, from love to God, and a view to his glory, that we are saved, but according to the mercy of God, by  
the

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*the washing of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour*<sup>1</sup>. To say no more, the Argument may easily be retorted thus : It seemeth evident from reason, that if God had willed that all the individuals of human nature, and among the rest the *Heathens*, should be saved through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom alone we hope to be saved, there being no other way of salvation that we know of ; I say, it seemeth evident from reason, that God would have given these persons the means of salvation, the means of knowing Christ, and salvation by him, and the knowledge of these things it self.

2. It is further argued<sup>m</sup>, “ If God hath given to all men immortal souls, it seemeth plainly hence to follow, that he hath put them some way in a capacity of being happy after death, and hath not left them under an inevitable necessity of being always miserable. For since, according to our *Saviour's* words, *it had been better for such men that they had not been born* ; and, according to right reason, *it is better not to be, than to be miserable*. And seeing all such men must be subject to a necessity of being miserable, only by being born into the world, that is,

<sup>1</sup> Tit. iii. 5, 6.

<sup>m</sup> *Whitby*, p. 534. Ed. 2. 512.

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[illegible]



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*that they had not been born, but it had been good for that man, Judas, if he had not been born*<sup>a</sup>. And this, as some think, was said according to the judgment of men, and as Judas himself would hereafter judge, and is designed to express the wofulness of his state and condition; tho' it is not said, *it had been good for him if he had not been, but if he had not been born*, i. e. if he had been an abortive, had died in his mother's womb. It is not according to right reason, but according to an erroneous judgment, that *it is better not to be, than to be miserable*; for *to be* is something, and something good, though attended with misery; but, *not to be*, is nothing, and *non entis nulla affectio*, can have neither goodness nor betterness, nor can be properly eligible or desirable. The reasoning, which follows, from the goodness of God in temporal things, to his concern for mens spiritual welfare, and from the law of nature and light of reason, implanted in them, have been elsewhere considered.

3. It is urged<sup>c</sup>, "That it cannot be consistent with divine equity and goodness, to make that a condition of any man's happiness, which he cannot know to be his duty, or knowing, cannot do. — Hence it is

<sup>a</sup> Matt. xxvi. 24.

<sup>c</sup> *Whist*, p. 536. Ed. 2. 514.

evident,

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evident, that the knowledge of any revelation made to *Jew* or *Christian*, cannot be necessary to the happiness of *Heathens* in general, much less the practice of any purely *Christian* duty; and therefore *faith in Jesus Christ* cannot be necessary to the salvation of as many of them as have never heard of him." I answer, That the *Heathens* will not be condemned and punished for their ignorance of that revelation which was never vouchsafed to them, nor for the non-performance of any purely *Christian* duty, such as Baptism and the Lord's Supper; nor for not believing in Christ, of whom they have never heard, only for those sins which they have committed against the law and light of nature; but inasmuch as they are without any true knowledge of the way of atonement for sin, and without any revelation from God of the method of salvation from it, they must be considered as destitute of the means of grace, and as far from true happiness and felicity.

4. When this author says <sup>p</sup>, "This I think certain, that God will only judge men at the last for sinning against the means he hath vouchsafed them to know, and to perform their duty, and only by that law which he hath given them.——" Hence it must follow, that those heathens

<sup>p</sup> *Whitby*, p. 537. Ed. 2. 514, 515.

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to whom the law of nature hath been only given, can be judged only for the violations of that law." This will be readily allowed, as agreeable to what the *Apostle* says<sup>9</sup>, *as many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law.* But then, this observation is no proof of their having any means of grace; this leaves them without any, and discovers the equity and justice of God in their condemnation.

5. It is further observed<sup>r</sup>, That "God having laid down this method in the dispensation of his gifts, that he who is *faithful in the least* talent, shall have a suitable reward; and that *to him that bath*, so as to improve what he enjoys, *shall more be given*, and, *vice versa*; we may hence rationally conclude, that he who diligently endeavours to do good, according to that light he hath received, shall find some tokens of the favour of God; and that if any farther aid be requisite to enable the *beathens* acceptably to perform their duty, the divine Goodness will impart that also to them, by those secret dispensations of his providence which we are not acquainted with." To which may be replied, That the parable of the *Talents* referred to, does not relate either to the gifts of nature, or

<sup>9</sup> Rom. ii. 12.

<sup>r</sup> *Whitby*, p. 539. Ed. 2. 516.

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of special grace; but to ministerial gifts, or such as qualify men for the preaching of the gospel, as has been shewn in the *first Part* of this work, and therefore cannot be of any service in the argument before us. What secret methods God may make use of to impart his grace to heathens, to afford them the aid that is requisite to perform their duty acceptably, to communicate his mercy to them, and apply the meritorious performances of Christ, are, indeed, secrets to us; and *secret things belong to the Lord our God, but these things which are revealed, belong to us and to our children*<sup>†</sup>. It is only according to the revelation God has made, we are able to judge of things, and beyond that we cannot go; and according to that revelation, it appears, that *Christ is the way, the truth, and the life*<sup>‡</sup>; the true way to eternal life; that *no man can come to the Father but by him*; that *there is salvation in no other*; that *there is none other name under heaven given among men, Jews or Gentiles, whereby we must be saved*<sup>§</sup>; that the heathens, destitute of revelation, *know not God*<sup>¶</sup>; are *without Christ, strangers to the covenants of promise, without hope and God in the world*<sup>||</sup>; and consequently, according to all the views

<sup>†</sup> No. 26, p. 139. <sup>‡</sup> Deut. xxix. 29. <sup>§</sup> John xiv. 6.

<sup>¶</sup> Acts iv. 12. <sup>||</sup> 1 Thess. iv. 5. <sup>||</sup> Eph. ii. 12.

of things we are capable of taking from hence, must be without any means of grace and salvation.

6. And lastly, it is said, That "we may reasonably conclude, God will deal with them, both with respect to the acceptation and reward of their good, and his displeasures against and punishment of their evil actions, according to the measures of their ignorance and knowledge, the abilities, motives and inducements afforded to them to do, or to avoid them; and that in these particulars.—— That their good actions, done upon less convictions, aids and motives, may be more acceptable to God, than the like actions done by *Christians*, upon much stronger evidence, and better aids, and more powerful inducements to the same actions, according to *Jobn* xx. 29. *Luke* vii. 9. *Matt.* xv. 28. —— That the Heathens may expect a reward upon performance of less duty, according to *Luke* xii. 48. —— That God should be more ready to pardon and pass by their transgressions, because there must be in them the more of ignorance, and so the less of contempt, and so the more of that which renders them excusable, and the less of that which aggravates transgression.—— That God should be more patient and long-suffering towards

\* *Whitby*, p. 540, &c. Ed. 2. 517, &c.

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were more to number, because the less  
the light, the more glow, and this is their of-  
fense against us — it is not reasonable to  
suppose that they may be more gentle in the  
treatment of their sinners, according  
to our Lord's own command. Luke xiii. 47."

There is much to be thought that the  
cause of *truth*, which with the circum-  
stances of a good work, such as love to God,  
and a true and pure love to his glory, and which  
are the true and appearance of goodness in  
them, should have any consideration what-  
ever, is more commendable to God, than the  
cause of Christians done by the assistance  
of grace to man, from pure love to God,  
and true and sincere love to his glory, and which  
are attended with, and are presented before  
God through the sweet intercession of Christ's  
mediation. There must be as much differ-  
ence in value, and actions, as point of  
distinction, as between the most fragrant  
rose, and the garden, and the most thinking  
man, and the dead. The words of our Lord;  
"I have seen many Christians and  
not seen any other," **the Christians and Chris-  
tians**, and **the Christians** each who believe on  
Christ, witness signs of his person and mi-  
nistry, and are believed on him  
and the signs of them. The Centurion,  
the Roman, and the *Syrian Pagan* woman,  
and others, though they were of *heathen*  
and *gentile* were not to be reckon'd as

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*thens*, since they conversed among the *Jews*, and probably were *Jewish Proselytes*, especially the former, and had heard of the *Messiah*; and were now, moreover, blessed with a gospel-revelation, enjoyed the ministry, and saw the miracles of Christ; and therefore their actions, and the instances of their faith, are not pertinent to the present argument. The saying of *Socrates*, this author mentions, supposes a plurality of Gods; and the expressions of *Epictetus*, breathe out the pride and vanity; the affectation and stupidity of a *Stoick*. Nor have the *Heathens* reason to expect a reward upon performance of less duty; for they have no reason to expect a reward, especially of eternal life, upon the performance of any duty, be it more or less; since the reward must be either of debt, or of grace; if of debt, the expectation must be founded upon the performance of the duty it self, and the strict proportion between the duty and the reward; but between eternal life, and the best performances of men, there is no proportion at all, and consequently there is no reward due unto them, and therefore no just expectation can arise from hence; if it is of grace, and the expectation is founded on divine goodness, there must be some notification of it, a promise of eternal life must be given: but the heathens are *strangers to*  
*the*

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*the covenants of promise*<sup>a</sup>; they have no such promise, and are incapable of having any, without a revelation, as this author himself observes<sup>b</sup>; and therefore can have no well-grounded expectation of the reward of eternal life, upon the performance of any duty whatever; but are, as the Apostle says<sup>c</sup>, *without hope*, that is, *of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began*<sup>d</sup>. The words of our Lord in *Luke xii. 48.* can be no foundation of expectation of reward to *beathens*, upon performance of less duty, since they know nothing of them; and did they, could be none at all, since they speak not of any reward to be given to men, upon performance of more or less duty; only of what is required of men to whom much is committed. To proceed; though the *beathens* have more of ignorance, and less of contempt, in their transgressions, than others who enjoy the light of the gospel, and so as their sins are not so aggravated, their punishment will not be so great; but that they may *reasonably expect*, that God should be more ready to pardon and pass by their transgressions, because of their ignorance, when they are not sensible of it, is not easy to be conceived of. Again, though the

<sup>a</sup> Eph. ii. 12.

<sup>b</sup> *Whitby*, p. 538. Ed. 2. 515.

<sup>c</sup> Eph. ii. 12.

<sup>d</sup> Tit. i. 2.



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less the light is men enjoy, the less is their offence against it, and God may be more patient and long-suffering towards them before he punisheth; but that the *Heathens* may expect he will be so on this account, is not very evident. There have been instances, indeed, of God's patience and long-suffering towards them; but that of God's waiting upon the old world, in the days of *Noah*, who was a preacher of righteousness to them, cannot well be thought to be an instance of God's forbearance of *Heathens*, of men destitute of a divine revelation. It must be owned, it is reasonable to conceive, that God may be more gentle and mild in the punishment of the iniquities of *Heathens*, not only from *Luke* xii. 47. but from the express declaration of Christ, That *it will be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon, and for the land of Sodom, in the day of judgment, than for Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum, wherein most of his mighty works were done*: which brings me to the consideration of these words, and the inference said to be made from them. As to the sense and meaning of them, that has been considered already in the *first Part* of this work, to which the reader is referred. The inference said to be made from them is this, *viz.*

<sup>e</sup> *Matt.* xi. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24.  
<sup>s</sup> *Whitby*, p. 545. *Ed.* 2. 523.

<sup>f</sup> *Nº.* 14. p. 130, &c.

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“ Hence it appears, that the means of salvation are not always applied to them, whom God foresaw would use them better.” By whom this inference is made, I cannot find; and am jealous, that it is not fairly represented as it was drawn; since these words, according to our sense of them, are not to be understood of God’s prescience or foresight of what would certainly come to pass; if such means were vouchsafed; but of a probability and likelihood, according to an human view and judgment of things, that the miracles of Christ would have been more regarded by, and would have had a greater influence upon, the inhabitants of *Tyre, Sidon* and *Sodom*, had they been wrought among them, than the inhabitants of those cities where they were performed: however, this, I think, may be fairly inferred from them, that God vouchsafes the means of grace sometimes to persons, who are not only unworthy of them, but to whom they are of no effect; when he denies them to others, who are no more unworthy of them, and who, in all probability, would shew a greater regard unto them. Now, as his with-holding them from the one, and giving them to the other, must spring alone from his sovereign pleasure, it shews, that it is not his will that every individual of human nature should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth, and therefore must  
lie

## *The Cause of God and Truth.* 339

he strongly against the universal scheme; It is, moreover, said<sup>b</sup>, That "in favour of these false interpretations, we add, that it would be an act of cruelty in God to have denied them those means, which he foresaw would have produced in them repentance unto salvation." Now it should be observed, that this is said not in favour of our interpretations, which this author says are false; but upon the false *hypothesis*<sup>i</sup> of our opponents. We do not say, that God foresaw that those means which he denied them would, had he granted them, have produced in them repentance unto salvation; or that God is cruel, when he denies the means of grace to some, and gives them to others; but this we say, and ask, upon the hypothesis of the *Arminians*, that if God foresaw those means would have produced in them repentance unto salvation, was it not cruel in him to deny them those means? This, I find, has been said, and asked by the *Contra-Remonstrants*; which, perhaps, our author refers to: their words are these<sup>k</sup>. "If this ought to be so taken, that God must be supposed to have certainly foreknown that these *Tyrians* would have truly and really converted themselves, if the

<sup>b</sup> *Whitby*, p. 547. Ed. 2. 524.

<sup>i</sup> *Vid.* Camero in loc.

<sup>k</sup> *Coll. Hag.* art. 3 & 4. p. 241.

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mighty works had been wrought among them, may it not be gathered from hence, that God is cruel and unmerciful, that he should with-hold from such, and would not give unto them the means necessary to that conversion, who would certainly have converted themselves? But how can this agree with their (the *Remonstrants*) opinion, who, in favour of it, produce those words of the *Apostle*, 1 Tim. ii. 4. *who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth*; especially when they say, that by the word *all*, every individual man, without exception, is to be understood? How could God will to save the *Tyrians*, from whom he with-held the means necessary to conversion, nor would he give them?" From whence it is manifest, that the *Arminians* ought not to be so forward with their charges of cruelty and unmercifulness against our scheme, on the account either of God's decrees before time, or of the methods of his grace in time, when their own scheme is not free from them. Upon the whole, it appears, that God gives and denies his grace, affords and with-holds the means of it, as he himself pleases; and as multitudes in all ages have been without the latter, there is much reason to believe they have been destitute of the former. I conclude, by observing what the Church of *England*, in her eighteenth Article, says,  
which

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which our author was obliged to subscribe and swear to: " They also are to be had accursed that presume to say, that every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that law and light of nature ; for holy scripture doth set out unto us only the name of Jesus Christ, whereby men must be saved."

The Testimonies of the *antient writers* in favour of the *beathens*, cited by this author, and their judgment of their case, will be considered in the *Fourth* and *Last* part of this work ; in which will be given the sense of the said writers before *Austin*, upon the points of Election, Redemption, efficacious Grace, Free-will, and the Final Perseverance of the saints.

*F I N I S.*



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
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Handwritten signature or initials, possibly "H. J. M.", written in a cursive style.

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HJM











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